Collective action in global governance : the case of the OECD development assistance committee by Owe, Masumi
  
 
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap  
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/67287  
 
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to 
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page. 
 
 
 
 
  
Collective Action in Global Governance 
: The Case of the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
 
 
 
 
 
by  
 
Masumi Owa 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Studies 
 
 
University of Warwick 
Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS) 
 
 
September 2014 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables…………………………………………………………………..                        i 
List of Figures………………………………………………………………… iii 
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………… iv 
Declaration……………………………………………………………………. vi 
Summary……………………………………………………………………… vii 
List of Abbreviations………………………………………………………..... viii 
Introduction………………………………………………………………….. 1 
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………… 1 
2. Context……………………………………………………………………... 2 
3. Summary of existing literature…………………………………………….. 4 
4. Aims………………………………………………………………………... 7 
5. Methodology……………………………………………………………….. 10 
6. Structure of thesis………………………………………………………….. 14 
7. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………. 16 
Chapter 1: The DAC and the Global Aid Architecture………………….... 17 
1.1: Introduction………………………………………………………………. 17 
1.2: Origin and purposes…………………………………………………….... 18 
1.3: Members and their incentives……………………………………………. 26 
1.4: Operations………………………………………………………………... 35 
1.5: The DAC in a changing aid landscape………………………………….... 41 
1.6: Conclusion……………………………………………………………….. 57 
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework…………….... 59 
2.1: Introduction………………………………………………………………. 59 
2.2: Concept of collective action in global governance………………………. 60 
Concept of collective action ………………………………………………… 60 
Collective action in global governance…………………………………….. 63 
2.3: Collective action in the context of aid…………...………………………. 68 
2.4: Theoretical framework of collective action in the DAC…………………. 75 
Literature review………………………………………………………………. 75 
Indicators of and conditions for collective action in the DAC………….. 80 
2.5: Conclusion……………………………………………………………...... 83 
Chapter 3: Indicators of Collective Action in the DAC………………….... 85 
3.1: Introduction………………………………………………………………. 85 
3.2: Members and meetings…………………………………………………... 86 
Members………………………………………………………………………... 86 
Meetings………………………………………………………………………... 95 
3.3: Agreement ……………………………………………………………...... 100 
3.4: Implementation…………………………………………………………... 107 
3.5: Monitoring……………………………………………………………….. 111 
3.6: Conclusion……………………………………………………………….. 116 
Chapter 4: Conditions for Collective Action………………………………. 118 
4.1: Introduction………………………………………………………………. 118 
4.2: Secretariat………………………………………………………………... 119 
4.3: Delegate-headquarter relationship……………………………………….. 128 
4.4: Member-member relationships…………………………………………... 134 
4.5: Domestic environment…………………………………………………… 146 
Government Policy……………………………………………………………. 148 
Politicians…………………………………………………………………….... 151 
Bureaucrats…………………………………………………………………….. 154 
Civil society organisations…………………………………………………… 162 
Research community………………………………………………………….. 167 
4.6: Recipient country level…………………………………………………... 173 
4.7: Member/non-member relationships ……………………………………... 177 
4.8: Conclusion……………………………………………………………….. 182 
Chapter 5: Aid Untying……………………………………………………... 184 
5.1: Introduction………………………………………………………………. 184 
5.2: Overview…………………………………………………………………. 186 
What is aid tying?.................................................................................... 186 
Overview of progress of the DAC’s work on aid untying………………... 187 
5.3: Indicators of collective action……………………………………………. 193 
Members and meetings……………………………………………………….. 193 
Agreement……………………………………………………………………… 198 
Implementation………………………………………………………………… 204 
Monitoring……………………………………………………………………... 212 
5.4: Conditions for collective action………………………………………….. 216 
Secretariat…………………………………………………………………….... 216 
Delegate-headquarter relationship…………………………………………. 219 
Member-member relationships……………………………………………… 220 
Domestic environment………………………………………………………... 230 
Member/non-member relationships……………………………………...…. 241 
5.5: Conclusion……………………………………………………………...... 246 
Chapter 6: Aid Effectiveness………………………………………………... 249 
6.1: Introduction………………………………………………………………. 249 
6.2: Overview…………………………………………………………………. 253 
The aid effectiveness debates………………………………………………… 253 
Overview of progress of the DAC’s work on aid effectiveness…………... 255 
6.3: Indicators of collective action……………………………………………. 257 
Members and meetings ………………………………………………………. 258 
Agreement……………………………………………………………………… 265 
Implementation ……………………………………………………………….. 275 
Monitoring……………………………………………………………………... 284 
6.4: Conditions for collective action………………………………………….. 287 
Secretariat…………………………………………………………………….... 287 
Delegate-headquarter relationship…………………………………………. 290 
Member-member relationships……………………………………………… 290 
Domestic environment ……………………………………………………….. 298 
Recipient country level……………………………………………………….. 303 
Member/ non-member relationships………………………………………... 310 
6.5: Conclusion……………………………………………………………...... 317 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………. 320 
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………… 320 
2. Summary of research………………………………………………............. 321 
3. Main findings………………………………………………………............. 322 
Indicators of collective action……………………………………………….. 323 
Conditions for collective action……………………………………………... 326 
4. Possible broader implications of the findings……………………………… 338 
5. Limitations of this thesis and future research……………………………… 341 
6. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………. 344 
Bibliography………………………………………………………………....... 351 
Annex A………………………………………………………………………. 384 
Annex B………………………………………………………………………. 389 
 
i 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1.1: 
 
Common objective, norms and value,  
standards and principles, and focus of the DAC…………………... 21 
Table 1.2: Work process of the DAC and its actors…………………………... 37 
Table 2.1: Categorisation of aid objectives of donors………………………… 69 
Table 2.2: Aid objective of selected donors…………………………………... 70 
Table 2.3: 
 
Possible hypothetical factors contributing for  
collective action in the DAC………………………………………. 82 
Table 3.1: Partnership with non-DAC actors…………………………………. 89 
Table 3.2: 
 
Top five countries for the number of registrations  
to OECD meetings in 2005 and 2012……………………………… 94 
Table 3.3: Types of policies agreed in the DAC………………………………. 102 
Table 4.1: 
 
Comparison of interest towards the DAC between  
the UK and Japan............................................................................... 
 
138 
Table 4.2: Comparison of domestic environment between the UK and Japan... 147 
Table 4.3: Comparison of CSOs aid community between the UK and Japan… 162 
Table 5.1: Efforts and attempts at aid untying in OECD……………………… 190 
Table 5.2: Types and levels of meetings on aid untying in OECD since 1960s. 194 
ii 
 
Table 5.3: Comparison between the DAC and ECA………………………….. 197 
Table 5.4: 
 
Top and bottom seven countries of bilateral untied ratio  
in 2000 and change of untied ratio 1999-2000 and 2000-2010……. 207 
Table 5.5: Domestic actors on aid untying policy in the UK and Japan……… 231 
Table 6.1: 
 
Indicators of collective action on aid effectiveness  
from Rome HLF to Busan HLF…………………………………… 256 
Table 6.2: 
 
Conditions for collective action on aid effectiveness  
from Rome HLF to Busan HLF…………………………………… 257 
Table 6.3: Meeting structure of the WP-EFF…………………………………. 260 
Table 6.4: Number of participants attending each HLF by categories………... 262 
Table 6.5: List of 14 CSOs participating in Paris HLF……………………….. 263 
Table 6.6: Progress on PD indicators between 2005 and 2010……………….. 277 
Table 6.7: Donors’ progress on PD indicators………………………………… 280 
Table 1: 
 
Balance between rationality and social norms  
for collective action at individual and member government level… 335 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1: Three domains of collective action in the context of aid………... 72 
Figure 3.1: Members of the OECD and the DAC…………………………… 88 
Figure 3.2: Trade-off between legitimacy and effectiveness………………… 90 
Figure 3.3: DAC members’ OECD budget contribution and  
voluntary contribution to DAC in 2011……………..................... 
 
93 
Figure 3.4: Structure of DAC meetings……………………………………... 97 
Figure 3.5: Comparison of policy processes between  
the OECD and the DAC………………………………..………... 
 
110 
Figure 4.1: Logic of collective action between  
headquarters (HQ) and delegation (Japan and UK)…………...… 129 
Figure 6.1: Actors and their positions on aid and  
development effectiveness at Busan……………………..………. 273 
Figure 6.2: Different ways in solving collective action problems…………... 274 
Figure 6.3: Layers of incentives for aid effectiveness at country level……… 309 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This thesis could not have been completed without continuous support and helpful 
advice from my supervisors Professor Peter Burnell and Professor Jan Aart Scholte. 
Their dedication, professionalism, warm-hearted and patient attitudes have always 
motivated me and helped me throughout my journey. Thank you very much. 
 
I am also deeply indebted to the extensive number of interviewees who gracefully 
offered their time and energy in sharing their opinions and ideas, inspiring me with 
useful advice and introducing me to future possible interviewees. I truly enjoyed the 
process of interviews and learned a lot from their perspectives. All their warm 
encouragements and kindness I have received helped me continue to write my thesis.  
 
I would like to thank the librarians at OECD Archives and Library who helped me with 
accessing necessary data and documents. I would also like to thank, for the research 
grant I have received form the Japan Foundation Endowment, which enabled me to 
conduct two research trips to Japan for the interviews. 
 
I have received so many warm supports, advice, and encouragements from many, 
among all, Dr. David Guttormsen, Dr. Soyeun Kim, Dr. Hiromi Kabashima, Professor 
v 
 
Howard White, Professor Motoki Takahashi and Professor Izumi Ohno. I also 
appreciate my friends at Warwick, Johanna Bergstrom, Sarah Goler and Carlos Zepeda, 
for their helpful support. 
 
As like many other PhD candidates, I have experienced some difficult time during my 
study. That experience may not have added value to the quality of my thesis, but 
changed the way I see my life, for a better one. Special thanks go to Mr. Harminder Basi 
who proofread my thesis and gave me confidence in my life.  
 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents who trusted me and provided 
enduring love from Japan. Thank you. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
Declaration 
 
This work is entirely conducted by the candidate. None of the work has been submitted 
for a degree at another University.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
Summary 
 
This thesis examines the achievements and limitation of collective action in the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). With particular focus on two specific issues of 
‘aid untying’ and ‘aid effectiveness’ between late 1990s and early 2010s, and two 
member countries namely the UK and Japan, the thesis first assesses the indicators 
(existence, forms and level) of collective action. It then explores the conditions (factors 
that account for the indicators) for collective action in the DAC. As literature on the 
OECD and the DAC is scarce, this thesis fills knowledge gaps by providing a detailed 
analysis of the DAC and offering insights into stronger global governance through the 
lens of collective action. 
 
Using primary evidence drawing on extensive interviews as well as OECD archival 
documents, the thesis advances four main findings. First, the DAC has achieved 
collective action only to some extent – it has successfully (if sometimes slowly) reached 
agreements, but implementation processes reveal more shortcomings. Second, 
successful agreement has resulted largely from leadership of the UK in the DAC 
together with work by the DAC Secretariat to build trust relationships as well as to 
nurture feelings of fairness among the members. The DAC’s limited membership and 
closed, homogenous nature encouraged this atmosphere. Third, DAC members’ 
motivations and incentives for collective action can be identified both at individual and 
institutional (government) levels, ranging between rationality and social/global norms, 
that are often intertwined and complex, making collective action challenging to 
understand. Fourth, the DAC is now in transition due to the rising influence of emerging 
countries and the growth of an additional locus of collective action at recipient country 
level. All this presents increasing challenges if the DAC is to maintain a reputation for 
collective action in the future. 
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Introduction 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This thesis on  Collective Action in Global Governance: the Case of the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) assesses the DAC’s record of achieving 
collective action and explores limitations and shortcomings in its collective action 
performance. The subject is topical and important. In 2011 when the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness was held at Busan, in his opening speech the OECD Secretary-General, 
Angel Gurría, addressed over 3,000 participants with the following: “While considerable 
progress has been made…we have fallen behind on our promises…We need a collective 
jolt and, most importantly, collective action” (Gurría, 2011). Referring to this, in closing 
a final plenary session of the Forum, Homi Kharas, a senior fellow at Brookings 
Institution, told the delegates that he hoped the forum had provided the ‘collective jolt’ 
back to them for their ‘collective action’ (Kharas, 2011a).  
 
Collective action at global level, be it multilateralism or international cooperation, has 
long been sought for but yet to be reached. How and why international institutions 
contribute to making effective global governance has long been a central concern of 
academic investigation (see Krasner, 1983; Martin & Simmons, 2001; Alexandroff, 
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2008; Hale, Held & Young, 2013). The aim of this thesis is to assess the forms and levels 
of collective action and to explore the conditions that promote or hinder collective action 
for global governance. In doing so, the thesis looks into one organisation – the DAC of 
the OECD. The OECD is an international policy think-tank that provides a forum for 
governments to work together by sharing experiences in order to solve common problems. 
The DAC has served as a forum for bilateral donors to coordinate their development aid 
policies ever since its establishment in 1961. Among the 250 OECD committees, the 
DAC is a special body due to its origin of pre-dating the OECD’s establishment, and also 
being the only committee with a Paris-based full-time chair.  
 
The following two sections summarise very briefly the context and existing literatures on 
the OECD and the DAC. This will serve to show there is a significant knowledge gap in 
the academic literature. A section on aims and methodology of this research and a final 
section offering a guide to the overall structure of this thesis complete the chapter. 
 
2. Context 
 
Over its 50-year history, the DAC has played a key role in promoting donors’ common aid 
efforts for sustainable development through coordinating bilateral donors’ aid policies. It 
has tried to increase donors’ aid volume to meet targets such as the pledge made by a 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution in 1970 that official development 
assistance (ODA) should increase to 0.7% of donor gross national product, and by 
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releasing DAC donors’ ODA records it pressures members to live up to their 
commitments. More recently, the DAC has been at the centre of a discourse on aid 
effectiveness, which resulted in an agreement in 2005, the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness. Over 100 countries and organisations drawn from the DAC and non-DAC 
actors such as civil society organisations (CSOs) and aid recipient countries have 
endorsed this document.1 The DAC has been a major forum for discussing and reaching 
agreement on development cooperation policies with a view to increasing the volume and 
improving the quality of donors’ aid provision. 
 
The DAC is known as a ‘rich donors’ club’, its membership being restricted to developed 
countries attaining a certain level of aid provision to developing countries. As of July 
2014, there are 29 member countries – a small number compared to other international 
organisations. However, in the last decade the DAC has begun to increase its membership 
and invite non-DAC actors to its meetings. The accession of five new members in 2013 
was unprecedented, as in the years from 2000 to 2013 the only new member was South 
Korea. Historically, the closed nature of the DAC has promoted frank discussions among 
the members, although this may change as the DAC shifts towards inclusiveness – a shift 
reflecting changes in the global economy that are seeing economic and financial power 
move from the West to the East, forcing the DAC to open up to others in order to retain its 
relevance as an aid organisation. In reality, however, the DAC has long faced problems of 
                                                         
1 In this thesis, the term ‘recipient country’ is used to mean  ‘aid-receiving country’  to distinguish it from 
‘emerging country’, although the term ‘partner country’ is often used instead in the policy arena to minimise 
political sensitivity. 
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achieving collective action, notwithstanding its successes, and these challenges are likely 
to increase as the membership develops and faces new and different challenges in the 
future.    
 
3. Summary of existing literature 
 
The DAC has received very little academic attention – something that is also true, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, of the OECD as a whole, particularly in comparison with some 
other international organisations such as the United Nations or the World Bank. This 
might be because the OECD is less well known, but also because of the nature of the 
OECD as an exclusive club of richer countries. Academic publications on the OECD 
have increased over recent years. For example, a book edited by Mahon and McBride 
(2008) examines different aspects and activities of the OECD through the lens of 
transnational networks, instead of conventional inter-governmental relationships. 
Another book, edited by Martens and Jakobi (2010), shows the ways in which the OECD 
influences member states. Woodward (2009) provides broad organisational knowledge as 
to how the OECD works and its role in global governance. Carroll and Kellow (2011) 
based on extensive interviews and archival research, offer comprehensive knowledge on 
the organisation’s history, structure and function.  
 
While these publications differ in the focus and the framework they used to analyse the 
OECD, they provide similar views on the OECD’s characteristics vis-à-vis other 
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international organisations: it is an organisation that generates ideas and knowledge based 
on soft enforcement mechanisms, and creates norms that are shared among like-minded 
members. Lacking funding tools, the OECD focuses on policy issues. The members are 
not legally obliged to comply with the agreed policies. However, because they are limited 
to fairly rich developed states, a majority of whom are European, they tend to be 
like-minded, and this makes it easier for norms to be shared.  
 
Nevertheless, as the Secretary-General of the OECD acknowledges, in his contribution to 
the journal Global Policy in a special section commemorating OECD’s 50-year 
anniversary, the centre of economic gravity in the world is now moving from West to East, 
and the OECD needs to become more inclusive (Gurría, 2011a). In fact reform has been 
happening since the early 1990s (Bourgon, 2009), but the OECD’s embedded club nature 
hinders real change (Clifton & Diaz-Fuentes, 2011). Indeed, some commentators are 
pessimistic about the future role of the OECD in global governance, as is the Dean of the 
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, who 
criticised the OECD for not playing its part and being close to becoming “a classic sunset 
organisation” (Mahbubani, 2012). In any case the OECD, like the DAC more particularly, 
has a past history of forming shared norms around the limited members, which is worth 
examining, even if the recent upsurge of emerging countries may challenge the role the 
OECD that can play in global governance in the future. 
 
 6  
As an OECD committee, the DAC now faces some similar challenges to the OECD as a 
whole. Literature on the DAC appeared in the 1960s when the DAC first came on the 
scene, and when foreign aid was a major component of the OECD’s overall terms of 
reference. The early literature focused on two main issues: how the DAC works as the 
only international forum to coordinate bilateral donors, and its role in increasing the 
common aid effort among western allies during the Cold War (e.g., Rubin, 1966; Esman 
& Cheever, 1967; Ohlin, 1968). However, since then the DAC has not attracted much 
academic research, apart from relatively recent, very few exceptions such as Masujima 
(2004), who examined how the good governance agenda came to be discussed in the 
DAC, and Eyben (2013), who examined how aid’s purpose was transformed in the DAC. 
In 2014, Gehart compared the OECD DAC and the World Bank in shaping the 
international aid effectiveness agenda, in a yet-to-be published doctoral thesis. Even so, 
more comprehensive literature on institutional and organisational aspects of the DAC is 
absent.  
 
In recent years, academic attention has shed light on the aid provision of non-DAC 
countries in the light of changes in the global economy, introduced as a 
counter-hegemonic power to DAC countries (Brautigam, 2009; Sörensen, 2010; Kim & 
Potter, 2012). Also, other types of actors than states have increased, such as CSOs and 
philanthropic bodies. Therefore, a global governance that accommodates these new and 
different kinds of actors and different levels of cooperation will be required, although it is 
not clear whether this means “hypercollective action” (Severino & Ray, 2010), “mixed 
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coalitions” (Savedoff, 2012), or some other innovations in collective action. In essence, 
multi-stakeholder forums to discuss and agree on aid policies are needed if the collective 
action problems that come with the inclusion of more and different kinds of actors are to 
be addressed, and if the DAC is to be able to continue to play a central role. However, 
although these comments apply to the current and future outlook for the DAC, there is 
still much to be gained by examining the DAC’s past to assess how successful it has been 
in terms of collective action up until now, and why it has not always been wholly 
successful even then. 
 
4. Aims  
 
The aims of this research are threefold. The first is to add value to the scholarly literature 
by filling knowledge gaps on the DAC. In spite of the DAC’s important contribution to 
reaching agreement on some influential aid policies including even the very definition of 
ODA, too little is known about how DAC policies came to be agreed, who was 
responsible for this, how the relevant actors interacted during the process of reaching 
agreement, and the measure of compliance thereafter. This thesis aims to help fill these 
gaps in academic knowledge, by highlighting the interactions among actors in the DAC. 
Indeed, as will be discussed in a later chapter, some of the DAC Secretariat staff and DAC 
member representatives said during interviews for this research that they did not 
understand how the DAC works until they started working in the organisation. My own 
experience working for the Japanese delegation to the OECD (DAC) in 2008-10 echoes 
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their comments. The nature of the DAC as a closed donors’ club reinforces the difficulty 
that outsiders have in understanding what is happening inside the institution.  
 
Second, the thesis aims to contribute to knowledge of global governance in respect of 
international aid, by utilising the concept of ‘collective action’. The term ‘collective 
action’ is now often used in policy research papers published by think-tanks that explore 
better global governance in development aid. Yet they do not provide definitions of the 
term or their reasons for employing it rather than other terms such as ‘cooperation’. In 
academic literature, the study of collective action originated from Mancur Olson’s theory 
in the 1960s (1965) and developed by different academic schools mainly focused on 
subnational levels, such as the management of common property resources by collective 
action among villagers or farmers (such as Hardin, 1982; Ostrom, 1998). Nevertheless, 
scholars have increasingly applied the logic of collective action to international levels as 
well (see Sandler, 2004; Maxwell, 2005; Acharya, 2014). The concept of global public 
goods was also developed by scholars (see Kaul et al., 1999a, 1999b, 2003) in close 
proximity to the purpose of achieving collective action. Drawing on theories about 
collective action, global public goods and the role of international organisations, this 
thesis will provide justifications for using the term ‘collective action’ when inquiring into 
aid and global governance. That is to say, the concept helps to make sense of the way the 
DAC operates and sheds light on why the DAC does not always work very well. 
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Third, the thesis aims to reflect the complex reality of the DAC in practice. While 
proposing an original theoretical framework to guide the analysis, it also aims to reveal 
the intricate incentives of the actors for collective action. For instance, the thesis aims to 
elucidate dilemmas faced by policy makers and practitioners, subtle relationships 
between the DAC Secretariat and its members as well as among the members themselves, 
and gaps between images of the DAC and its reality as perceived differently by different 
members and expert witnesses. These matters are difficult to understand by complete 
outsiders, who can only see outcomes in the sense of agreed policies. Heavily based on 
original findings from extensive primary new empirical research, the thesis potentially 
signals implications for policy practitioners in the donor countries and developing 
countries who wish to capitalise on the DAC in the future.  
 
The main research question of this thesis is: ‘To what extent is there collective action in 
the DAC and how do we explain it and the shortcomings?’ That is: ‘Why is there (not) 
collective action there?’ The DAC has long attempted to promote collective action by 
changing the donors’ behaviour towards common objectives in order to support 
sustainable development in developing countries. The concept of collective action and 
the understanding of collective action problems offer a way of making sense of the 
achievements and the limitations of the DAC. The theory guides us to identify the 
incentives that lie behind aid and how these incentives impact on the pursuit of collective 
action in search of enhanced aid quantity and quality, and on ways to avoid collective 
action problems.  
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In so doing, the thesis proposes indicators of and conditions for collective action. The 
indicators are drawn from policy processes, beginning with ‘members and meetings’, 
moving to ‘agreement’ process and then on to ‘implementation’ by the members, ending 
with ‘monitoring’ of members’ compliance. Examining the indicators provides answers 
to the research question, “To what extent is there collective action in the DAC?” Then, 
conditions for collective action are discussed in order to inquire into “Why is there (not) 
collective action?” This step is taken by using six actor-oriented conditions to examine 
relationships amongst actors in the DAC: namely, the Secretariat; delegate-headquarter 
relationships; member-member relationships; domestic environment; recipient country 
level; and member/non-member relationships.  
 
5. Methodology 
 
The methodology for the research is as follows. The empirical part of this research is 
based on extensive interviews, archival documents and academic literatures (Annex B 
contains the full list of the interviews). For the interviews, 84 conversations were 
conducted with Secretariat staff officials at the OECD and delegates of member 
governments, as well as other stakeholders both in the UK and Japan (politicians, 
government officials, researchers/consultants, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and business sector). Some persons were interviewed twice. A majority of informants 
were interviewed face-to-face in their own location, but some were conducted by skype 
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or telephone. The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured form with open-ended 
questions. They are qualitative research interviews with elites, drawing on their 
perspectives and perceptions on issues related to the DAC. Also, interviewees were 
varied in their relationship with the DAC and in their knowledge about the DAC, which 
makes semi-structured interviews appropriate. The time of each interview varied from 30 
minutes to 3 hours; on average they lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours. The interviews made 
with Japanese informants were conducted in Japanese and then translated into English by 
the writer. 
 
Fifteen interviews were conducted with DAC Secretariat officials, including the DAC 
chair and the two directors. Fourteen interviews were conducted with member delegates 
based in Paris, including the Japanese and UK ambassadors to the OECD. Thirty 
interviews were conducted with various stakeholders in Japan. Twenty interviews were 
conducted with similar stakeholders in the UK. In the UK it was more difficult to trace 
government officials who were involved in the DAC, because they move to new postings 
every 3-4 years; hence supplementary information was sought from interviews with 
academics and consultants whose involvement with the DAC spanned more years. In 
contrast, over a third of the interviews in Japan were with government officials – with a 
suitable emphasis given the major role of civil servants in Japan's relationship with the 
DAC. 
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The writer visited the OECD archive library three times – in 2011, 2012 and 2013 – 
during which extensive official OECD documents and data were consulted (see 
Bibliography). The types of documents and data range from records of high-level 
meetings to statistics on meeting registrations. They are used in this thesis to provide 
information as well as analysis of relations among actors and policy development in the 
DAC.  
 
The writer had an advantage in interviewing DAC officials and government officials, 
CSOs and researchers in Japan and the UK because of her previous job experience 
working for the Japanese Delegation to the OECD in charge of the DAC (2008 -2010) and 
for the Japanese Embassy in Uganda (2003-2006) as an advisor/researcher for the 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). The writer participated in DAC meetings 
in Paris on a daily basis, working to assist the Japanese DAC delegate, communicating 
with MoFA officials in Tokyo and with the DAC Secretariat. Therefore, the research 
benefits from an element of participant observation. 
 
The thesis includes two studies of collective action around specific aid issues: aid untying 
and aid effectiveness (chapters 5 and 6, respectively). They are chosen because: (1) 
high-level agreements were made on these issues, which is untypical of most of the issues 
discussed in the DAC; (2) as relatively recent issues, they offer greater chance of data 
availability; and (3) these issues are widely mentioned in the academic literature on aid, 
which means that detailed examination here may contribute to these ongoing debates. 
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Other issues were also considered at the beginning of this research but rejected in favour 
of the two that were chosen. For example, the DAC’s Shaping the 21st Century: The 
Contribution of Development Co-operation in 1996, which provided a foundation for the 
United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and in part was initiated by 
Japan, could have offered a good comparison to cases where the UK took the lead, but 
poses greater challenges in terms of accessing comparable amount of information and 
data.  
 
The decision to concentrate on the two issues mentioned above was accompanied by a 
decision to focus on two DAC member countries in particular, namely Japan and the UK. 
They are chosen because: (1) their interactions in world affairs and international 
institutions are different, which potentially makes for an interesting comparison; (2) 
academic literature comparing these two countries is rare, which allows the thesis to add 
to existing knowledge; and (3) data accessibility is comparable for the two countries. The 
two countries are both important players in international relations, though the ways in 
which they interact in the DAC are quite different: in general, the UK leads the agenda 
and discussions there, whereas Japan is usually one of the followers. Making comparison 
of these two members throughout the entire thesis, and especially in respect of the two 
case study issues, should help us understand the motives and incentives of members both 
in positive terms, such as what makes them lead and how they utilise the DAC, and in 
negative terms, such as obstacles that impede cooperation. As a basis of this comparative 
analysis, Annex A provides a summary of Japan and UK’s profile of OECD/DAC and aid 
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as well as existing literature with regard to the two countries’ aid and their role as donors. 
As shown in the brief summary of literature on both Japan and the UK’s aid, not much 
attempts to compare the two, which means this thesis makes a further contribution of 
knowledge. 
 
6. Structure of thesis 
 
There are six chapters in this thesis in addition to this Introduction and the Conclusion. 
The first chapter lays a foundation to understand how the DAC works and discusses its 
changing role in the global aid architecture. This includes the origin and purposes of the 
DAC, membership and incentives of the members to participate, operational aspects of 
the DAC, and the DAC’s role in relation to the OECD and wider aid architecture over the 
period. Chapter 2 makes a theoretical contribution, by reviewing existing literature on 
collective action and offering a rationale for researching the DAC through the lens of 
collective action. It links collective action theory and related concepts to global 
governance in the context of aid and the DAC specifically.  
 
Based on the framework offered in chapter 2, chapters 3 and 4 establish indicators of and 
conditions for collective action in the DAC. The aim of these chapters is to provide an 
overall assessment of the level of collective action, and conditions for collective action, 
based mainly on the interviews and archival materials. Chapter 3 is organised according 
to the aforementioned four indicators (members and meetings, agreement, 
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implementation, and monitoring). Similarly, chapter 4 is organised around the six 
actor-oriented conditions (Secretariat, delegate-headquarter relationships, 
member-member relationships, domestic environment, recipient country level, and 
member/non-member relationships).  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 are in-depth studies that examine the indicators and conditions in more 
detail in relation to the two previously named issues. Chapter 5 investigates aid untying, 
in regard to which a DAC Recommendation was agreed in 2001. Although this issue was 
first raised in the DAC much earlier, from the early 1960s, the chapter focuses on the 
period from the late 1990s, when intensive high level negotiations began. Chapter 6 
examines aid effectiveness, as reflected in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness with wider stakeholders beyond just DAC members. A comparison of the 
two cases will help us understand institutional evolution in the DAC, meaning a shift in 
the nature of collective action there along with changes in DAC members’ incentives and 
motivations for collective action. 
 
A concluding chapter integrates overall analysis of indicators of and conditions for 
collective action in the DAC in the light of the evidence surveyed in the main body of the 
thesis. It draws on comparison of the two cases of aid untying and aid effectiveness 
surveyed in association with the part played by the two contrasting actors, Japan and the 
UK. The chapter also raises some implications from studying collective action in the 
DAC for future global governance, most notably in regard to aid. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has framed the thesis by introducing the reasons for choosing the topic and 
offering a brief account of how it is approached. Contextual information and a comment 
on the existing literature have highlighted both the problems faced in the DAC and a 
knowledge gap in the academic literature. The central research question and aims of this 
research were explained. The methodology of how to achieve these aims was introduced 
together with justifications behind the choice of issue case studies and countries, namely 
Japan and the UK. The structure of the thesis has been summarised in order to assist the 
reader’s navigation.  
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Chapter 1: The DAC and the Global Aid Architecture 
 
 
1.1: Introduction 
 
As the previous chapter introduced contextual information and overall structure of the 
thesis, this chapter aims to set the general context for the thesis by introducing the basis 
of the DAC – how it was established with what purposes, who the members are and 
what their incentives are, how it works – and its evolution over time, while linking its 
activities to the global aid architecture. The chapter fills a gap in academic publications 
on the DAC which can be found either during the early period of the DAC in 1960s, 
when it received some attention, or in recent researches on the impact of emerging 
non-DAC. 
 
The first section discusses the DAC’s origins and purposes. Later sections detail the 
membership, criteria for accession, and how members perceive the DAC – how they 
view the benefits of membership – and the policy process in the DAC, as well as 
distinguishing characteristics relative to some other international organisations. The 
penultimate section describes the DAC’s evolution in relation to other actors in a 
changing global aid landscape. Although the DAC was originally set up to frame the 
global aid architecture, the changing external environment of the wider global political 
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economy has come to influence the DAC’s role in the global aid architecture, and now 
presents it with new challenges. 
 
1.2: Origin and purposes 
 
The DAC is a special committee of the OECD, as it is the oldest committee in that its 
forerunner group began before the OECD was formally set up. The establishment of the 
OECD and the DAC reflected the US’s strong interest in forming an alliance of the 
West to expand the liberal economic, free-market bloc against the East, during the Cold 
War. This origin to increase the ‘common aid effort’ amongst the West countries 
influenced the purpose of the DAC especially in forming the norms among the 
members.  
 
While the DAC was formally established in 1961 at the same time as the OECD, its 
origin dates back to 1959, when the Special Economic Committee of the Organisation 
for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) decided to establish an informal group of 
governments to discuss the contribution of funds to underdeveloped areas, as well as 
improve aid flows (Esman & Cheever, 1967, p.52). As a predecessor of the OECD, the 
OEEC was founded in 1948 in Paris to administer the Marshall Plan after World War II. 
Following the aforementioned decision by the OEEC, the Development Assistance 
Group (DAG) was established in January 1960 with the original eight member states of 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the UK, and the US plus the 
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Commission of the European Economic Community. Japan was immediately invited to 
join, and the Netherlands joined in July in 1960 (OECD, 2006, p.7). Therefore by the 
end of 1960 there were ten DAG members, and the DAC was established in 1961 by 
succeeding the DAG.  
 
Two background points are worth mentioning. First, the 1960s saw an increasing 
number of development agencies. After many new African nations gained independence 
during 1960, major donors set up agencies and ministries that specialised in foreign aid, 
such as the Ministry for Cooperation in France and West Germany, the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation 
Fund, and the Swedish Agency for International Assistance (Führer, 1994). The 
establishment of DAG (and the DAC later) was “part of an extraordinary upsurge of 
related institutional developments” (ibid, 1994, p.12) with a growing necessity to 
coordinate amongst donors. Also, there was increasing attention on development and 
poverty in order to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor nations. The 1960s 
were named the ‘United Nations Development Decade’. White argues that World War 
II blurred the distinction between national interests and common good because nation 
states fought for collective interests of “the Allies” (1974, p.199), and this also 
presumably facilitated rich nations’ willingness to support poor nations.  
 
Second, the OEEC and the Marshall Plan were politically important for the US as an 
economic bloc against communism during the Cold War, and a similar logic applied to 
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the founding of the DAG. The US had a strong interest in establishing a forum through 
which to persuade the wealthy industrial nations to share the international aid burden 
(Esman & Cheever, 1967, p.53). This owed to increasing dissatisfaction among the 
American public and Congress, dating from the Marshall Plan, and it became an issue in 
the 1960 presidential election campaign.
1
 The incoming Kennedy administration 
embarked on aid reform, resulting in the US Foreign Assistance Act (1961) and the 
establishment of USAID. That momentum in promoting foreign aid in US domestic 
politics also influenced its strong leadership in the OEEC as well as its initiative in 
establishing the DAG. The Soviet Union withdrew from the discussions to which it had 
been invited during the OEEC meeting, as it felt the US’s proposals threatened their 
independence and sovereignty, and Poland and Czechoslovakia followed suite (Esman 
& Cheever, 1967, pp.40-41). Also, politically neutral countries, such as Austria, 
Sweden and Switzerland, initially declined to join the DAC, although they were 
members of the OECD (White, 1974, p.216).  
 
The DAC’s purpose has been to coordinate aid among the members in order to increase 
both the volume and quality of aid. During the early days, the DAC was mainly focused 
on improving the aid volume, but then shifted more towards improving the aid quality. 
By looking at the purpose of the DAC, this section discusses how common objectives, 
                                                     
1
 The growing dissatisfaction with foreign assistance, highlighted by the 1958 novel by Eugene Burdick 
and William Lederer, The Ugly American, prompted Congress and the Eisenhower Administration to 
focus U.S. aid to developing nations 
(http://www.allgov.com/departments/independent-agencies/united-states-agency-for-international-develop
ment-usaid?agencyid=7290, accessed 1 Aug 2014). The Ugly American, a fictional book, illustrates 
Americans’ innate arrogance and their failure to understand the local culture in developing countries. 
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norms and values, standards and principles are understood in the DAC, because these 
are important factors that bind the behaviour of DAC members together for collective 
action.  
 
As shown in Table 1.1, the common objective of DAC members is to improve living 
standards of people in developing countries. This was set out in the Mandate of the 
DAC revised in 2010 “to promote development co-operation and other policies so as to 
contribute to sustainable development... improvement of living standards in developing 
countries, and to a future in which no country will depend on aid” (OECD Archives, 
2010). In order to achieve the common objective, the DAC sets out standards and 
principles in the form of recommendations, declarations or guidelines. While the 
standards and principles are decided, agreed and complied with by DAC members (i.e., 
donors), the target of the common objective is developing countries (i.e., aid recipients), 
who are not members of the DAC.  
 
Table 1.1: Common objective, norms and value, standards and principles, and focus of the DAC 
Common objective Improvement of the living standards in developing countries, as stipulated in 
the Mandate of the DAC 
Norms and values Liberalism, democracy, altruistic 
Standards and 
principles  
Agreed among the members in the forms of recommendations, declarations 
guidelines, based on evidence 
Focus in aid provision Grant (vs Loan), Untied aid (vs Tied aid), Africa or Low Income Countries (vs 
Asia or Middle Income Countries), Multilateral aid (vs Bilateral aid), 
Programme aid (vs Project aid), Budget support (vs Technical aid) 
Source: Author partly based on the OECD website 
(http://www.oecd.org/dac/thedevelopmentassistancecommitteesmandate.htm, accessed 1 Jul 2014) 
22 
 
Arguably the DAC’s norms have had a deep impact on members’ aid policies.  
Altruistic norm is embedded in the Resolution of the Common Aid Effort, agreed in 
1961. This recommends members to make their common objective to expand the 
aggregate volume of resources to the less-developed countries as well as their 
effectiveness (OECD, 2006). For the first few decades, the DAC’s focus on increasing 
aid volumes was preoccupied with setting the definition of official development 
assistance (ODA). One of the core tasks was to push the DAC donors to increase their 
aid to the target of 0.7% of members’ Gross National Income (GNI) that was agreed in a 
UN General Assembly Resolution in 1970. The DAC chair’s annual report has 
monitored the DAC donors’ performance in line with this ever since. 
 
The norms were reinforced by more detailed technical rules, such as the 
Recommendation on Financial Terms and Conditions (1965), adding to the concepts 
and definitions of aid agreed during the 1960s and 1970s. Two important issues were 
decided at that time: (1) ODA was defined as containing a grant element of at least 
25%
2
; and (2) the target set for the average grant element for each member increased 
from 84% in 1972 to 86% in 1978 (OECD, 2006). The 1965 Recommendation urged all 
members to increase the grant element, noting that some members already extended 
more than 70% of their total aid in the form of grants or grant-like contributions and 
                                                     
2
 The grant element is a measurement of the concessionality of a loan based on its interest rate, maturity 
and grace period. A higher percentage is more concessional. The grant element for grant aid, therefore, is 
100%.  
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urged others to follow (OECD, 1965, p.120). 
 
One of the problems built into the DAC philosophy is that ODA volume is calculated on 
net terms rather than gross; the loan repayment from recipient countries is deducted 
from the total ODA volume. This can be a real dilemma, because donors providing loan 
aid need to increase gross flows faster than the repayment flows in order not to prevent 
total loan amount becoming negative, even when effective loan projects may not be 
found (Carey, interview, 2012). According to a former Development Co-operation 
Directorate (DCD) director, this is why most DAC members stopped loan schemes, but 
he personally thinks defining ODA in gross terms may reflect the real level of burden 
sharing among donors (ibid). The way that ODA is calculated together with its 
definition has given an impression that grant aid is superior to loan aid. If we can call 
this a norm then it is not fully compatible with Japanese ODA, which is more 
experienced with loan aid especially in Asian region. As Carey says, the definition of 
ODA is an international political game, where power and interests are involved 
(interview, 2012), in which members make a calculation about who gains and who loses. 
In this regard, Japan is a loser. In 2011, the total recovered amount of Japanese bilateral 
loan aid from recipient countries was US$ 9,334 million, which exceeded the total 
amount of Japanese bilateral loan aid of US$ 7,614 million (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MoFA), 2012). Therefore, in net terms, Japan’s bilateral loan aid amount was negative.3  
 
                                                     
3
 Although when combined with grant aid, Japan was still the fifth largest donor in 2011. 
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DAC has originally placed importance on creating an agreed community of interest and 
purpose rather than applying pressure to “apparently laggard donors” (Little & Clifford, 
1965, p.270). And yet recognising that continuing differences among the members 
endanger the spirit of the common effort (OECD, 1965, p.117), DAC has tried to 
standardise the practices of its members. In fact, donors who had achieved more 
generous aid terms felt they were financing the repayment of aid loans from other 
donors whose aid terms were more strict (OECD, 1985). They viewed them as 
free-riders. As such, collective pressure from the governments who had made the most 
progress was a driving force that sustained and developed the norms and common 
objectives of the DAC. Over its history, DAC has tried to shift bilateral aid policies 
away from national interests towards the common objective. The “common aid effort” 
implies that development co-operation is a shared international responsibility whose 
embodiment is to be found in donor institutions, deriving from a principle of collective 
action (OECD, 1985, p.144).  
 
Although DAC norms are not formally specified in a single official document, they are 
spelled out in the Peer Review reference guide, to be applied equally to all members, 
respecting the specific context of each member (Jorgensen, interview, 2013). A 
distinguished Japanese academic perceives the DAC as “a shared cognitive model in 
which actors share same norms and values, especially pursuing one principle since the 
end of Cold War with a leadership of the UK” (Shimomura, interview, 2012). DAC has 
been dominated by European countries, and the policies discussed in the DAC are likely 
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to be shaped by members’ perceptions and values (Furukawa, interview with Japan 
International Cooperation Agency Research Institute (JICA-RI) official, 2012). 
Therefore, although the common objective of the DAC is to increase the welfare of 
developing countries, other values such as human rights or gender are also likely to be 
valued, gradually mainstreamed in the DAC (Ishize, interview with Japanese DAC 
delegate, 2011).  
 
However, this situation has changed recently with the rise of emerging countries, as the 
DAC has been increasingly perceived as “outdated” (Glennie, interview with Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) fellow, 2012), especially with a “fundamental limitation in 
its mentality” (Choi, interview with Korean DAC delegate, 2013). Consequently, the 
habit of Europeans in imposing their own principle values has been questioned 
(Yokobayashi, interview, 2011; Shimomura; Furukawa, interview 2012). When asked 
whether DAC norms would change, the head of peer review division said “When the 
world changes, norms are expected to be different, otherwise DAC would be obsolete” 
(Jorgensen, interview, 2013). As DAC has been offering a “de-facto global standard” 
ever since the 1960s (Shimomura, interview 2012), the question of how it can be 
changed is a crucial one especially for the traditional donors. Some argue that the 
DAC’s comparative advantage of technical capacity is global public goods that can be 
sustained in a donor forum (Evans; Christiansen, interview with former ODI director 
and fellow, 2012). Others call for a wider multilateral framework, including emerging 
countries, so that all are bound by universal compliance (Yamada, interview with 
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advocacy manager of Oxfam Japan, 2012). Araki, a long-serving Japanese journalist 
and influential commentator on international development, argues that the current DAC 
should be disbanded as a relic of world history (interview, 2012).  
 
To sum up, although the origin of the DAC was strongly influenced by the US, a 
common objective of the DAC as making a collective effort for the benefit of 
developing countries became an established altruistic norm, influencing DAC members’ 
aid provision. 
 
1.3: Members and their incentives 
 
As the success of collective action in the DAC depends on the membership and the 
members’ incentives to join, we need to know who the DAC members are and why they 
participate in it. 
 
Although there are 34 members in the OECD, the DAC has only 29 formal members. It 
has one of the smallest memberships among the international development 
organisations compared with the United Nations (UN) (193 member countries) or the 
World Bank (WB) (187 member countries). The 29 DAC members are Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the US 
and the EU, and those who joined after 1990s are Spain (1991), Luxemburg (1992), 
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Greece (1999), Korea (2010), Iceland (2013), Czech Republic (2013), Slovak Republic 
(2013), Poland (2013), and Slovenia (2013).  
 
The discrepancy between the number of members between the OECD and the DAC 
arises because a country must be rich enough to contribute to global development 
cooperation. The criteria of DAC membership are: (1) existence of appropriate strategy, 
policies and institutional framework; (2) accepted measure of effort (e.g., over 0.2% of 
ODA/GNI or ODA volume above USD 100 million); and (3) existence of a system of 
performance monitoring and evaluation (OECD Archives, 2011). OECD countries 
which do not meet these criteria are ineligible to be DAC members, although they are 
entitled to participate in all DAC meetings. Most other OECD committees’ 
memberships are open to all the OECD members. The DAC’s more restricted 
membership is a specific characteristic that has enabled it to function as a homogeneous 
donors club. As Japanese Ambassador to the OECD remarked; 
  
All the OECD members should be DAC members regardless of the level of aid 
provision. It took more than ten years for Korea to join the DAC after 
becoming an OECD member. The privileged mentality of the DAC that only 
those who are proper donors can be the DAC members needs to be 
reconsidered. (Yoshikawa, interview, 2013, italic by author) 
 
Moreover, because of the recent (2007 on) economic crisis in many of the OECD 
countries, the gap between the level of provision of the DAC members and non-DAC 
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members has narrowed. As a result, the DAC membership criteria are not now in line 
with today’s reality of the world (Ishize, interview with former Japanese DAC delegate, 
2011); and the DAC has recently increased its membership (discussed more in chapter 
3).  
 
Why members join the DAC is important, as it reflects the benefits the members hope to 
receive. DAC members value and benefit from the work of peer review and statistics. 
These are core activities identified during DAC’s reflection exercise undertaken in 2008 
in response to the OECD Council’s recommendation in the in-depth evaluation (OECD, 
2009). From the writer’s own interviews, Japanese and UK government officials have 
both referred to these activities as benefits of membership (such as UK government 
official, interview, 2012; Okano, interview, 2013); and outsiders have shared a similar 
impression (e.g., Addison, interview with deputy director of United Nations University, 
2012). The process in which peer review operates has not changed much since 1961; 
and the “Peer Review process is an original and interesting way to make collective 
action among the DAC donors, and the process has influenced donors’ behaviour”, says 
an ODI senior researcher (Hewitt, interview, 2012). This is because peer review offers 
learning opportunities, such as by pointing out the particularities of one’s own aid 
policies from a comparative perspective (Watanabe M., interview with MoFA official, 
2012). The review is also a good opportunity for member governments to publicise their 
weaknesses (Kanayama, interview with Ministry of Finance official, 2012).  
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DAC statistics have been the only source of ODA data for the last fifty years for the 
purpose of monitoring (Randel, interview with director of British NGO, 2012), thereby 
playing an important role in international aid (UK government official; Watanabe M., 
interview, 2012). The DAC publishes members’ ODA volume annually. These may 
then be covered in the members’ media, which member governments see as good 
pressure to increase ODA volumes (Watanabe M., interview, 2012).  
 
Also, members benefit from the DAC by sharing information and understanding about 
other members, as well as the international agenda (Watanabe S., interview, 2012). This 
too is a learning opportunity (Maxwell, interview, 2012). According to a UK 
government official, the DAC offers a forum for ‘collective thinking’ for collective 
action through different kinds of guidance to improve the aid system; and the UK 
benefits from the DAC because it can utilise DAC guidance while at the same time 
contributing only a part of its finances (interview, 2012). UK and Danish DAC 
delegates shared the same view that if the DAC did not exist, then they would have 
created something similar anyway (UK government official; Neergaard, interview, 
2012). For a former US DAC delegate who works in the DAC Secretariat, the DAC is a 
place to talk about collective contribution to international development, offering an 
environment to gather ideas quickly (Dijkerman, interview, 2013).  
 
These are benefits of being a DAC member that can apply to all the members, whereas 
other reasons for joining the DAC can differ from country to country. In terms of their 
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national interest, DAC members can be categorised into three types. In the first category 
are the US and the UK, who value the DAC as a tool to exert influence towards other 
members. As noted previously, during its early days the DAC was led by a US initiative 
to get other countries to share the aid burden. However, when western DAC donors 
were experiencing aid fatigue during 1990s, Japan became the top donor and the US lost 
interest in multilateralism. Taniguchi (who served as the first Japanese deputy 
Secretary-General of OECD, between 1990 and 1997) criticises the US for exploiting 
international organisations for its own short-term interest, ignoring smaller countries’ 
positions, and then abandoning the OECD when it ceased being useful to the US (1999, 
p.43). In early 1990s the US dominated discussions and was contributing 25% of OECD 
budget, though later it proposed OECD budget cuts by 30% and withdrew from the 
OECD Development Centre (ibid, p.58).  
 
The change in US attitudes over time can be gauged by its relationship to the DAC chair. 
From 1961 it was a custom for the US to take the DAC chair and France as vice chair, 
but by the late 1990s the US decided to open the chair’s appointment. Since then, 
France (1999-2002) followed by the UK (2003-2007), Germany (2008-2010), the US 
(2010-2012) and Norway (2013-) have taken the DAC chair’s position. The US decision 
to give up the chair’s post in late 1990s was taken by the then USAID administrator, 
Brian Atwood, who served as DAC chair between 2010 and 2012. When asked if he 
faced difficulties within the US government, he answered;  
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The US was no longer the top donor during that time, so we could not justify (taking 
the chair’s position), and I did not even feel we had the right to remain. I rather 
thought the DAC would be strengthened once we shared it with others (interview, 
2012). 
 
The situation has changed again since, for the Obama administration has taken more 
interest in international organisations, after which Atwood was asked by the then US 
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton to advise on the possibilities for the US to take the 
lead on development. As a result, he was asked to stand for the DAC chair (ibid). 
Atwood’s chairmanship is reflected of the US government’s interest in the DAC 
(Dijkerman, interview with former US DAC delegate, 2013), which shows a clear 
contrast with the time when Atwood took his decision to abandon the US’s permanent 
chairmanship. 
 
The loss of political interest by the US in the DAC after late 1990s led to the UK taking 
the lead, especially in setting the agenda. This was also reflected by the UK assuming 
the DAC chairmanship, under Richard Manning. Although detailed analysis of the UK’s 
leadership will be discussed in later chapters, the UK sees the DAC as a tool to 
influence other donors, as revealed by a British academic: 
 
We do have a sense of doing things in European ways and the DAC represents 
northern European donors by and large. So, I think there is a sense in Britain 
that here’s something we can use for our own development objectives; we can 
punch above our weight in the DAC by trying to get our views across with any 
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other donors falling in our lines. I don’t think UK goes to the DAC thinking 
‘what can we learn from others?’, but it’s more about ‘how can people learn 
from us?’ as the UK sees itself as a lead donor. (White, 2012, interview) 
 
For the UK, DAC may also be a tool to increase its national value by being a world 
leader in the field of international development (Jin, interview with head of Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) UK office, 2012). The UK’s leadership is 
further discussed in chapter 5 and 6. 
 
In the second category of DAC members, small to medium sized European countries 
seek a place in international organisations to make their voice heard, especially on 
international development which is a major policy area for Scandinavian countries. As a 
Danish delegate says, multilateralism through international organisations is necessary 
for smaller countries to get together to be part of the larger international community 
(Neegaard, interview, 2012). As the Nordic countries share comparatively similar views 
on development, they form like-minded groups. The fact that a number of Nordic 
countries achieved the 0.7% ODA target also helps to position them in international 
society to boost their profile (Carey, interview with former DCD director, 2012). 
 
For the third category of DAC members, including Japan and Korea, reputational 
reasons are important when deciding to join. The DAC increases members’ 
international status (Okano, interview, 2012), and provides an opportunity to engage 
with Europe for ‘diplomacy in development’ (Furukawa, interview, 2012), which would 
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not have been available from outside the DAC. During early 1960s, the DAC was the 
only committee Japan participated in at the OECD as it was invited to the DAG from 
the very beginning; one of the purposes for joining the DAC was a stepping stone to 
Japan’s accession to the OECD, which was achieved in 1964 (Murata, 2000, p.14; 
Suzuki, 2005, p.62). The 1960s was a period of significant growth for Japan’s economy, 
and one of Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda’s aims was to gain accession to the OECD. On 
a visit to seven European countries in 1962 he explained that if Japan’s accession to 
OECD was not approved, while participating in the DAC, then this would undermine 
the dignity of Japanese nationals (Suzuki, 2005, p.65). An internal Japanese MoFA 
report also states that Japan needed to justify its accession to the OECD against most of 
the OECD members, who were not in favour of Japan’s accession at that time (apart 
from the US, West Germany and Canada). And Japan’s government did this by 
emphasising that increasing ODA volume and supporting less developed countries are 
also linked to commerce, finance and economic policies, and it would be unnatural if 
Japan participated only in the DAC (MoFA, 1962). 
 
The same MoFA report explains one of the benefits for Japan to become an OECD 
member, namely to gain international status as a free and advanced industrialised 
country, thereby dispelling an image of Japan as a mere middle-income country, 
especially in the area of economic diplomacy (MoFA, 1962). According to a Japanese 
ambassador to the OECD, joining international organisations was a political symbol of 
Japan’s recovery from World War II, through gaining international status, similar to 
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entering a prestigious university (Yoshikawa, interview, 2013). The value to Japan of 
gaining OECD membership has not changed over the last fifty years. As argued by 
Amiya-Nakata, the OECD is still treated by Japan’s government as an issue of status or 
power rather than policy, which is not dissimilar to the arguments made at the time of 
Japan’s accession to the OECD (2007, p.88).4  
 
DAC membership has been an asset for Japan, because the government cares about its 
image and recognition in the international society (Ishize, interview with DAC delegate, 
2011). Like Japan or Korea, who were latecomers to an international society already 
formed by the West, how they are perceived internationally matters a lot. As Ishize says, 
whereas some OECD countries like Mexico or Chile regard themselves as ‘developing 
countries’ in the UN, Korea’s recent accession to the DAC shows their willingness to be 
seen as a fully developed nation (interview, 2011). Also, DAC membership can 
distinguish Japan from countries like China by showing accountability and conformity 
to international norms (Hoshino, interview with former Japanese DAC delegate; 
Takahashi M., interview with Japanese academic, 2012). 
 
On the other hand, the ways that non-DAC donors are thought to perceive the DAC are 
somewhat different. There is less merit for China, whose economy is stronger than most 
of DAC members, to join the DAC where a majority comprises European countries 
                                                     
4
 Amiya-Nakata refers to MoFA’s Blue Paper on Foreign Relations 2004, in which then Japanese Deputy 
Secretary-General of OECD is introduced as representing an upgrade of Japan’s position in the 
international arena. 
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(Watanabe M., interview, 2012). According to a Mexican official, whose country is an 
OECD member but only a DAC observer, Mexico benefits from DAC’s technical 
support on statistics and learns from the international agenda, though there exists the 
large difference of the obligation and responsibility between Mexico and DAC members 
(Bracho, interview, 2011).  
 
This section noted that the criteria for DAC accession are more restricted than for the 
OECD, and hence the DAC has fewer members. This restricted membership now looks 
outdated, in a changing world. There are some benefits common to all members, such as 
peer review, and in addition there are a variety of different incentives or interests 
particular to specific categories of member or individual member. 
 
1.4: Operations 
 
How does the DAC operate as an international organisation? This section introduces the 
overall policy and some of the DAC’s distinguishing characteristics vis-a-vis other 
international organisations. 
 
As a committee of the OECD, the DAC’s governance mechanism follows that of the 
OECD. The OECD is an international organisation which provides a forum in which 
governments can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to common 
problems. The OECD analyses and compares data to predict future trends, sets 
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international standards, and recommends policies to the member countries. Throughout 
these activities, collective action is required among member countries, from the level of 
day-to-day information sharing to negotiating towards agreement. 
 
Table 1.2 shows the process of policy making in the DAC, including the division of 
work among the actors. The overall work plan and its budget are decided every two 
years through the process of the OECD Program of Work and Budget, which is 
approved by the Council.
5
 Based on a two-year plan, the Secretariat prepares policy 
documents by collecting data for analysis. The Secretariat and the chair are involved in 
the preparation of the meetings, where agreements are made, though once the policies 
are agreed upon the members are responsible for implementing them. The policies are 
scrutinised through peer review every four to five years. Members are monitored on 
their compliance based on the statistics that the Secretariat collects and the peer reviews, 
which are publicised.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5
 The council is attended by ambassadors of delegations; therefore, it is the highest-level meeting except 
for the annual Ministerial Council Meeting. 
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Table 1.2: Work process of the DAC and its actors 
Phase Process Secretariat  Chair Members  
Preparation 
 
Data Collection     
Analysis     
Agenda setting       
Agreement  
 
Discussion      
Decision      
Implementation  Implementation     
Monitoring Peer Reviews       
Source: Author 
 
The DAC’s work focuses on knowledge production based on evidence and data 
collection, knowledge diffusion through the process of discussion, consultation and 
agreement. The same is true for other committees in OECD (Mahon & McBride, 2008; 
Woodward, 2009; Martens & Jakobi, 2010). Knowledge production in the DAC 
contributes to forming the future direction of global aid, as Porter & Webb note,  
 
[T]he knowledge produced in these networks is not just a summation of data and 
lessons from the past, but also a guide to future directions in the reproduction and 
development of the practices that shape an increasingly harmonised global 
political and economic system. (2008, p.43) 
 
Its influential role in knowledge production makes the DAC attractive to its members. 
They do not want to be left behind. Because knowledge can be powerful, people who 
attend DAC meetings try to diffuse this knowledge to their own countries. As 
Woodward points out, “Knowledge translates into power when officials return to 
national capitals because they have superior information to prevail over colleagues 
38 
factoring alternative approaches and can frame policies in a manner intelligible to their 
political taskmasters” (2009, p.67). The fact that the OECD had long served as a rich 
countries’ club, with exclusive membership and closed meetings, presumably enhanced 
its power of the knowledge.  
 
In comparison to other organisations, the work of the DAC can be described as informal. 
This informality dates from the early days of the DAG, which was intended to be “an 
informal group of governments” (Esman & Cheever, 1967, p.52). Furthermore, the 
structure of the meetings (especially in the subsidiary body meetings where 
development specialists gather, exchange ideas and learn from each other) creates a 
conducive informal environment. The arrangement of meetings attended by DAC 
delegates also increases feelings of closeness among the DAC community in Paris more 
than with their colleagues at headquarters. The personnel who attend different DAC 
meetings are skilful and creative experts who are highly respected in their chosen fields; 
they have knowledge that outsiders lack, and examine policy problems with their peers 
(Woodward, 2009). The restricted and relatively homogeneous membership also allows 
members to speak freely. As a result, the loose and permissive institutional structure of 
the DAC facilitates the emergence of compatible policies and coordinated action, 
through the interplay of national interests, while protecting all parties’ freedom (Esman 
& Cheever, 1967, p.326). According to a Japanese DAC delegate who also worked for 
its UN delegation, people talk freely in OECD depending on the substance of the 
discussions, which is different from the UN where political groupings often define what 
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people are prepared to say (Ishize, interview, 2011).  
 
One of the key characteristics of the DAC is that, unlike such international 
organisations as the WB, it lacks a financial funding mechanism and does not have a 
presence (i.e., country offices) on the ground. Yet precisely because of this it may also 
be able to garner a reputation for neutrality, unlike organisations (such as the WB) that 
attach conditionalities to their funding. Nevertheless, as the gap between DAC policies 
and the reality on the ground has increasingly been pointed out, the lack of presence on 
the ground weakens its capacity to formulate relevant and useful policies (such as 
Watanabe M.; Hattori, interview with Japan’s government officials, 2012). When the 
writer was working as an advisor in the Japanese Delegation to the OECD attending 
DAC meetings in late 2000s, she often heard people saying ironically that the DAC is a 
forum in which armchair theories are discussed among diplomats who do not have 
on-the-ground experience in developing countries. This applies not only to the DAC 
delegates but also to the Secretariat to some extent. Because of this, a British academic 
who previously attended DAC subsidiary body meetings describes the DAC as a 
“symbolic theatre” (Eyben, interview, 2012). 
 
With regard to compliance mechanisms, decisions taken by the DAC are not 
legally-binding. Unlike the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WB for example, 
“the OECD lacks the power to enforce compliance with its decisions” (Mahon & 
McBride, 2008, p.3). However, according to several DAC Secretariat officials and 
40 
member delegates, if DAC agreements were made legally enforceable then fewer 
agreements and a longer agreement process can be foreseen (such as Watanabe S.; Nicol, 
interview, 2012). In fact, many interviewees (including DAC Secretariat) think the 
current level of enforcement is appropriate, as hard enforcement mechanism is not 
realistic; and peer pressure works well in the OECD (e.g., Ward, interview with DAC 
Secretariat, 2012). Therefore, getting the right balance between encouraging donors and 
making them agree and implement is the key, rather than pushing the donors all the time 
(Hynes, interview, 2013). 
 
There are different types of policies and obligations that the members should respect. 
First, members are obliged to report their own ODA statistics according to rules and 
guidelines decided in the DAC. Known as DAC’s Creditor Reporting System, data on 
ODA statistics is one of the core activities of the DAC. It is one of few reliable 
international sources of ODA statistics commonly used by the wider communities of 
development cooperation. Second, members are obliged to allow their ODA policies to 
be peer reviewed. The peer review is to follow up and monitor the activities and policies 
of member countries through examination by a specialist group consisting of the DAC 
Secretariat and reviewers from two other member countries, every four years. The 
resultant recommendation is not legally binding, though a major aim of the DAC is to 
change members’ attitudes through peer review. Third, there are recommendations, 
declarations, guidelines and references over specific issues agreed by the members. 
Examples are the DAC Recommendation on Untying Official Development Assistance 
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to the Least Developed Countries (OECD, 2008), and the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (OECD, 2005). These agreed policies are often included in the check list 
of peer review. 
 
Apart from the soft enforcement mechanism through peer review, do other factors 
influence compliance? For most members, international reputation or credibility matters. 
As one DAC delegate says, “If you live up to the DAC norms you’ll get strong 
credibility within the DAC” (Neergaard, interview, 2012). Non-compliance jeopardises 
a member country’s credibility within the DAC. More recently, as the power of pressure 
by civil society organisations (CSOs) has increased, a ‘naming and shaming’ culture has 
become more important for members considering whether or not to comply with agreed 
policies.  
 
This section has shown that the operation of the DAC has both advantages and 
disadvantages relative to other organisations. The knowledge-based policy focus of the 
DAC sits alongside having no financial instrument or presence on the ground. In theory 
having only a soft enforcement mechanism means compliance could be difficult to 
achieve, but a stronger enforcement mechanism would probably reduce the chances of 
agreements being reached.  
 
1.5: The DAC in a changing aid landscape 
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So far, this chapter has discussed the origin, purposes, membership and operations of 
the DAC. This section turns to the DAC’s influence over the global aid architecture, 
which has always had to deal with non-members such as aid receiving countries or other 
international organisations but now faces a growing challenge from the increasing aid 
impact of emerging countries, with consequences for the global aid architecture. 
 
Before the DAC was established, there was a struggle in the UN system between 
developing and developed countries over control of aid. One example is a proposal to 
create a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development, through which 
bilateral grants and concessional loans could be managed. Although the proposal was 
repeatedly presented by developing countries throughout the 1950s, with strong 
disagreement by the developed countries who were to provide aid,
6
 the proposal 
resulted in (1) the creation of the UN Special Fund agreed in 1957 which was later 
transformed into the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and (2) 
establishment of the International Development Association (IDA) as a subsidiary of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in 1959 (Little & 
Clifford, 1965; Browne 1990). 
 
A crucial issue is the controlling power over funding. As donors provide the funds, they 
want to determine how funds are used. However, recipients also want to influence the 
way aid is used in their country as much as possible. The conflict was intensified with 
                                                     
6
 Esman and Cheever note that a significant disagreement occurred between the developed countries of 
the US and the UK on the one side, and India, Chile and Brazil on the other on this issue (1967, p.30). 
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the increase in newly independent African countries, whose leaders were sensitive about 
forming relationships with the developed countries. The United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), under which aid and trade issues are discussed, 
made several (unsuccessful) attempts to wrest control of aid policy from the DAC 
(Hjertholm & White, 2000, p.84). The DAC created international norms such as the 
definition and concessionality of ODA, which made the DAC influential in forming the 
international aid regime. But this was not without experiencing opposition from 
developing countries. The conflicts eased especially after recipient countries started to 
accumulate high national debt, which arguably weakened their negotiating power 
against donor countries.  
 
Shaping the 21
st
 Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation (hereafter 
referred to as Shaping the 21
st
 Century) adopted in 1996 at the DAC High Level 
Meeting (HLM) illustrates both the DAC’s influence over the global aid architecture 
and its limitations (OECD, 1996a). The 1990s was a period when aid volumes declined, 
as donors experienced aid fatigue, following the end of the Cold War. The DAC came 
up with a strategy to reverse the decline (Fraser & Whitfield, 2009, p.77) and 
“regalvanize” donor interest in aid (Riddell, 2007, p.41).  
 
Shaping the 21
st
 Century is widely recognised as “one of the most important roles that 
the DAC played in global aid architecture” (Jolly, interview with British academic, 
2012); and the 1990s when the DAC produced this report was the “heyday of the DAC” 
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(Hewitt, interview with ODI senior researcher, 2012). The report is a good example of 
collective action among the DAC members; and it also influenced the wider aid 
architecture. Its significance is twofold. First, the document was the first time that 
donors agreed on targets, which later led to the UN Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) (Lancaster, 2007, p.55; Riddell, 2007, p.41; Jolly, interview with British 
academic, 2012). By locking down the purpose of aid as ‘development’, MDGs has 
changed international aid architecture completely from that of the Cold War era 
(Christiansen, interview with former ODI Fellow, 2012). Second, the document helped 
shape the discourse on aid effectiveness (discussed in chapter 6) in that it proposed 
recasting the aid relationship as a partnership between donors and recipient government 
(Fraser & Whitfield, 2009, p.77). It used words and phrases which were to shape the 
language and rhetoric of the aid donors for the new century (Riddell, 2007, p.41). 
 
The idea of setting targets (which then turned into the MDGs) originated from Japan: in 
the words of a former DAC chair “Japan played a substantial role in the discussion of 
setting the targets” (Atwood, 2012a, p.3). A former Ambassador to OECD, Norio 
Hattori who was a deputy Director-General of Economic Cooperation Bureau of 
Japanese MoFA at that time, took the initiative (Carey, interview with a former director 
of DCD, 2012).
7
 As Hattori recalls;  
 
                                                     
7
 The same was also mentioned by Richard Carey at the occasion of his retirement speech as a director of 
DCD at OECD in March 2010 in which the writer was present.  
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I thought it was important to measure the result of our ODA in order to be 
accountable towards our taxpayers and recipient countries. So, I started gathering 
indicators in 1995 and then I thought these should be accepted internationally as 
well (interview, 2012).  
 
This coincided with the time when the then DCD director thought a new business plan 
for the DAC was necessary and started talking with DAC members (Nicol, interview 
with DAC Secretariat, 2012). Around the same time, Development Partnerships in the 
New Global Context was adopted at the HLM on 3-4 May 1995. At the HLM, it was 
also decided that a Groupe de Reflexion be set up to review the future of development 
aid and the role of the DAC, proposed by the Presidency of the EU, France (OECD 
Archives, 1995). The Group consisting of Japan, the US, France, Netherlands, Sweden, 
and Spain met many times over a year before producing its outcome document: Shaping 
the 21
st
 Century. At the opening of the 1996 HLM that accepted the document, the 
OECD Secretary General remarked that we often hear of ‘aid fatigue’, which makes the 
DAC Reflection Exercise timely and important (OECD Archives, 1996). Interestingly, 
many of the DAC members were initially negative about the report: the UK was 
sceptical about the chances of achieving a consensus acceptable to the DAC as a whole; 
the US was sceptical about agreeing on something coherent and politically meaningful; 
Germany doubted the process could produce results (OECD Archives, 1996). 
Notwithstanding these initial reservations, when the members approved the report their 
comments were very positive, as the US delegate Brian Atwood (who later became 
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DAC chair) said, “it could be the most significant statement on development 
co-operation since the report of the Brandt Commission” (OECD Archives, 1996, p.7). 
 
In explaining this successful example of collective action, the commitment of the 
members has to be mentioned. As Brian Atwood reflected, “there are many fathers and 
mothers of the report” (interview, 2012). In turn, Jean-Michel Severino, who was also in 
the Groupe de Reflexion representing French government, commended Atwood’s 
contribution to proposing the set of indicators (2011, p.124). Severino contributed to 
introducing a partnership component, which lead to the aid effectiveness agenda that 
emerged later (Carey, interview with former director of DCD, 2012). Some of the 
‘fathers’ include Hattori, who exceptionally for a Japanese MoFA official took the 
initiative, and James Michel who was a DAC chair, calling the targets set in the report 
as “inspirational” (OECD, 2011, p.32). ‘Mother’ is a reference to Clare Short, who had 
come in as head of the UK’s newly born DFID after the report was produced. She took 
the report to other international forums most notably at the UN, saying “Look, this is 
what all of us should be doing!” (Carey, interview, 2012). At a seminar organised by the 
OECD and London School of Economics, on the margins of the DAC HLM held in 
London in December 2012, Brian Atwood as DAC Chair mentioned the report in his 
opening remarks by revealing that Short (who was also attending the seminar) helped 
him (as then USAID administrator) persuade his colleagues in the US Treasury and 
State Department despite their reluctance to endorse it after it had been adopted in the 
DAC, by saying she would criticise the US publicly if they would not agree. As Atwood 
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summarised in the seminar, “The important lesson was that it was people who believed 
that we could change”(Atwood, 2012c). This collective self-belief was vital to 
achieving collective action.   
 
The report subsequently evolved into the MDGs, which shows how significant 
collective action achievements in the DAC can be. At the HLM when the report was 
adopted, it was already decided that monitoring for follow-up would be in cooperation 
with UNDP, WB and the IMF, while each DAC member country would follow their 
own publicity strategies at home (OECD Archives, 1996).
8
 Clare Short took a lead in 
dissemination by incorporating the report in a DFID White Paper and by making sure 
the report was mentioned at the G8 Birmingham (UK) Summit, both in 1998, “so, she 
deserves a lot of credit as one of the mothers” (Atwood, interview, 2012). The report 
was originally introduced by Richard Jolly, who formerly worked for the UN, to Clare 
Short (Short, interview, 2012; Manning, 2007, p554). Short remembers well when she 
first read the report and that it helped her as the new DFID Minister in shaping her 
thinking on development, and with the help of Britain’s ambassador to the UN, 
promoted the idea of addressing targets for poverty reduction at the UN (Short, 
interview, 2012). A reference to the report in the G8 Summit communique in 1998, 
which Short contributed, made it easier for the report to be adopted as MDGs (Atwood, 
interview, 2012).
9
 The targets were enshrined in DFID’s White Paper in 1997 (Black & 
                                                     
8
 After one year, a joint OECD/UN/WB seminar on indicators of development progress was held as a 
first step towards monitoring (OECD Archives, 1998). 
9
 The Communique says “We commit ourselves to a real and effective partnership in support of these 
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White, 2004; Wickstead, interview with former DFID official, 2012) and with DFID 
and Short championing the report the targets gained a foothold in the international 
community (Black & White, 2004).  
 
When the targets were brought to the UN, they were initially rejected by developing 
countries who disliked their association with ‘donors’. The initial reaction that “we do 
not want anything to do with OECD DAC” was tempered after Clare Short’s efforts to 
persuade them that the targets were built on different UN targets agreed in the past 
anyway (Short, interview, 2012). As she says, “It was quite funny that UN people were 
hostile to DAC figures while the DAC was respecting UN process by gathering their 
targets” (ibid). Although not well known, the whole process culminated in a report titled 
A Better World for All, published jointly by the OECD, WB, IMF and the UN in June 
2000 – a pre-version of the MDGs. However, when UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan 
launched the report in Geneva, it received criticism from non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), unhappy with the involvement of the international financial 
institutions (IFIs) (Carey, interview with director of DCD, 2012). Even at the 
Millennium Summit in New York in 2000 when the MDGs were adopted, the 
discontent felt by some developing countries that the targets represented an imposition 
by the DAC was still palpable (Black & White, 2004, p.6). This illustrates that moving 
from Shaping the 21st Century to UN adoption of the MDGs was not entirely 
                                                                                                                                                         
(African) countries' efforts to reform, to develop, and to reach the internationally agreed goals for 
economic and social development, as set out in the OECD's 21st Century Strategy” 
(http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1998birmingham/finalcom.htm).  
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straightforward because of various actors involved and could not have been achieved by 
the DAC alone. 
 
What does the whole process of Shaping the 21
st
 Century tell us? It was the first time 
that the DAC produced a document which had a big impact in changing the 
international aid architecture, as it led on to the UN MDGs. The targets in the report 
won unprecedented support and prominence (ibid, p.1). The report was an example of 
the DAC thinking ahead about a global vision on development, says a Portugal DAC 
Delegate who is also DAC vice chair (Fernandes, interview, 2011). It had a marvellous 
impact on shaping international debate – and a similar initiative is now needed (Nicol, 
interview with DAC Secretariat, 2012).  
 
However, it was only with the UN that the DAC’s targets became fully utilised, through 
the MDGs. Having noticed the low publicity in spite of the DAC’s contribution to 
MDGs, a former Japanese journalist thought the DAC could have advertised its 
contribution more (Sugishita, interview, 2012).
10
 There was a structural problem which 
prevented the DAC as a donors’ club from being perceived favourably by developing 
countries and NGOs. Therefore, the current post-MDGs framework intentionally tries to 
be more ‘inclusive’, without the label of ‘OECD’ (Okano, interview, 2012). At the 
present time the DAC has backed off from influencing the post-MDGs agenda, in order 
                                                     
10
 He published an article about Japan’s initiative in Shaping 21st Century in Gaiko Forum (Sugishita, 
1996). He is currently a president of Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development 
(FASID), a research and training organisation for international development established in 1990.  
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not attract a ‘neo-colonialist’ image (Rogerson, interview with ODI senior researcher, 
2012). Although White and Black (2004, p.6) argue that setting targets for developing 
countries by a group of developed countries (i.e., DAC) was “somewhat ironic”, when 
the report was adopted in 1996 it was thought to increase the level of ODA, by 
“capturing public attention and making clear to the taxpayers what we intend to 
achieve”, as John Vereker (Permanent Secretary of DFID attended the DAC HLM when 
Shaping 21
st
 Century was adopted) commented (OECD Archives, 1996, p.6). In other 
words, the report was also meant to increase public support in the donor countries.  
 
The limitation brought to light by Shaping the 21
st
 Century became more explicit 
subsequently as the global aid landscape started to change. The major reason for this 
change stems from the rise of emerging powers, most notably, China and India, and a 
shift of gravity in geopolitics from West to East in line with a shift in economic power. 
Two examples below illustrate how this has affected the DAC. The first example is 
represented by the outreach activity of OECD and its influence on the DAC. The second 
example deals with the DAC’s relationship with the UN under the aid effectiveness 
agenda. 
 
Outreach refers to the OECD as a whole, including the DAC. The OECD’s policy 
dialogue with the newly industrialised economies (NIES) such as South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Singapore started as early as 1989, and in 1990 a Centre for 
Co-operation with the European Economies in Transition was established to foster the 
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OECD’s relations with those countries (Taniguchi, 2001). These initiatives coincided 
with the end of Cold War. From 1996 a full-scale OECD initiative to increase the 
membership started under Canadian Secretary-General, Donald Johnston, and in 2002 a 
Working Group on Enlargement Strategy and Outreach was created, chaired by 
Japanese Ambassador to OECD, Noboru Seiichiro (Woodward, 2007, p.68-69). The 
Group produced a report titled A Strategy for Enlargement and Outreach, which was 
agreed at the OECD Council in 2004 known as ‘Noboru report’ (Noboru, 2004). This 
laid the ground in establishing two pillars of the OECD’s outreach activities: Enhanced 
Engagement and Enlargement. Enhanced Engagement, targeting Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia and South Africa as countries to which the OECD would intensively try to 
outreach, and under the Enlargement component Chile, Estonia, Israel, the Russian 
Federation and Slovenia were identified as countries with whom the OECD would open 
discussions on accession. Both were decided under OECD Council Resolution in 2007 
(OECD Archives, 2007). It is important to note that the current OECD 
Secretary-General, Angel Gurría, who was Mexico’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
became the first OECD Secretary-General from non-Western countries since June 2007, 
showed strong interest in expanding the OECD’s relations with others.11  
 
The increasing activities of reform at the OECD Council level also affected the work of 
the DAC. The aforementioned report A Strategy for Enlargement and Outreach asked 
                                                     
11
 The former OECD Secretary-Generals were from Denmark, Netherlands, France and Canada. (List of 
OECD Secretaries-General and Deputies since 1961, 
http://www.oecd.org/about/secretary-general/listofoecdsecretaries-generalanddeputiessince1961.htm, 
accessed 1 Jul 2014). 
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OECD committees to develop a pro-active outreach strategy to invite non-members in 
the work of the committee and its subsidiary bodies (OECD Archives, 2005). In 2005, 
the DAC formulated a DAC Outreach Strategy for the first time, which defines its 
relationship with non-DAC members (donors or recipients), international organisations, 
and non-governmental stakeholders. The Strategy was revised in 2008, and in 2011 with 
a new name of DAC Global Relation Strategy. 
 
The OECD-wide outreach activities gradually brought out an issue related to the 
peculiarity of the DAC. While the OECD’s outreach is focused on ‘emerging countries’, 
the DAC is the only committee whose outreach activities include ‘recipient countries’ 
that are the centre of the DAC’s work. This structural difference between the DAC and 
other OECD committees created a discrepancy in what they understand as outreach. In 
May 2012, at the OECD’s 50 years’ anniversary of Council Meeting at Ministerial 
Level, a document titled OECD Strategy on Development (hereafter referred to as 
Development Strategy) was adopted. The document was a follow-up from the previous 
year’s Council Meeting at Ministerial Level, where a Framework for an OECD Strategy 
on Development was adopted.  
 
An issue that arose during the process of formulating the Development Strategy was 
that whereas the DAC (Secretariat and members) perceives it as being for developing or 
recipient countries, the OECD sees it as being for emerging countries. The boundary 
between developing countries and emerging countries was intentionally blurred in the 
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Strategy to accommodate this difference, because “it was a diplomatically compromised 
document”, according to a DAC Secretariat who was involved in the process 
(Dijkerman, interview, 2013). This is why the Strategy was seen by some people to 
have mixed up low income countries and middle income countries, although the two 
groups must be different (Miyamoto, interview with DAC Secretariat, 2012). A OECD 
deputy Secretary-General who led the process said the most difficult partners for him 
during the process were DAC members, because some members – notably Nordic 
countries – did not really understand that the traditional style of DAC’s discussions are 
now old-fashioned; For instance, DAC members were not satisfied with the exclusion of 
the term ‘Low Income Countries’ from the Strategy (Tamaki, interview, 2013). Okano 
points out that it was misleading to name the document ‘Development Strategy’, as it 
implies that DAC would play a core role, but in reality the core content is to achieve 
global growth (interview with Japanese DAC delegate (DAC vice-chair), 2013).  
 
The Strategy also put the DAC in a situation where it needs to take care of its own 
survival in the OECD. As the OECD’s relationship with emerging countries has become 
increasingly important, and some Low Income Countries started to graduate into Middle 
Income status, there is recognition within the OECD that the DAC should be reformed. 
In other words, DAC needs to take a much wider perspective on development, rather 
than being busy in playing with technical jargons on aid (Tamaki, interview with deputy 
Secretary-General of OECD, 2013). Tamaki cautions that the DAC is now behind the 
times. This was echoed by a former British Ambassador to the OECD who pointed out 
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that the DAC is based on an aid relationship between donors and the recipients which is 
now old-fashioned (Martin, interview, 2012). Furthermore, he revealed that some DAC 
members were blocking sensible proposals for DAC reform, and this would undermine 
the DAC’s relevance in the wider architecture. Similar resistance to reform was 
experienced at the OECD level as well. According to a former Canadian Ambassador to 
OECD, the concerns shown by smaller European members, who value the 
‘like-mindedness’ of the OECD more than strengthening relations with non-likeminded 
major developing countries, was making OECD enlargement activities difficult 
(Bourgon, 2009, p.17), because some European countries may not see power-sharing 
with newcomers as being in their interest (Clifton & Diaz-Fuentes, 2011, p.301). 
Nevertheless, as the Secretary-General does not want the OECD to be seen as ‘rich 
man’s club’ (Nicol, interview with DAC Secretariat, 2013), the likeminded nature of the 
OECD and the DAC are likely to be eroded by reform process anyway. 
 
An important question which can be drawn from the OECD’s experience on 
Development Strategy is “for whom does the OECD work?” The DAC is peculiar in 
that it coordinates donors’ policies that are then implemented in and by recipient 
countries. However, the core message of the Development Strategy is that OECD 
committees will work collectively to provide knowledge to the non-member countries 
based on OECD members’ experiences. In reality, rather than the OECD approaching 
non-member countries, these countries will decide by themselves whether the OECD 
offers something useful to them (Tamaki; Dijkerman, interview, 2013). The underlying 
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awareness is that the concept of ‘donor’ has disappeared, along with the distinction 
between the North and the South. The problems faced by the developed and developing 
countries are becoming more similar; for instance, problems of inequality and gender 
are found in developed countries too (Tamaki, interview, 2013). This however implies 
two things. First, if the knowledge and policies that the OECD offers are based solely 
on OECD members’ own experience, these are likely to be more suitable for Middle 
Income Countries than Low Income Countries. Second, as far as the OECD’s outreach 
activities are focused on comparatively developed countries the DAC’s role will provide 
only limited knowledge, unlike other committees that accumulate knowledge on 
sectoral policies of OECD member countries. The added value provided by the DAC 
comes into question (Tamaki, interview, 2013).  
 
While the DAC has been urged to reform from within the OECD, there has also been an 
external jolt from its relationship with the UN. This is a second reason why the DAC is 
now being affected by changes in the global aid landscape. The growing pressure from 
emerging countries reduces the DAC’s position in the global aid architecture, as 
mentioned by many informants. The DAC’s role is constrained by its limited 
membership while the world of development cooperation is diversifying and 
fragmenting (Rogerson, interview, 2012). Hence, as a former director of ODI said, “the 
DAC is thrown around in a washing machine with a changing geopolitics, and it needs 
to settle somewhere” (Evans, interview, 2012).  
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The tug of war between the DAC and the UN emerged after 2008, when the UN created 
a biennial, high-level United Nations Development Cooperation Forum (UNDCF) in 
which emerging countries and recipient countries also participate in reviewing trends 
and progress in international development. As both developed and developing countries 
are represented in the UNDCF, some commentators are now more critical of the DAC 
(for example Tandon, 2008; Glennie, 2011). After the Busan High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness in 2011, the DAC’s hosting and Secretariat role on this issue moved to a 
new structure called Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, where 
the role of Secretariat is shared between the DAC and UNDP and the number of DAC 
members’ participation is limited to just a few. So, the Busan High Level Forum is seen 
as “a closure of an old chapter and the Global Partnership opened a new chapter” 
(Rogerson, interview, 2012). 
 
Yet, the challenge for international aid remains. Since “the current aid landscape has a 
problem of too many actors and massive proliferation” (Short, interview, 2012), a better 
way of achieving collective action needs to be found: “we still need some kind of 
universality” (Yamada, interview with Oxfam Japan advocacy manager, 2012) in 
governing the global aid architecture. What is the DAC’s role in the new order? As 
ODI’s director said, “the DAC cannot be a convenor of collective action” in global aid 
architecture, with its limited membership, and yet, “if you add more actors you will get 
collective action nightmare” (Evans, interview, 2012). Therefore, “the DAC is in the 
fight of its life, trying to find its niche” (ibid). It is important for the DAC to capitalise 
57 
on its successes in respect of collective action in the past and use the experience to 
benefit its contribution to global aid governance in the future. 
 
To sum up, this section has described DAC’s relationship with some other actors, 
notably recipient countries and certain international organisations, as well its role within 
the OECD, in a changing aid landscape. In spite of its confrontations with recipient 
countries notably through the UN, the DAC had more influence over the global aid 
architecture in the early days, compared to now. The experience of Shaping the 21
st
 
Century in the mid-1990s shows that it took the UN to build on the DAC’s work, and 
there are limits to what the DAC could achieve by itself. The rise of emerging countries 
is now impacting on the DAC’s role in the OECD. 
 
1.6: Conclusion 
 
This chapter laid out foundations for understanding the significance of what the DAC 
does or has done, and the importance of collective action to the DAC. The DAC’s 
objective of assisting developing countries to achieve sustainable development is well 
recognised among the members, and its norms have encouraged a degree of 
homogeneity among the members. The limited membership has reinforced this. 
Members perceive some common benefits but also have individual reasons for 
belonging to the DAC. 
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Being an inter-governmental organisation the DAC is a bureaucracy, though the 
atmosphere of the meetings may be ‘informal’. The DAC’s reliance on soft enforcement 
mechanisms such as through peer review limits its ability to secure members’ 
compliance with DAC policy initiatives, but stronger enforcement powers may have a 
negative effect on its ability to reach agreement. 
 
The DAC’s influence on the global aid architecture is waning compared to its early 
years when the world was more clearly divided into ‘developed’ (DAC) countries and 
‘developing’ (aid recipient) countries. The report Shaping the 21st Century is an 
example of collective action at work in the DAC, but UN agency was needed to take it 
further. In a sense, the early days of the UN’s attempts to wrest control from the DAC 
are now coming to fruition.   
 
Building on these foundations the rest of the thesis explores in closer detail whether, 
how and to what extent collective action can be found in the DAC. By examining the 
indicators of and conditions for collective action in the DAC (chapters 3 and 4) with 
specific references to aid untying and aid effectiveness (chapters 5 and 6), some 
implications may be drawn about the DAC’s ability to play a useful role in the future 
global aid architecture. But before turning to indicators of and conditions for collective 
action in any detail, the broader theoretical framework of the thesis must be shared, first, 
in chapter 2. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 
 
2.1: Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 introduced the foundations of what the DAC does and how, as well as its role 
in the global aid architecture. This chapter introduces a theoretical framework for the 
thesis through a critical review of the existing literature on collective action. Subsequent 
chapters examine how collective action has operated in the DAC.  
 
The main aim of this chapter is to examine the concept of collective action and its 
applicability to global governance, how the concept is related to the context of aid and, 
finally, to establish a framework to assess collective action in the DAC. In other words, 
the chapter considers collective action (problems) in theoretical literature and how these 
are relevant to the DAC.  
 
Section two will present how collective action problems are addressed in the general 
theoretical literature by summarising major arguments posed by the theory of collective 
action. It discusses how the concept of collective action is applied to global governance. 
As international society lacks a centralised supreme public authority comparable to the 
functions served by a state vis-à-vis a country, international institutions play a key role 
in coordinating policies among states and mitigating the risks of inter-state conflicts. 
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The section highlights relations between rational incentives and the provision of public 
goods. 
 
The third section reviews literature on collective action in the context of aid. Although 
limited, this literature trails some contested issues in regard to collective action. For 
example, the aid motivations of donors are not as simple as the idea of rationality 
explained in collective action theory.  
 
The final section outlines a theoretical framework for analysing collective action in 
relation to the DAC specifically. The proposed indicators will help in assessing the level 
of collective action in the DAC; and the proposed conditions introduce reasons to 
explain successful and unsuccessful collective action. This original framework guides 
the more empirical chapters that follow in later chapters.  
 
2.2: Concept of collective action in global governance 
 
This section introduces the general concept of collective action, starting by introducing 
the core argument of Mancur Olson’s collective action theory followed by critiques. It 
goes on to apply the concept of collective action to global governance. 
 
Concept of collective action  
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Collective action can be defined as measures that are taken jointly by a group of actors 
who share common objectives. Olson’s Logic of Collective Action (1971) begins by 
explaining the paradoxical aspect of group organisation: based on an assumption that 
rational individuals try to maximize their self-interest, individuals will either not be able 
to advance the common or group interest, or will not advance it adequately. This core 
argument has been challenged by many scholars from different academic disciplines. A 
contested issue surrounds how to explain the relationship between the behaviour of 
individuals in a group and the group outcome. Collective action problems are defined as 
situations where individual actors in a group choose actions that produce outcomes that 
are less desirable for the group as a whole (Gibson et al., 2005, p. 15). The theory 
highlights the dilemma presented at the boundary between the spheres of private 
individuality and public collectiveness. 
 
The outcome products of collective action are referred to as public goods; individuals 
act collectively in order to provide public goods. Pure public goods share two 
characteristics: non-exclusion (i.e., no one can be excluded from benefiting from the 
goods) and non-rivalry (i.e., consumption of the goods by one person does not affect the 
consumption by others). Few goods can be purely public or purely private, so many 
goods are categorised as impure public goods, sharing at least one of the two 
characteristics of pure public goods. Since pure public goods do not exclude anyone 
from consuming, some people may take advantage of this and not contribute to the 
provision of public goods while consuming them; this is known as a ‘free-rider 
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problem’.  
 
Olson’s theory “challenged a cherished foundation of modern democratic thought that 
groups would tend to form and take collective action whenever members jointly 
benefitted” (Ostrom, 2000, p.137). However, many critics reject Olson’s basic 
assumption that individuals are self-interested rational actors based on material interest. 
Instead they emphasise the importance of social norms such as reciprocity, reputation, 
trust and identity, which can promote cooperative behaviour (Wendt, 1994; Ostrom, 
1998; Kahan, 2003; Bowles & Gintis, 2009). Individuals interact with each other 
through social norms (Ostrom, 2000). In a multi-disciplinary review of collective action 
literature scholars found that cooperation occurs more than rational theorists expect, 
because of the influence of social norms such as trust and belief (Gillinson, 2004). 
Furthermore, during the 1960s and 1970s theorists presumed that individuals could not 
solve collective action problems by themselves, meaning centralized government is 
necessary to offer solutions (Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1968). However, more recent 
theoretical and empirical research shows that individuals are capable of crafting 
solutions to their own diverse problems of collective action (Gibson et al., 2005, p. 16). 
 
The concept of collective action has been focused on individual behaviour in a group or 
local/national community, but the next section applies it to collective action within a 
wider context of global governance. But before doing this, it is worth comparing the 
idea of collective action with ideas of cooperation, collaboration and coordination, 
                                                             
 
63 
 
which are sometimes used almost interchangeably in international relations literature. In 
reality cooperation and collaboration are often treated as synonyms to refer to a process 
where actors work towards agreeing on common objectives, whereas coordination is a 
process whereby actors work towards sharing information about the means to achieve 
already agreed-upon objectives. According to Martin (1992), actors often face a 
dilemma of cooperation and collaboration and can have strong incentives to defect. This 
can look rather similar to the collective action problem. However, in respect of 
coordination, actors try to negotiate between two (or possibly more) possible 
equilibrium outcomes, and once agreement is reached there is no incentive to defect. 
Woods (2011, p.116) explains the difference between the two in the context of aid: 
while cooperation and collaboration involve pooling of things like funds, information 
and expertise, coordination is about organising activities harmoniously so as not to 
threaten one another. Chandy and Kharas (2011, p.741) advances this concept in that 
cooperation in international development is a global public good whereas coordination 
is more straightforward goal. In sum, cooperation and collaboration involve diverse 
interests and values, and require more effort to put into practice than coordination. 
 
Collective action in global governance 
How can the concept of collective action at an individual level be applied to the global 
level? Messner et al. (2013) discuss that while there is evidence of human cooperation 
through the social norms (e.g., trust, communication, reputation, fairness, enforcement, 
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identity and reciprocity),
1
 international relations theories generally perceive the 
interactions of people, organisations and states as power games based on self-interest. 
Nevertheless, human cooperative behaviour can “trickle up” to larger and more complex 
forms at global level, as the social norms are “scale-free properties” (ibid, p.23). Also, 
Barrett’s observation suggests that the ability to overcome collective action problems at 
the individual level might be replicated at the global level too, although the different 
circumstances at the global level should be taken into consideration, too (2002, p.51)  
 
Three points can be pointed out about these different circumstances: actors, public 
goods, and institutions. First, while the focus of much early analysis of collective action 
was largely on the individual level (Olson, 1971; Hardin, 1982; Sandler, 1992), states 
are also regarded as actors who must engage in collective action in international society, 
because global challenges cannot be tackled by one state alone (Held, 2006; Sandler, 
2010). Traditionally, in the study of international relations states were the main actors 
and rationality was translated as the maximisation of national interests. When states 
pursue their own interest, conflicts are inevitable. Therefore, collective action is 
necessary to mitigate and resolve conflicts. However, as Putnam (1988) suggests in his 
famous logic of two-level game, states’ decisions at the international level are strongly 
influenced by domestic politics and actors. So, multiple domestic constituencies are 
involved in global collective action.  
                                                 
1
 Messner et al. name these as “cooperation hexagon” (2013, p.15). 
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In addition, as Cerny (1995, p.1) argues, globalisation has transformed the international 
system from a simple states-based system to one with plural and composite actors, 
which has significant consequences for the logic of collective action, rendering it more 
complicated and multi-layered. For instance, civil societies or their networks can be 
identified as actors of collective action in global politics (Carlsson, 2000; Glasbergen, 
2010), and such actors as regional trading blocs, charitable foundations and other 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been catalysts for international collective 
action (Sandler, 2010, p.40).  
 
Second, how can we translate the relationship between individual rationality and the 
public objective of collective action theory to the global level? At the global level, 
actors act collectively for the global interest; and the global interest can be understood 
as GPGs, sharing characteristics of either non-rivalry or non-excludability or both, and 
whose scope goes beyond the national level (Kaul et al., 1999a, 1999b, 2003). For 
instance, improving the global environment, peace or financial stability are all GPGs 
that benefit people at the transnational level. However, when states act rationally to 
maximise their national interest, the chances are that GPGs will be underprovided – 
which is the collective action problem at the global level.  
 
How can the rationality of states be understood here? States’ behaviour in international 
relations is not only determined by materialistic hard power (e.g., financial resources, 
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military means), but soft power also plays an important role. Nye says soft power is “the 
ability to shape the preferences of others”, and argues that setting the agenda and 
attracting others in world politics is as important as acquiring hard power (2005, p.5). 
Soft power can be attained through exercising leadership (Mazzucelli, 2009, p.312), and 
by using knowledge and ideas to influence policies (King & McGrath, 2004; Jones et al., 
2013). Here, non-state actors such as the research community may be instrumental 
(Stone, 2001). Actors’ decision-making behaviour is also influenced and framed by 
social norms such as reputation, identity, and belief, not only by materialistic or 
self-interested factors. Therefore, in international relations understanding collective 
action can be explained by the role of socialisation and normative considerations rather 
than hegemonic power alone (Acharya, 2014). 
 
However, the combination of two levels of domestic and international spheres and the 
involvement of different actors other than states makes it more difficult to identify and 
compare the incentives and motivations of all the participants. For there to be GPGs, 
states must contribute to collective action rather than always prioritise national interest, 
but at the domestic level, securing the national interest equates to providing national 
public goods. Also, as decision-making in international fora is often taken by 
individuals who represent governments, other factors than national interest may also 
affect their decisions, such as personal belief, identity in negotiation groups, or their 
relationships with other actors. This is why Messner et al. argue that more research is 
needed regarding the meso-dimension of global governance – “a point of confluence of 
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individual motivations, collective identities within the groups of international 
negotiations or within global policy networks, and larger societal interests” (2013, p.8). 
 
Third, international institutions can make a significant contribution to solving global 
collective action issues (Martin & Simmons, 2001; Boas & McNeill, 2004; Baylis & 
Smith, 2005; Karns & Mingst, 2010), even if “gridlock” that impedes global 
cooperation is part of present-day reality (Hale, Held & Young, 2013, p.3). Of course, as 
new sets of challenges emerge and nations become more divided, international 
institutions that had some success in the past may not be adequate for solving current 
problems (Goldin, 2013). Increase in actors at the global level is one complicating issue. 
Also, since global governance lacks a central governing authority comparable to the 
state within national boundaries, appropriate incentives to induce cooperative behaviour 
must be provided. Understanding how and when international institutions can change 
the behaviour of states is fundamental to our future success in supplying GPGs (Barrett, 
2007, p.21). 
 
This section has transferred the concept of collective action to world politics, which 
relates to how international governance arrangements can lead to the provision of GPGs 
through collective action that involves the behaviour of actors other than just states, 
such as the domestic actors who influence how states behave. International governance 
arrangements must respond to change in a globalising world if they are to provide GPGs 
for all, and that means ensuring that appropriate incentives to overcome collective 
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action problems are in place. 
 
2.3: Collective action in the context of aid 
 
This section transports the concept of collective action to the context of international 
aid.
2
 It shows how rationality and public goods are understood in the context of aid in 
association with collective action, before turning to some contested issues. 
 
How can the concept of rationality be understood in the aid context? If states are 
completely rational, and rationality is defined by self-interest alone, then aid might not 
exist at all or alternatively would have fewer objectives than the objectives presented in 
Table 2.1. The empirical question of whether aid is provided mainly on moral or ethical 
grounds or instead based on pursuing national material benefits is subject to debate 
(Lumsdaine, 1993; Burnell, 1997). But in principle, different objectives and 
combinations of objectives are possible (see Table 2.1, where the vertical criteria show 
the level of either donors’ interest or recipients’ need). The objectives and what lies 
behind them are relevant to explaining the presence and absence of collective action in 
the light of Olson’s theory of rationality and criticisms of that theory which emphasise 
                                                 
2
 The term aid is mainly meant to indicate Official Development Assistance (ODA), which the DAC 
defines as (a) undertaken by the official sector (b) with the promotion of economic development and 
welfare as the main objective, and (c) at concessional financial terms. The term aid is used interchangeably 
in literature with foreign aid, development aid or international aid (although references to development aid 
sometimes expressly contrast this with humanitarian assistance: both figure in foreign aid in the wider 
sense). 
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other motivations. Different aid objectives provide different incentives for collective 
action within the world of aid policy-making that, as Shimomura says, seeks an 
appropriate equilibrium between public goods and private goods (2011, p.40).  
 
Table 2.1: Categorisation of aid objectives of donors 
Criteria Aid 
objectives 
Content Example 
Donors’ 
interest 
basis 
(rational) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recipients’ 
needs 
basis 
(less 
rational) 
National 
interests 
(political ) 
・Domestic special interests 
・Diplomacy 
・National political and strategic 
interests 
・Historical ties 
・Allocation to post-colonial states 
・Politically strategic allocation 
based on reciprocity (e.g., UN 
vote) 
National 
interests 
(economic) 
・ Promoting donor country 
commercial interests  
・Securing natural resources 
・Tied aid to benefit economy of 
own country 
・Connecting aid to trade and 
investment of own country 
Global 
interests 
・GPGs 
・Addressing global issues 
・Promoting democracy 
・Mitigating conflicts and managing 
post-conflict transitions 
・ Vertical funds (e.g., Global 
Funds) 
 
Developmental 
effects 
・Assist recipients achieve their 
development (especially economic 
growth) 
・Improve lives of the poor 
・Majority of development aid  
Moral case ・Humanitarian 
・Help address emergency needs 
・Solidarity  
・Human rights  
・ Emergency assistance for 
short-term humanitarian aid  
・ Most aid which aims for 
improving welfare of the poor 
(i.e., development) 
Sources: Author with reference to Burnell (1997), Hopkins (2000), Lancaster (2007) and Riddell (2007). 
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While factors other than national interest can account for why states provide aid to other 
nations, the provision of morally motivated aid will probably depend on the nature of 
society, culture and values of a state as well as the citizens of that state. At the same 
time, rationality may not be measurable by one criterion alone. The moral case for aid 
could coincide with the national interest, just as aid based on the national interest of the 
donor might yield developmental effects for the recipient. Indeed, as Table 2.2 shows, 
the stated aid objectives of three selected donors (UK, US and Japan) all manifest 
national interests, but not to the exclusion of global interests, developmental effects and 
the moral case. Rationality understood in the context of aid is not straightforward. 
 
Table 2.2: Aid objective of selected donors 
Donors Objective 
UK (DFID) To help reduce the inequalities of opportunity we see around the world today. 
We believe that promoting global prosperity is both a moral duty and in our 
national interest. 
US (USAID) U.S. foreign assistance has always had the twofold purpose of furthering 
America's foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets 
while improving the lives of the citizens of the developing world. 
Japan (MoFA) To contribute to the peace and development of the international community and 
thereby to help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity. 
Source: DFID (2011), USAID website (http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/, Accessed: 20 May 2011), 
MoFA (2003) 
 
How does this relate to the concept of public goods? Aid can be understood as both 
public goods in the recipient countries and as GPGs. As official development assistance 
(ODA) comes from (or is backed by) tax revenues collected in developed countries, aid 
                                                             
 
71 
 
can be regarded as publicly funded from developed countries, and is supposed to be 
used for the public benefit in developing countries. Although the beneficiaries of aid 
projects within a recipient country may be narrowly targeted (e.g., the poorest), the aid 
can still be understood as public goods.
3
 Aid is also a global public good because it 
contributes to the well-being of the global community through such means as reducing 
communicable diseases, mitigating damaging climate change or addressing migration 
problems. Sometimes, aid to provide national public goods may ultimately contribute to 
GPGs as well. Aid can either contribute to national public goods in developing 
countries or towards GPGs, or possibly both.
4
  
 
This interpretation of public goods implies that collective action in the context of aid is 
mainly divided into two domains: collective action at the global level deals with aid 
policy; and at the level of the countries that receive aid collective action refers to 
implementation of the policy (by donors with or without full cooperation of recipients). 
In addition, as was discussed, collective action at the global level is influenced by 
domestic politics (i.e., two-level game concept). So, as Figure 2.1 shows, three domains 
of collective action are identified in the context of aid. At the global level, donor and 
recipient governments negotiate on aid policy, often taking place in international 
                                                 
3
 More precisely aid is an input to produce public goods. As the allocation of aid among recipient countries 
is decided by donors, aid is excludable and rivalrous in that respect and so may not count as public goods in 
this regard. 
4
 According to Sandler (1992, p.106), aid in general contributes to GPGs as it serves as an input which 
produces an output that is both nonexcludable and nonrival to all nations with an interest in the recipient’s 
well-being. 
                                                             
 
72 
 
organisations. These negotiations are influenced at the domestic level, and at both levels 
civil society organisations (CSOs) and researchers are becoming more engaged. At the 
implementation level, aid agencies and sectoral ministries together with CSOs deliver 
services to beneficiaries.  
 
Figure 2.1: Three domains of collective action in the context of aid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from international development cooperation octangle in Gibson et al. (2005, p.64). 
 
What are the main problems besetting collective action in the context of aid? First, how 
much aid should be offered, how much can be provided, and the gap between 
commitment and actual disbursement amounts have all been central issues in aid policy, 
as the level of aid provision has been always below a globally agreed target. The 0.7% 
target agreed in the 1970s at the UN General Assembly has not yet been achieved after 
40 years. The average DAC donors’ contribution of ODA was 0.31% of their GNI in 
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2009 (OECD, 2010c). A collective effort by all donors to achieve the common target is 
still needed. 
 
Second, coordination problems have been much discussed in the aid literature, and have 
a strong link to the quality of aid. A long-standing debate on aid effectiveness has 
focused on the necessity of better aid coordination and harmonization both among 
donors and between donors and recipients. An example of coordination problems besets 
humanitarian relief aid after natural disasters (Ramalingam & Barnett, 2010), where 
various types of donor (governments, non-governmental organisations and private 
companies) offer different kinds of help in different ways, sometimes overwhelming the 
host government’s capacity to coordinate and adding to the problems caused by the 
disaster. At present donors are paying the costs of aid coordination on behalf of recipient 
governments.
5
 One approach to better coordination is for donors to pool aid resources,
6
 
meaning their individual donors’ flags (and attention to donor interests) are supposed to 
be removed.  
 
Third, problems of core value – more particularly whose core value – are relevant to aid. 
While globalization unites societies through transborder interactions, it also highlights 
                                                 
5
 In aid receiving countries where the government’s leadership and capacity are strong, such as India, 
donors may not need to coordinate.  
6
 Or at the extreme case, budget support is a modality of aid in which donors’ financial aid is directly 
transferred to the national budget of recipient countries. As a result, traceability of spending of any 
individual donors’ aid becomes difficult. 
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differences in values, which continue to exist. Defining and agreeing on the core value 
of aid is made difficult by huge disparities in terms of economy, politics, society and 
culture between developed countries as donors and developing countries as recipients 
(disparities also exist within each category). In practice, donors’ policies have changed 
over time, as most donors came to believe in a single model of development based on a 
particular Western concept of liberal democracy influenced by international institutions 
(Hjertholm & White, 2000, p.80). Just as the emphasis moved from the role of the state 
to the role of the market in making development happen, so the aid focus has moved 
from national economic reconstruction after the World War II towards more local, 
community-based attempts to reduce poverty reduction, macroeconomic reform, and 
improving governance.  
 
Finally, the form of collective action in aid has also changed. Emerging donors such as 
China and India have been gradually bringing about change in the aid architecture.
7
 
Even though the exact amount of aid they are providing is not known (Manning, 2006), 
their impact on the ground has started to change aid relations between recipient 
countries and the more traditional (DAC) donors (Woods, 2008; Mold, 2009). The way 
they provide aid differs from the traditional arrangements and creates new options or 
                                                 
7
 The terminology of “emerging donors” is contested. “New donors” seems to be used interchangeably, 
though as Brautigam (2011) argues, China for instance considers itself to be a developing country and tries 
not to position itself as the leader of developing world. Smith et al. (2010) categorise “other countries 
providing development cooperation” into (a) emerging donors, (b) providers of south-south cooperation 
and (c) Arab donors. 
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more space for recipient countries. This, in turn, might be thought to increase the 
negotiation power that recipient countries have towards the traditional donors. The 
effect of new actors is generally seen as undermining the traditional donors’ collective 
efforts, especially in respect of coordinating and harmonizing their provision of aid with 
a view to reducing the transaction costs incurred by recipient governments (see 
Kragelund, 2008; Woods, 2008; Grimm et al., 2010). As the international architecture of 
aid undergoes more change, so the ways that collective action is organised will probably 
change too. Any up-to-date examination of collective action and its associated problems 
in the context of aid must take this into account. 
 
This section discussed how the concept of collective action can be applied to the context 
of aid. It underscored the complexity of donor rationality. Issues to do with coordination 
and core values are very real; and the structural transformation taking now place in the 
global economy and international system more generally is beginning to impact on the 
existing aid architecture.  
 
2.4: Theoretical framework of collective action in the DAC 
 
Literature review 
Existing literature relevant to investigating collective action at the DAC can be grouped 
into four different issues. The first group illustrates successful collective action. The 
second group represents a success though taking a long time before agreements were 
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reached. The third group explains unsuccessful cases of collective action. The fourth 
group exhibits changes in the structure of collective action. 
 
First, the DAC has successfully reached agreements and introduced norms that are now 
widely accepted or used, an example being the definition of ODA which was agreed in 
1969 and revised in 1972. The definition of ODA consists of three main characters: 
official flow; a main objective of promoting economic development and welfare of 
developing countries; and more than 25 % of concessionality. This definition has been 
adopted as a standard of measuring ODA by donors, and is used in academic studies. 
Even though the aid literature does not attribute this conception to collective action in 
the DAC, the fact that it has become a common standard and is so widely adopted in the 
literature suggests that it is a product of collective action in the DAC. The DAC has 
been successful in creating and protecting the definition of ODA (Woods, 2011, p.119).  
 
Another example, less well known but an influence on the UN Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), arises from the DAC’s strategic paper Shaping the 21st 
Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation (OECD, 1996a), which 
contains specific international goals to be achieved collectively. This paper laid out the 
foundation for the following policy shift towards aid partnership and ownership 
(Whitfield, 2009). More importantly, the MDGs adopted in 2000 incorporated core 
concepts from this DAC publication (Lancaster, 2007, p.55; Riddell, 2007, p.41, p.383). 
The DAC report, Shaping the 21st Century, highlighted the continuing gap between 
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grand intentions of donors and the reality of declining aid levels in the mid-1990s 
(Riddell, 2007, p.41), and is often mentioned as one of DAC’s contributions to wider 
debates on aid policies. 
 
In a second group of studies, there are policies which took DAC a long time to reach but 
a common position was adopted in the end, aid untying (see chapter 5) being a major 
example. This topic was discussed in the DAC ever since it was established but only 
after 40 years was the Recommendation on Untying ODA to Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) agreed by DAC, in 2001. The DAC discussions made a major contribution to 
raising awareness of the issue; as early as the mid-1960s “There is now much greater 
recognition of the problem than a year or two ago, and the DAC has made some 
progress” (Little & Clifford, 1965, p.270). Following the DAC’s ultimately successful 
initiative to agree on untying, the proportion of untied bilateral aid for LDCs increased 
from 54% to 93.5% during 2000s (OECD Archives, 2011b, p.8). The DAC’s role in 
bringing significant progress on untying bilateral aid is widely recognised (Martinussen 
& Pedersen, 2003, p.14; Riddell, 2007, p.99).  
 
In the third group of studies, an often discussed issue where the DAC has been much 
less successful in achieving collective action notwithstanding its efforts is aid 
coordination (examined in detail in chapter 6). Unlike the other issues mentioned so far, 
aid coordination has been discussed extensively among international organisations such 
as the World Bank (WB), as well as among scholars. This means the literature on aid 
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coordination does not necessarily correspond only to activities in the DAC. At the same 
time, it is also true that aid coordination is a core activity of the DAC; and more 
importantly, since 2005 when the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was agreed in 
the DAC, academic literature on aid coordination linked to the DAC activities has 
grown (such as Eyben, 2013). In the words of the current DAC chair (Atwood, 2011, 
p.23), the Paris Declaration now serves as norms to be used extensively and “helped to 
focus the divergent interests of different stakeholders on ambitious, quantifiable and 
action-oriented measures”. This is a success for collective action, but the success is only 
a partial or limited achievement. 
 
As scholars repeated point out, aid coordination has not yielded good results. In 1994, 
Cassen & Associates wrote, “Coordination has been the subject of lengthy deliberations 
in the OECD DAC over a number of years – deliberations which until recently 
produced a good deal of paper, but not much coordination” (p.184). More than a decade 
later, similar words were still being voiced; and implementing the aid coordination 
agreements reached in the Paris Declaration has been a very slow process (see chapter 
6). The DAC still looks unlikely to deliver substantial results in this area unless 
alternative ways are sought (Barder, 2009, Severino & Ray, 2010). 
 
The main reasons offered in the literature converge on the political economy of donors’ 
aid: donors have multiple objectives and are accountable to domestic constituencies (see 
for example Barder, 2009). Faust, Koch, & Leiderer (2011, p.1) too argue that because 
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of the different domestic concerns of the donors, there is no consensus on the hierarchy 
of potential conflicting goals to be pursued with specific aid instruments. Different tools 
for achieving coordination, such as budget support and division of labour exercises, 
have been unsuccessful (ibid; also Molenaers & Nijs, 2009). 
 
Reaching agreement on aid initiatives at the international level can look easier than 
forming consensus at the implementation level in recipient countries, especially as 
implementation involves several different levels and a variety of actors. Coordination at 
country level can be hampered by lack of coordination at headquarters level. Analyses 
of how aid coordination has operated on the ground have proliferated since the Paris 
Declaration (Fengler & Kharas, 2010; Grimm et al., 2010). They tend to agree that 
leadership and capacity shown by the developing countries is a critical influence. 
 
In the fourth group of studies, recent literature on aid coordination has turned to the 
changing aid architecture (i.e., increased role of non-DAC donors and therefore less 
dominance of DAC activities in overall aid architecture) (Grimm et al., 2010; Glennie & 
Rogerson, 2011; Kharas, Makino & Jung, 2011). This mattes for collective action in the 
DAC, as its collective efforts to coordinate aid within the DAC can be undermined 
unless other actors outside the DAC align their own aid with DAC norms and standards. 
Furthermore, DAC donors’ motivation for coordination is affected when they see the 
increasing influence of non-DAC donors on international aid undermining the benefits 
of their own attempts to coordinate. 
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Finally, the modest literature on collective action in aid offers little or no formal 
guidance on what in principle would constitute indicators (which in practice means 
evidence) of (successful) collective action and, conversely, of where attempts to secure 
collective action have failed. Similarly the literature offers only modest help with 
identifying what in principle are the conditions for collective action in respect of the 
DAC or aid, that is to say the factors, properties, circumstances or other variables that 
make collective action there more likely to take place and be successful, and whose 
absence would weaken or even prevent the possibility of successful collective action 
taking place. The next section seeks to remedy this deficiency, in order to take up a 
better position for assessing collective action in the DAC and explaining why the DAC 
has achieved some successes but also been inconsistent over time, especially in regard 
to the two important issues areas of aid untying and aid effectiveness. 
 
Indicators of and conditions for collective action in the DAC 
This section offers an original analytical framework for assessing and explaining 
collective action in the DAC. Four indicators are chosen to follow the policy process of 
the DAC, by profiling the number of members and meetings, the agreements reached, 
the record of implementation, and the monitoring of performance. The first of these 
indicators looks at when and why members joined the DAC and their reasons for doing 
so, and the type and frequency of DAC meetings, as well as attendance by members. 
The second indicator examines whether and how agreements are reached, and whether 
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clear outcomes are reached and the nature of the agreement, including the presence of 
shared understandings of what needs to be followed-up by members. The third indicator 
reviews the level of implementation, that is to say, whether members comply with the 
agreed policies and try to put them into practice. The fourth indicator investigates 
whether there is a monitoring mechanism and if it operates properly, the presumption 
being (as with the other indicators) that positive evidence is an indicator of collective 
action. 
 
After assessing the level of collective action in the DAC by using the four indicators, 
the thesis goes on to examine the conditions for successful (or conversely) unsuccessful 
collective action. Here, the theoretical framework takes an actor-centred approach, 
focusing on relations between actors in the DAC and their roles but with some reference 
to actors outside the DAC, who impinge on the DAC as well. This translates into:  
Secretariat, delegate-headquarter relationships, member-member relationships, domestic 
environment, recipient country level, and member/non-member relationships.  
 
Table 2.3 lists hypothetical factors possibly contribute for achieving successful 
collective action. These were used as the main issues to be explored during interviews 
in the field research conducted for this thesis. The list draws on the writer’s experience 
of working for the Japanese Delegation to OECD (DAC) and existing literature on 
collective action at the global level more generally. Among these, strong leadership is 
widely regarded as a condition for collective action (Sandler, 2004, p.7; Yoshimatsu, 
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2006, p.5), and capacity also matters in taking leadership (Acharya, 2014).
8
 Forming a 
small core group who agree on the need to persuade others to move forward can also 
help discussions move faster than otherwise (Sandler, 2004, p.10; Maxwell, 2005, 
p.416). One of the most important principles for effective collective action itemised by 
Maxwell dwells on trust-building measures starting from the outset of negotiations 
(2005, p.9), which is also noted by others (such as Messner et al., 2013, p.17). Other 
conditions in Table 2.3 concern the capacity of the Secretariat and the members’ interest 
and capacity.  
 
Table 2.3: Possible hypothetical factors contributing for collective action in the DAC 
 Strong leadership of members. (i.e., small number of members who have an influential voice leading 
to form an agreement) 
 Capacity of the secretariat to facilitate agreement among members. 
 High level of interest from HQ of the members and their capacity. 
 Existence of an informal environment to build trust relationship and converge on common views. 
Source: Author 
 
Olson’s theory also suggests that collective action is more likely in smaller groups 
compared to large groups, because the benefits to members individually are greater and 
their contribution easier to assess. In large groups more coercive mechanisms may be 
                                                 
8
 Acharya uses the term ‘capability’. 
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needed. Also, collective action is more likely in a homogeneous group. From this, it can 
be said that because the DAC is a donors’ club with a limited number of members it 
meets these preconditions that Olson’s reasoning suggests are favourable to collective 
action. But of course only an evidence-based account of the sort offered in this thesis 
will tell us whether or not the DAC has really delivered on its potential for collective 
action. 
 
2.5: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided a theoretical framework to assess the indicators of and 
conditions for collective action in the DAC. The core concept of collective action theory 
is the dilemma of individuals’ rational behaviours that do not yield optimum result as a 
group, because public goods would be underprovided. The importance and relevance of 
this for global governance is that when states try to maximise their national interest, 
collective action problems are less likely to be solved, meaning that GPGs – of which 
(good quality) aid can be said to be one, or at least is an instrument for achieving GPGs 
– will not be supplied.   
 
The DAC is a response to this situation, which makes it important to examine whether 
the DAC has shown itself to be capable of overcoming collective action problems in its 
own activities. The DAC has consistently tried to reduce the negative effects of 
attention by donors to their national interest and to increase their aid contributions and 
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aid quality, for the global good. If some donors are reluctant to provide more aid or 
improve its quality, then other donors may see this as ‘free-riding’, and be less inclined 
to provide more or better aid themselves. The thesis aims to show whether and how well 
the DAC overcomes these collective action problems.  
 
The chapter has noted that social norms as well as self-interest rationality count towards 
motivations for collective action, including at the global level. This is particularly 
relevant to an institution like the DAC, which is a policy think-tank rather than a forum 
for agreeing legally binding international treaties. That the DAC’s collective action 
takes place at three levels – OECD in Paris, members’ headquarters in the home country, 
and their engagement in recipient countries – raises the possibility that different 
incentives or motivations to collaborate for collective action might apply at the different 
levels, even in instances where the same actors are all working the same donor 
government.  
 
The framework to examine indicators of and conditions for collective action in the DAC, 
briefly introduced in this chapter, is further developed in chapters 3 and 4, respectively, 
and then applied systematically to the two case studies in chapters 5 and 6.  
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Chapter 3: Indicators of Collective Action in the DAC 
 
 
3.1: Introduction 
 
Based on the previous chapter that set out the conceptual framework, this and the 
following chapters address the indicators of and conditions for collective action in the 
DAC. In this chapter, the indicators of collective action are examined by discussing 
whether and to what extent the DAC exhibits collective action. In the beginning of each 
section, reasons for selecting the specific indicators are provided to justify the criteria 
for understanding the existence and level of collective action. It is also important to note 
that as the DAC is an international organisation with government members, accessible 
information is limited not only for official documents but also for informal 
communications which are not recorded. Therefore, this chapter also draws evidence 
from interviews with interviewees, many of whom have working experiences in the 
DAC. 
 
Four indicators (members and meetings; agreement; implementation; monitoring) are 
discussed in turn. The section on members and meetings explains the recent increase in 
DAC members as well as its changing composition, and how meetings are organised. In 
the section on agreement, the types of the DAC policies that were agreed as well as the 
processes by which members agree on policies are discussed. This is followed by a 
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section on implementation, where the level of implementation by members and how it 
can be identified are discussed. The section on monitoring shows how peer review is 
conducted to scrutinise members’ compliance. Agreement in the DAC and 
implementation by members are primary indicators of collective action, whereas the 
number of members and meetings as well as monitoring is supplementary but still 
significant. This is because implementation will not happen without agreement and 
without members’ implementation of the agreed policies. 
 
3.2: Members and meetings 
 
By choosing to become a member the DAC members signal their interest. The greater 
the number of members, the larger the potential scope of influence or impact the DAC 
can have. Also, the meetings structure of the DAC and the way the participant engage in 
them are further indicators of how collective action is organised there. Evidence of 
membership and meetings sets the scene for collective action. The first sub-section 
below offers an overview of OECD and DAC membership, the members’ level of 
attendance in meetings as well as their financial contributions. The second sub-section 
explores how meetings are structured. The section draws mainly on OECD and DAC 
official documents and public information supplemented by the writer’s interviews. 
 
Members 
The DAC has been functioning as a donors club since 1961, and it is one of a few 
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‘exclusive’ international organisations. However, with the OECD’s strategy to expand 
its membership, the number of countries formally joining the DAC has also 
dramatically increased recently. Five OECD countries out of 29 current DAC members 
gained accession in 2013. The director of DCD called 2013 an exceptional year, proving 
that the DAC is “a heterogeneous group that welcomes different development actors” 
(Lomøy, 2013). As shown in Figure 3.1, the underlined five countries who joined the 
DAC in 2013, and Korea who joined in 2010, are the only countries to have joined the 
DAC as full members since 2000.
1
 The DAC is the only committee in the OECD which 
sets out special criteria for its membership accession on its own, and this is why all 
DAC members except the European Commission (EC) are OECD members, whereas 
six other OECD members are not DAC members but simply observers, as shown in 
Figure 3.1.
2
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Before 2000, Greece joined the DAC in 1999. 
2
 The OECD members who are not the DAC members are entitled to participate in all the DAC meetings 
as observers (http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/49304654.pdf). 
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Figure 3.1: Members of the OECD and the DAC 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from OECD website (http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/, 
accessed 1 July 2014) 
 
Apart from the full members, DAC has six non-DAC partners as in Table 3.1. Bilateral 
providers can be categorised into donor countries and those who are regarded as both 
donor and recipient countries. When requested, DAC conducts special reviews of 
non-member countries, based on the norms and standards of the DAC, most often for 
countries which are candidates to become the members. As aid from emerging countries 
has increased and is becoming more influential, DAC has been inviting them, most 
notably China and India, to attend various meetings. One example is the China-DAC 
Study Group which was formed in 2009 to exchange information and views on 
development cooperation. As the growth of emerging countries in the global economy 
has come to challenge the leadership of the OECD, the OECD Ministerial Level 
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Council Meeting in 2007 decided to strengthen partnerships with five non-member 
countries (China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia), and the DAC also 
formulated its own outreach strategy, as was discussed in chapter 1. 
 
Table 3.1: Partnership with non-DAC actors 
Types Example of DAC activities 
Bilateral providers:  
Donor countries (OECD but non-DAC, 
Arab donors, EU but non-OECD) 
・Special reviews of aid systems upon request (Czech Republic in 
2007, Korea in 2008, Poland in 2010, Slovak Republic in 2011). 
・Policy dialogue with Arab donors. 
Bilateral providers:  
Donor and recipient countries (Major 
emerging economies, Other middle 
income countries) 
・China-DAC studies. 
・Support for south-south cooperation. 
International organisations ・Participation in the DAC meetings. 
Developing/recipient countries ・Participation in Working Party on Aid Effectiveness.  
・International Dialogue on Peace Building and State Building. 
Private sector ・Consultations and informal meetings. 
Private foundations ・Few opportunities for policy dialogue and joint actions at 
international level. 
Civil society organisations (CSOs) ・Establishment of Advisory Group and Aid Effectiveness (2007), 
which developed into Open Forum for CSO Development 
Effectiveness (2009).  
・Istanbul CSO Development Effectiveness Principles (2010).  
Source: Compiled by author based on OECD Archives (2011), OECD website (http://www.oecd.org/dac/, 
accessed 1 July 2014) 
 
What does the recent increase in formal DAC members as well as observers tell us 
90 
 
about collective action? As membership and participation increase, the DAC increases 
its legitimacy but at the risk of losing some of its effectiveness. Killen & Rogerson 
(2010, p.2) argue that two criteria of legitimacy and effectiveness are important in 
evaluating international institutions ability to provide better global governance for 
development. Based on these two criteria, Figure 3.2 shows that there could be a 
trade-off between legitimacy (i.e., inclusiveness) and effectiveness (i.e., speed of 
decision-making, level of agreement and compliance), and situates the United Nations 
(UN), the DAC and the High Level Forum (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness of the DAC in 
relation to this dilemma . 
 
Figure 3.2: Trade-off between legitimacy and effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author based on Killen & Rogerson (2010). 
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because the more the members increase, the less the ‘like-mindedness’ of the 
organisation and the greater the chance of experiencing conflicts of interest. On the 
other hand, although the DAC is generally well regarded for its effectiveness, its 
legitimacy is not so high – there is a legitimacy deficit. Yet, precisely because of the 
DAC’s limited membership, it has proven comparatively effective in decision-making, 
agreement and compliance (as will be shown later). The fact that the DAC has long 
been serving as a rich countries’ club with limited membership has increased the 
members’ like-mindedness and “the nature of honesty” in DAC (Watanabe M., 
interview with MoFA official, 2012).
3
 As will be discussed in chapter 6, the HLF on 
Aid Effectiveness increased participants beyond the formal DAC members: this should 
improve its legitimacy, but at the same time risk becoming less effective by going 
outside of the like-mindedness that formerly characterised its membership. 
 
One of the indicators to assess the members’ willingness to contribute to international 
organisations is the level of the members’ budget. In 2011, the OECD budget as a whole 
was EUR 342 million, consisted of Part I budget (proportional contributions by the 
members according to their size of economy) and Part II budget (voluntary contribution 
both from members and non-member participants according to their interests). Figure 
                                                 
3
 Although the DAC sees itself and is seen by others as having a like-mindedness common to all the 
members, the writer’s field work found out that some members think some are more like-minded than 
others depending on how tight and united the group is. Therefore, in this thesis, the term ‘like-minded’ 
can sometimes refer to the whole membership of the DAC and sometimes to a smaller number of donors 
who share a specific common objective or interest. 
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3.3 shows DAC members’ contributions to OECD Part I budget and Part II budget for 
voluntary contribution to DAC activities. The Part I budget contribution is automatically 
decided by the members’ Gross National Income (GNI). Consequently 35% of the total 
Part I budget is contributed by the US and Japan alone. However, the real interest of 
members is shown by the level of their contributions to the Part II budget, which is 
voluntary. In Figure 3.3, the voluntary contributions to the DAC activities are indicated 
by the dotted line: these are higher for mid-sized countries like Sweden (10.8%), 
Belgium (9.1%), UK (8.8%), Ireland (8.1%) and Australia (6.4%). The solid line shows 
countries that make higher contributors to the core budget of OECD, notably the US, 
Japan and Germany, according to the level of their GNI. Economically smaller 
European countries make a stronger voluntary contribution to the DAC. 
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Figure 3.3: DAC members’ OECD budget contribution and voluntary contribution to DAC in 2011 
Source: Compiled by author based on; OECD Archives (2011a); OECD Programme of Work and Budget 
Part I 2010-2011;http://www.oecd.org/about/budget/member-countries-budget-contributions.htm 
(Accessed: 20 September 2014) 
 
The number of meetings and delegate registrations by members is another indicator of 
collective action. Data for these can be extracted from OECD Event Management 
System, that is the online meeting registration system.
4
 Although most of the data are 
for OECD in general, four points can be drawn from the data.
5
 First, the number of 
OECD meetings and registered participants has increased dramatically over the last 
decade. The registered people were nearly doubled from 2005 to 2012 (95,892 
registrations in 2012); and the number of official OECD meetings increased by over ten 
times from 2000 to 2012 (2,043 meetings in 2012). Second, among the OECD members, 
                                                 
4
 Compiled from data accessed in January 2013 by author at OECD Library and Archives, Paris. 
5
 Similar data specific to the DAC is not available.  
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the larger economies who were larger contributors to the OECD core budget usually 
registered more officials at meetings, as shown by Table 3.2 below. France marked the 
highest for the two selected years, as the OECD is based in Paris; the US and Japan, the 
two largest core budget contributors, came next. 
 
Table 3.2: Top five countries for the number of registrations to OECD meetings in 2005 and 2012 
 2005 2012 
1 France (3,239) France (4,358) 
2 US (2,673) US (2,893) 
3 Japan (2,230) Korea (2,770) 
4 Germany (1,709) Japan (2,687) 
5 UK (1,601) Germany (2,246) 
Source: OECD EMS Portal data accessed in January 2013 
 
Third, it is also interesting to note that although the UK ranked fifth for registrations in 
2005, it went down to eighth in 2012 and Korea became the third overtaking Japan, with 
Italy and Mexico sixth and seventh respectively after Germany. Recently joined 
countries or non-traditional DAC members’ registration has been increasing. In addition, 
the percentage of registrations of national delegates from member countries decreased 
from 53.5 % in 2005 to 43.6 % in 2012 while that of the registrations from non-member 
countries increased from 12.7% in 2005 to 27.1% in 2012.
6
 
 
The fourth point is that the number of DAC meetings and registrations to meetings are 
                                                 
6
 Other categories in the registration are: permanent delegation, OECD (other members or staff from 
other committees), other international organisations and so on. 
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high compared to other OECD committees. In 2012, 119 official meetings were held 
with 3,600 member country participants in the DAC, which means DAC meetings were 
held every other working day with 30 participants from member countries. The number 
of meetings and registered participants is placed sixth out of nearly 30 committees. The 
number increases further once informal meetings are added.  
 
The members of the OECD are also represented by their delegations based in Paris 
headed by the ambassadors. The size of the delegations normally corresponds to the size 
of their financial contribution. The distance of their headquarters from Paris also matters, 
as geographically distant members tend to have larger delegations so as to reduce costs 
and coordinate more effectively (Carroll & Kellow, 2011, p.16). Among OECD 
members, the Japanese delegation has the highest number of 39 staff deployed from 
Tokyo, followed by 31 from Korea and 22 from Australia, and 15 each from the US, 
Germany and Spanish delegations. Given that other members only have five to ten staff 
from their countries, non-European members whose headquarters are distant from Paris 
maintained more than twice as many as staff. In the view of a former British 
ambassador to OECD, the number of diplomats working at the Japanese delegation was 
“strikingly large” (Martin, interview, 2012), although it is also true that the number of 
visits from headquarters is less frequent for Japan compared to the European members, 
and the delegation staff attend more meetings instead.  
 
Meetings  
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The structure of meetings in the DAC is not straightforward – as expressed by one DAC 
delegate: 
 
When you arrive in Paris as a DAC delegate, the first thing you would need is an 
organigram of the DAC. However, you would soon find out that that does not exist 
because the structure of the DAC meetings is too complicated and it also changes 
too fast. (interview, 2012) 
 
DAC meetings fall into three layers, and the participants to each layer of the meetings 
are from different departments or divisions of the member government. As Figure 3.4 
shows, the highest layer of the pyramid is the High Level Meeting (HLM), in which the 
heads of ministries or agencies in charge of development cooperation participate, and 
Senior Level Meeting (SLM), the responsibility of senior management officials. These 
meetings are held once a year and adopt high level decisions on the policies discussed in 
the DAC, which serves to indicate a high level of commitment towards the common aid 
effort. Regular DAC meetings are held every six weeks and are attended by DAC 
delegates based in Paris. The role of the ordinary DAC meetings is rather managerial, as 
they discuss the organisational and strategic aspects of the DAC and oversee the 
subsidiary bodies. Most of the specialised knowledge and policy drafts are produced in 
the subsidiary body meetings, which are the lowest level of the pyramid. There are 
seven subsidiary bodies specialising in, for example, evaluation, gender, environment, 
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and conflict and fragility.
7
 Each subsidiary meeting is attended by personnel from 
members’ headquarters, most of whom are working as advisors or policy-makers in 
charge of the respective issue areas. The subsidiary bodies are the heart of the DAC, 
where “much of the committee’s most highly valued work takes place” (OECD, 2009, 
p.12).  
 
Figure 3.4: Structure of DAC meetings 
 
Source: Author 
 
                                                 
7
 There are: Working Party on Statistics (since 1968), Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (since 2003), 
Network on Development Evaluation (since 2003), Network on Gender Equality (since 2003), Network 
on Environment and Development Co-operation (since 2003), Network on Governance (since 2000), and 
International Network on Conflict and Fragility (since 2009) (OECD, 2010). The mandate of these bodies 
are agreed by the DAC members and renewed from time to time.  
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・Once a year.  
・Attended by head of ministry /agency in charge 
of development cooperation from HQ.  
・Once every six weeks. 
・Attended by DAC delegates based in Paris. 
・1-2 a year for plenary meetings. 
・Attended by advisors or heads of department/ 
section in charge of specific sectors issues from 
HQ. 
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Although the decisions on agreements take place at the highest level of the pyramid at 
the HLM or SLM, the DAC meetings and subsidiary body meetings lay the essential 
foundations. Therefore, unless participants to the DAC meetings and subsidiary body 
meetings agree on the proposals to be put on table at the HLM and SLM, collective 
action cannot be expected to follow. This means the two levels supporting the highest 
level are very important.  
 
The three layers of the meeting structure are peculiar to the DAC, because a majority of 
OECD committees lack the middle layer that is solely attended by the delegates in Paris. 
The DAC delegates are often represented by the officials from the foreign ministry, such 
as Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) for Japan, or development ministries or aid 
agencies such as Department for International Development (DFID) for the UK. As the 
DAC is an international organization dealing with policy issues, some DAC delegates 
have experience of working in the delegations of other international organizations such 
as the UN or European Union (EU), but delegates with work experience in developing 
countries are relatively few. However, being based in Paris, the DAC delegates have a 
common objective in advancing the DAC activities in order to attract their headquarters’ 
interests, so DAC delegates feel that the discussions in the DAC are based on issues 
rather than predetermined politically by the government positions (Ishize, interview, 
2011; Okano, interview, 2012). 
 
For the participants to the subsidiary bodies, their common objective is to produce 
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policies relevant to their work at home. Through the process of policy making, the 
participants can both be influenced by and influence the collective thinking and ideas, 
which a British academic calls a “boomerang effect” (Eyben, interview, 2012). 
Speaking as a former DFID chief social development advisor who attended meetings in 
international organisations, she says two directions of influence can be observed – to 
and from the “global policy space” such as the DAC – which gave her internal influence 
to change DFID’s policy as well. The subsidiary body level not only involves 
influencing but also information-sharing and mutual-learning. According to a former 
chair of the DAC Network on Development Evaluation (EVALUNET) and head of 
DFID’s evaluation department, although originally he was thinking about influencing 
other donors he later came to realise that he was learning from others more, because the 
network was a good opportunity for mutual learning (York, interview, 2012).  
 
Therefore, unlike other international organisations where member governments push 
their own governments’ positions, the discussions and negotiations in the DAC are 
rather flexible. This is because each level of the meetings provides opportunities for the 
participants to construct informal networks for the purpose of exchanging information 
and promoting mutual learning.  
 
To sum up, this section has discussed the members and meetings of the DAC as 
indications of collective action. The recent increase of its official membership as well as 
its participants (as observers) from non-members should enhance the legitimacy of the 
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DAC but possibly at the expense of effectiveness. While the increase of members and 
participants is a clear indication of collective action, it should help expand the impact 
and influence of the DAC towards wider audiences but potentially could undermine the 
like-mindedness and frank and harmonious relations within DAC that have made it 
effective in the past. The larger economies that contribute more to OECD’s core budget 
are registered with the OECD meetings more than others, and these countries tend to 
have larger delegations in Paris. But financial contributions to the DAC are higher for 
the European countries with middle to smaller economies. Finally, by creating three 
layers of DAC meetings, the DAC has been able to form networks of members in each 
layer to achieve different objectives. This structure has contributed to sharing norms 
among the participants in meetings at different levels, which can only be helpful to 
achieving collective action. 
 
3.3: Agreement 
 
Agreement is one tell-tale sign of collective action. In addition, the process of 
agreement (i.e., how the agreement is reached) also tells us something about the level of 
collective action, because in principle the process can range from easy to difficult, and 
from simple to complicate. This section discusses the types of agreement and the 
processes by which the agreements are made. Information about the DAC’s 
performance here is available from DAC documents, but interviews conducted by the 
writer provide fresh insights into the actual process of reaching agreement and the 
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pattern of member groupings, which depends on the topics and the issue. 
 
Overall, there are four types of OECD policy instruments, ‘Decisions’, 
‘Recommendations’, ‘Declarations’, ‘Arrangements and Understandings’. However, the 
DAC has only agreed on ‘Recommendations’ and ‘Declarations’ as listed in Table 3.3. 
‘Decisions’ are the highest level with legally binding nature, and ‘Arrangements and 
Understandings’ are the lowest level, and adopted by some members only. There are 
also 18 guidelines and references published in the DAC since 2001.  
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Table 3.3: Types of policies agreed in the DAC 
Types Adopted by the DAC 
R
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
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o
n
s 
(f
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r
m
a
l 
a
c
t 
o
f 
o
r
g
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
) 
 2011, Recommendation of the Council on Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible 
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas  
 2011, DAC Recommendation on Good Pledging Practice  
 2010, Recommendation of the Council on Good Institutional Practices in 
Promoting Policy Coherence for Development   
 2001, DAC Recommendation on Untying Official Development Assistance to the 
Least Developed Countries and Highly Indebted Poor Countries    
  1996, DAC Recommendation on Anti-Corruption Proposals for Bilateral Aid 
Procurement     
 1989, Recommendation of the Council concerning an Environmental Checklist for 
Possible Use by High-Level Decision-Makers in Bilateral and Multilateral 
Development Assistance Institutions    
 1986, Recommendation of the Council on Measures Required to Facilitate the 
Environmental Assessment of Development Assistance Projects and Programmes  
 1985, Recommendation of the Council on Environmental Assessment of 
Development Assistance Projects and Programmes 
 1978, Recommendation on Terms and Conditions of Aid 
D
e
c
la
r
a
ti
o
n
s  2008, Declaration on Policy Coherence for Development     
 2006, Declaration on Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into Development 
Co-operation   
 2005, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness  
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 2012, Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility 
 2012, International Support to Post-Conflict Transition 
 2011, Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility 
 2010, Quality Standards for Development Evaluation 
 2009, Natural Resources and Pro-Poor Growth 
 2007, Promoting Pro-Poor Growth 
 2006, Applying Strategic Environmental Assessment 
 2006, Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery, Volume 2 
 2005, Managing Aid 
 2005, Environmental Fiscal Reform for Poverty Reduction 
 2005, Security System Reform and Governance 
 2003, Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery 
 2003, Poverty and Health 
 2002, Integrating the Rio Conventions into Development Co-operation 
 2001, Strengthening Trade Capacity for Development 
 2001, Strategies for Sustainable Development 
 2001, Poverty Reduction 
 2001, Helping Prevent Violent Conflict 
Source: Compiled by author based on; Decisions, Recommendations and other Instruments of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (http://webnet.oecd.org/oecdacts/, accessed 1 
Dec 2013); DAC Guideline and Reference Series 
(http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/dac-guidelines-and-reference-series_19900988, accessed 1 
Dec 2013); OECD Legal Instruments (http://www.oecd.org/legal/legal-instruments.htm, accessed 1 Dec 
2013) 
 
‘Recommendations’ and ‘Declarations’ are normally agreed at the HLM, where heads of 
agencies and departments make decisions. The guidelines and references are 
substantively agreed at the subsidiary or DAC meetings level. Table 3.3 shows that the 
DAC has agreed on policies in most years, which is a positive sign of collective action. 
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On the other hand, it is also true that not all the policies proposed in the DAC are agreed. 
Most of the substantial negotiations are done during informal communications, where 
members want to make changes or alternatively reject them. Therefore, public 
statements do not necessarily reflect all the intentions of the members (interview with 
UK government official, 2012). Also, as a DAC Secretariat official points out, the 
smartest and easiest way to reject proposals is to block them in the initial stage before 
the members and Secretariat have invested effort in the process – it is less likely to stop 
the process once started, because of the cost for derailing ongoing processes 
(Lammersen, interview, 2012). Therefore there may be proposals that were put on the 
table but did not reach an agreement stage.  
 
In relation to the quality of the agreement, the policies tend to be framed in as general a 
way as can be agreed upon. It is most likely that there is a trade-off between the 
possibility of reaching agreement and the level of particularities of the agreement. 
Donors’ willingness to sign up to general policies can be seen as diplomatic 
(Rabinowitz, interview with ODI officer, 2012), because disagreements can be observed 
later during the implementation stage. Sometimes, the Secretariat does not even aim for 
perfect agreement, in order to avoid failure to agree on anything at all. Nicol 
experienced such a scenario around the failed attempt to reach a Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment (MAI) as a Secretariat (interview, 2012). Members may prefer to have 
flexibility on the rules they agree to, in order to accommodate their own country’s 
peculiarities (Yokota, interview with MoFA official, 2012) and also to avoid members 
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spending unnecessary time and energy (Asai, interview with JICA official, 2012), even 
at the risk of misunderstandings surfacing later. It is often the case that international 
organisations will agree on collective statements that can satisfy all actors’ concerns, but 
the statements may risk in being interpreted in different ways by the different actors 
(Rabinowitz, interview, 2012). It is also the case that the more rigorous the monitoring 
mechanism is, the more likely the members will be cautious about the wording of the 
agreement (Miyamoto, interview with DAC Secretariat, 2012).  
 
Agreement in the DAC is based on consensus, and the process of the agreement is often 
led by a small number of like-minded countries.
8
 Since some members find it less easy 
to agree than others, the process of reaching consensus may be prolonged, which 
explains why those who are already in agreement often tend to form a like-minded 
group with the intention of moving the process forward. According to a British 
academic, a disadvantage of consensus is that the whole process needs to move at the 
pace of the slowest; when the big donors are reluctant, frustrated smaller countries are 
more likely to then form their own like-minded groups (Riddell, interview, 2012). A 
pattern of leaders and followers then emerges.  
 
                                                 
8
 Although agreement is based on consensus, members can abstain or make reservation without 
obstructing the agreement. For instance, Italy made a reservation on the Recommendation on Terms and 
Conditions of Aid, in 1978, and Greece abstained on the Recommendation on Good Pledging Practice, in 
2011(Decisions, Recommendations and other Instruments of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development, http://webnet.oecd.org/oecdacts/, accessed 1 Dec 2013). 
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As will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6, the leading like-minded countries tend to be 
northern European countries including the UK, whereas following countries tend to be 
larger economies including the US and Japan.
9
 Although agreement is based on 
consensus, in reality the larger donors have more leverage, because of their influential 
role in making impact in practice (due to their bigger budget). This happened with the 
International Accountability and Transparency Initiative (IATI), where initially the US, 
Japan and France were reluctant to join. The US was targeted to get on board “because 
we thought we wouldn’t be able to make it happen without the US as being one of the 
biggest donors”, says a former director of an NGO who was involved in the process 
(Christiansen, interview, 2012). In 2011 at the Busan HLF, the US’s decision to join in 
IATI was announced. In contrast to the bigger donors’ influence, smaller donors can 
have what Riddell calls a “demonstrative effect” by forming a like-minded group, which 
may prove persuasive to others (interview, 2012). This is also observed by a former 
EVALUNET chair; the smaller donors are good at influencing the bigger donor by 
pressuring them as a group (York, interview, 2012).  
 
This section has shown that the DAC has been successful in agreeing different kinds of 
policies, which is prime evidence of collective action. However, this indicator will be 
affected by a number of factors, including any monitoring mechanisms that may make 
members more cautious when agreeing. Also, although the DAC’s decision-making is 
                                                 
9
 Also, the larger contributors to the OECD core budget (after the US and Japan), namely France and 
Germany, are often regarded as follower countries as well. 
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based on consensus, smaller donors tend to form a like-minded group to lead the agenda. 
When they are successful in persuading others to agree, this can be understood both as 
an indicator and part of the explanation of collective action.  
 
3.4: Implementation 
 
After the DAC members agree on policies, it is the responsibility of the members to 
implement them. While meetings and agreement take place in Paris as a collective 
process, implementation depends on individual members’ will and efforts. Without 
implementing and complying with the agreed policies, collective action appears on 
paper only. However, in the DAC more attention seems to be put on reaching agreement 
than on implementation, as was noted by a DAC Secretariat official who said “We are 
good at agreeing but bad at following up, so we have to be a bit more police man of our 
rules” (Nicol, interview, 2013). Also, the agreement process can be seen as “technical”, 
which is easier than implementation processes where more politics are involved 
(Hudson, interview, 2012).  
 
Overall, the level of implementation depends on the specific issues and policy. As 
chapters 5 and 6 will show, while the level of compliance for aid untying 
recommendation was high, implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda was low. 
Hence, performance is not uniform. And as the case study chapters explore, 
implementation can become difficult when the number of actors increases and the 
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agenda or policy becomes more diverse.  
 
In identifying the indicators for implementation, three analytical distinctions are made 
here. First, existence of a clear monitoring mechanism is important to identifying the 
level of implementation by DAC members. For instance, as will be discussed in chapter 
5 and 6, the DAC’s agreements on aid untying as well as aid effectiveness included 
separate monitoring mechanism with specific indicators. However, most of the DAC’s 
recommendations and declarations listed in Table 3.3 do not contain a specific 
monitoring framework. This means very little information is available, especially for the 
guidelines and references. As a UK government official says, “it is difficult to evaluate 
the level of utilisation of these, and there is no method to systematically check the direct 
impact on donors’ policy” (interview, 2012).10 According to a DAC Secretariat, the 
impact of the DAC guidance on the member governments may best be identified by the 
level of ‘plagiarism’ (Hynes, interview, 2013), that is to say whether civil servants make 
reference to it when drawing up their own policies.  
 
In addition, the level of utilisation depends on member countries as well as on the 
advisors or officials in charge. When the members need what the DAC wants to 
                                                 
10
 During a half-day seminar “The OECD Development Assistance Committee: Looking Towards the 
Future: What can we learn from the past?”, organised jointly by OECD and LSE on 6th Dec 2012 in which 
author participated, a DAC Secretariat said that although difficult the DAC was currently looking for 
ways in which it could understand the impact that the DAC had on member countries. 
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introduce anyway, then they are more likely to adopt it. For instance, the UK would 
anyway come up with the same kind of guidance if the DAC guidance did not exist 
(interview with UK government official, 2012); and DFID advisors attending subsidiary 
bodies have an incentive to refer to the DAC’s policy especially when they want to 
change UK governments’ policies (Eyben, interview, 2012). 
 
Second, there is also a distinction between formal and informal compliance. As the 
chapter 5 on aid untying shows, there are instances where members formally untie their 
aid but the actual procurement award goes to the donor country’s own companies. 
Therefore, even when the monitoring framework exists and the members implement 
accordingly, informal non-compliance may happen. The DAC Secretariat has begun to 
look at this for the case of aid untying. Chapter 5 will discuss how the motives and 
rationale behind implementation can change over time. 
 
Third, while for some policies implementation is the sole responsibility of the donors, 
for some others it is the responsibility of both the donors and aid recipients, and in this 
case there are limits to what the DAC alone can do. Figure 3.5 compares the policy 
processes between the DAC and the other OECD committees. In the OECD committees 
other than the DAC, the process of policy-making circulates exclusively within and 
between the OECD and its members, as shown in the upper box; since the policies are 
implemented in the member countries, data can be collected from there, which can be 
used as evidence to formulate new policies. However, the DAC is distinctive; as shown 
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in the bottom box, the policies internalised by its members are implemented in the 
recipient countries that are not the DAC members, which makes data collection difficult. 
As the study of aid effectiveness will show later, once the recipient country level is 
added in the responsibility for implementation becomes dispersed, with consequences 
for the chances of achieving successful policy implementation. 
 
Figure 3.5: Comparison of policy processes between the OECD and the DAC 
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Source: Author. 
 
This section has shown the significance for collective action of evaluating the level of 
implementation by DAC members. The utilisation of DAC initiatives by national 
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governments is clearly important to passing judgment. But the DAC does not, and 
perhaps cannot, collect extensive information about this, although it does have in place 
a monitoring process for some – albeit not all – the policies it agrees on. 
 
3.5: Monitoring 
 
Monitoring of the members’ compliance is in itself another indicator of collective action. 
The monitoring mechanism of the DAC, namely the DAC peer review, is not a one-way 
monitoring process by the Secretariat checking the members’ compliance, but more a 
case of peer pressure and mutual learning among the members. The monitoring process 
helps build the DAC’s peer identity and common awareness, which are important 
foundations for collective action. This section draws mainly on interviews as well as 
DAC peer review documents in the public domain.  
 
Peer review is one of a few core activities of the DAC (OECD, 2009), and it is the main 
tool to monitor the compliance level of the DAC members. There is no enforcement 
mechanism for compliance, but peer review is one way to induce peer pressure on the 
members to comply. Peer review started already in 1962, and in the early days all 
members were reviewed annually, though in a less systematic and intense way than 
now.
11
 Based on a graph which shows the number of reviews across the 22 DAC 
members between 1961 and 1994 (Ben-Artzi, 2013, p.24), about half of DAC members 
                                                 
11
 It was called “aid review” in the early days. 
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were reviewed 20-25 times; the rest vary, because their accession to the DAC came 
later. 
 
DAC members now are monitored through the peer review process every four years. 
When the member state is reviewed, two other DAC members are selected by the 
Secretariat to nominate examiners for the review process. The two reviewing 
governments are chosen based on their size (small or big), strength and institutional 
affiliation (groupings such as The Group of Seven (G7) or EU), and language (English 
or others such as French) (Verger, interview, 2012). The examining team consists of the 
two examiners and some staff from the Secretariat. In the beginning of the review 
process, the reviewed government needs to submit a memorandum whose structure is 
reflected by a DAC content guide which is revised every two years. Based on the 
memorandum, the examining team visits the reviewed member’s capital to meet with 
government officials, civil society organisations (CSOs), researchers and one aid 
receiving country to check if their policies are working at the country level. The whole 
process takes six months. Since five members are reviewed each year, a full-day peer 
review meetings is held five times annually. The process looks substantial, but reviews 
are not a panacea, and the process cannot guarantee compliance by members. 
 
What does the peer review tell us about collective action? It is best described as 
‘critically constructive’: not confrontational, but rather a learning process. There is a 
balance to be struck between pushing a reviewed country to change and integrating that 
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country into the process in a way that makes it feel comfortable in responding to the 
recommendations. Peer review is a soft enforcement mechanism, without powers of 
legal enforcement. One of the most important factors it relies on is mutual learning. 
Both the members and the Secretariat recognise peer review as an interactive process 
between the reviewed government and the examiners; the collective learning process 
includes both the Secretariat and other members (Jorgensen, interview with a head of 
peer review division, 2013). For instance, the Danish DAC delegate who examined the 
Japanese peer review in 2009, found the process very constructive and open-minded: he 
added that the Japanese government was always asked about the recommendations they 
would like to see in the report, and these proposals were then considered by the peer 
review team for possible inclusion (Neergaard, interview, 2012). At the peer review 
meetings held in Paris, members try to offer constructive criticism and realistic 
recommendation, because all the members come up for review every four years and 
might be subjected to the same treatment (Jorgensen, interview, 2013). In this way, 
tension among members is prevented. Similarly the review teams do not receive so 
many critical comments from governments whose aid has been reviewed when they 
read the draft report (ibid). This is because peer review teams have ongoing engagement 
process with the reviewed government, in which the reviewed governments are able to 
surmise the direction of recommendations (ibid). If the peer review were to push 
reviewed countries too much, there is a risk that countries will become alienated, so 
making their cooperation less likely.  
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In addition, the peer review has been structured with consideration for the balance 
between global standards and diverse country contexts. Although the review is guided 
by standards on which the DAC members are agreed, the process of peer review tries to 
accommodate the peculiarities and limitations of members in changing their policies 
according to the standards. It is the art of the Secretariat to handle the delicate balance 
between the two. As a DAC Secretariat who was in charge of the previous Japanese 
peer review recalls, “The Secretariat tried to draw a line between what can be changed 
pragmatically and beyond, so that we do not push the members in an unrealistic way” 
(Hayashikawa, interview, 2012). The Secretariat also tries to be helpful and respectful 
to accommodate the different contexts of the member states (Verger, interview, 2012). 
The peer review reference guide provides benchmarks and conditions but there is no 
‘one size fits all’ model; “each peer review will be situated in its own context” (OECD 
Archives, 2013, p.2). Asked if working for the peer review is frustrating, the head of a 
peer review division’s answer below reflects her long experience in getting the  
balance right if change is to happen;  
 
No frustration, as I understand that changes cannot be made overnight. You have to 
be realistic about what you can change, and more importantly, we need to find out 
where we see changes and keep encouraging these positive changes by observing the 
context (Jorgensen, interview, 2013).  
 
A former DAC chair, Richard Manning, views the DAC in a similar way; we should be 
practical that uniformity of approach cannot be expected because donors are 
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independent actors and diversity within and beyond the DAC is valuable (2008, p.17). 
 
One of the challenging tasks for the DAC Secretariat is to manage members’ 
expectations, because some members want the standards to be stricter and more 
rigorous but some others believe peer review is more useful when it has flexibility 
(Jorgensen, interview, 2013). When the current head of peer review assumed her 
position in 2006, there was no standard framework of analysis (i.e., reference guide), so 
“it was evident that some members felt they were not measured on the same yardstick as 
others” (ibid). This is why she created the guide in order to manage members’ 
competing interests and making the peer review more credible. 
  
For members, peer review is an opportunity to be used strategically. For instance, when 
the UK hosted a public launch of its peer review in 2010, just before a change of 
government, the Permanent Secretary of DFID emphasised the positive aspects of the 
report, as it wanted to maintain public support for official development assistance 
(ODA) (Verger, interview with DAC Secretariat, 2012). According to a Japanese 
ambassador to OECD, who also received the DAC peer review in 2003 as a 
deputy-director in charge of ODA at Japan’s MoFA, “There is no merit in peer review if 
the report lists unrealistic recommendations. But if it encourages the policy direction 
that is beginning to move, then the peer review will work as an endorsement as 
favourable wind domestically” (Yoshikawa, interview, 2013). This was also the case in 
Korea that was peer reviewed in 2012. Through the peer review process, many domestic 
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stakeholders, who were originally not in favour of reforming in line with the OECD and 
the DAC’s market economic policies, began to realise the need for Korea’s government 
to be more open in joining the international community (Choi, interview with Korean 
DAC delegate, 2013). As such, peer review can be useful for the DAC members in two 
ways: by providing opportunities to appeal to a domestic audience; and by providing 
support when the members want to reform (Hayashikawa, interview with DAC 
Secretariat, 2012).  
 
To summarise, the monitoring mechanism of peer review provides strong evidence of 
collective action. First, members value peer review as mutual learning process, which is 
a positive indication instead of criticising each other too much. Second, the Secretariat 
has been successful in managing the level of pressure to put on members, and handling 
the balance between strict peer review standards and flexibility in accommodating the 
members’ own context. Third, the reviewed members also use peer review strategically, 
by using external pressure to encourage internal reform and to promote ODA towards 
domestic audiences. 
 
3.6: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined indicators of collective action in the DAC and has reported 
some evidence from the DAC’s experience of trying to achieve collective action. The 
performance is variable. And now that the DAC has opened its door to non-members 
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either as formal members or observers, the possibility of trade-offs between securing 
greater legitimacy and maintaining effectiveness must be considered in any assessment 
of its likely future performance.  
 
Prime evidence of collective action can be seen in the process of agreement, 
implementation and monitoring of the DAC policies. The DAC has successfully agreed 
on different kinds of policies; the agreement processes show that different grouping of 
members have contributed to this in different ways. But the implementation of agreed 
policies is more difficult to trace. Peer review is a well-valued monitoring mechanism 
by the DAC members; not only does it help scrutinise the compliance of members but 
also encourages mutual learning; and the ways in which peer review is conducted 
facilitates respect and a positive attitude between the Secretariat and members as well as 
amongst the members themselves. 
 
Having introduced and illustrated indicators of collective action in the DAC in this 
chapter, the next chapter builds on the analysis by exploring the conditions that are 
likely to make the successful achievement of collective action there more likely and, 
conversely conditions that are likely to impede collective action, once again illustrating 
by reference to actual DAC performance. 
 
 
118 
 
Chapter 4:  Conditions for Collective Action 
 
 
4.1: Introduction 
 
The previous chapter discussed whether and to what extent there is collective action in 
the DAC by reviewing the indicators of its members and meetings as well as the process 
of agreement, implementation and monitoring. Based on these indicators, this chapter 
discusses conditions which affect the existence and the level of collective action by 
addressing questions about “why is there collective action (or not)?” and “what kind of 
conditions are relevant to successful (or conversely) unsuccessful attempts to secure 
collective action?” 
 
In responding to these questions, six actor-oriented conditions are selected as follows; 
Secretariat, delegate-headquarter relationships, member-member relationships, domestic 
environment, recipient country level, and member/non-member relationships. While the 
first three conditions are located at the DAC in Paris, the domestic environment refers to 
actors in member countries such as politicians, researchers, civil society organisations 
(CSOs) and their relationship with government officials. The country-level deals with 
actors in the recipient countries (most notably the donors’ involvement at that level). 
Since DAC policies are discussed and agreed by the DAC, internalised by the member 
countries and implemented in the recipient countries, the actor-focused and three-level 
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(international, domestic, country levels) approaches help us understand the different 
conditions for collective action. In addition, the UK and Japan are compared in detail in 
order to illustrate how DAC members differ in regard to the conditions for achieving 
collective action, particularly in respect of their domestic environment.  
 
4.2: Secretariat 
 
Whether there can be successful collective action in the DAC depends on the existence 
of a capable Secretariat. The DAC Secretariat is an important condition. Like any 
Secretariat of an international organisation it can facilitate collective action by 
providing proper guidance and professional skills. Therefore, one of the conditions for 
the Secretariat is to have necessary capacity to prepare and facilitate the meetings. Also, 
if the Secretariat secures a reputation for neutrality or impartiality vis-a-vis members, it 
will gain their trust, which increases the chances for Secretariat to foster collective 
action. If in contrast the Secretariat is perceived to behave unfairly towards a member, 
or to manipulate processes for its own ends, then that could be counterproductive.  
 
The Secretariat is headed by a director of Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD) 
in the OECD. The DCD is organised around four divisions as of 2013; Policy 
Coordination; Aid Quality and Architecture; Review, Evaluation and Engagement; 
Statistics and Monitoring. There are 100 Secretariat staff in the DCD comprised of 70 
expert staff and a few dozen administrative staff. Some are seconded from the member 
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governments, which means they are paid by their own governments, whereas most staff 
are employed either as permanent or contract-based by the OECD. As the Secretariat 
staff are employed on different terms, their incentives vary. Those who are seconded 
from their governments often need to reflect their governments’ interests in their work. 
In theory they could face a conflict of interest between securing neutrality as members 
of the Secretariat and representing their government’s position. For all the staff and 
similar to other international organisations, they have individual incentives to survive in 
the organisation; they need to show their outputs and results on an individual basis. This 
can be a strong motive for moving the proposed agenda forward and producing visible 
results – even more so for staff who are on contract. 
 
Having noted the different incentives among the Secretariat staff, the rest of this section 
analyses how the Secretariat staff contribute to forming collective action. As a Japanese 
DAC delegate views, whereas DAC members consider the DAC to be owned by its 
members, the Secretariat staff consider it as their own (Ishize, interview, 2011). The role 
of the Secretariat is to provide advice and technical expertise to help build consensus 
among the DAC members. In reality, however, its role and power are perceived by both 
the members and Secretariat to be bigger. The OECD is perceived by members as a 
Secretariat-driven organisation, in contrast to the United Nations (UN) where members 
have more power (Choi, interview with a Korean DAC delegate, 2013). Dirk Dijkerman 
who was a US DAC delegate and works as a DAC Secretariat official expresses the 
Secretariat’s subtle power in relation to the DAC members as follows;  
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Secretariat does have power in a sense that it holds the pen, and through that it can 
advance its ideas, assert things, and if the members are not watching closely then 
that becomes part of the mythology or belief that that’s what’s been agreed to 
(interview, 2013, author’s italics). 
 
The fact that the Secretariat prepares the meetings process (e.g., data collection, drafting 
documents) gives them discretion in controlling the direction of the discussions, which 
may create some tensions between Secretariat and members. As a Japanese DAC 
delegate recalled; there was an occasion when a Secretariat staff corrected the record of 
a meeting only after being challenged by a member, because the original record 
included a proposal made by the Secretariat which was objected to by some members 
during the meeting (Okano, interview, 2012). The Secretariat uses tactics that may lead 
DAC members to believe in something that was not agreed, and this can lead to create 
the “mythology” (Dijkerman, interview, 2013). The Secretariat may delay in sending 
out the record, so that the members’ memory becomes vague, or they may intentionally 
make members work busier. For instance, when the Secretariat produces a large number 
of meeting documents, members often find it difficult to keep up with reading and 
dealing with them, which in turn enables the Secretariat to have its own way more 
easily (Dijkerman, interview, 2013). The Secretariat can also manipulate information 
they give to the objecting members in order to get their proposal approved, by the way 
they consult or alternatively avoid individual members, and by providing incorrect 
information through informal communications (member government official, interview, 
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2012).  
 
On the other hand, members try not to be deceived by the Secretariat. In a sense, it is a 
silent battle between the Secretariat and member countries. It is the responsibility of the 
members to watch carefully the direction of the Secretariat and to demand what they 
want and send proper messages, so that the Secretariat have no choice but to respond as 
DAC (former) delegates say (Fernandes, interview, 2011; Okano, interview, 2012; 
Dijkerman, interview, 2013). In other words, unless the members exert their right to 
demand information and watch the Secretariat’s work properly, and unless “the 
members stay on top of the Secretariat” (Dijkerman, interview, 2013), the process can 
be overridden and controlled by the Secretariat.  
 
Sometimes, it is the Secretariat’s individual belief that drives the direction of the DAC 
(Shoji, interview, 2012). For instance, during an Australian peer review meeting in 2012, 
one of the Secretariat’s recommendations was that Australia should devote more money 
to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Some DAC delegates questioned this, 
asking: “How do we know the level of Australian funds to NGOs is low, as we have not 
agreed any standard in the DAC on that?” In the final version of the peer review report, 
this point was deleted (Dijkerman, interview, 2013). In this case the belief or the 
presumption of the Secretariat that the donors should transfer more funds to NGOs 
resulted in including it in the recommendation, although there was no shared agreement 
in the DAC. As Dijkerman reflects;  
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If there is no DAC standard, why were they asserting this? It was the Secretariat 
staff’s willingness and desire. There are staff in the OECD who think their role is 
to push the members by which the Secretariat can get something done. This is why 
the members need to watch the Secretariat, so that definition of things cannot be 
changed according to what they want to push (interview, 2013, italic by author). 
 
Importantly, though, that the Secretariat staff’s belief affecting the direction of their 
work may be subconscious (Okano, interview, 2012) and these might happen through 
unintentional processes.  
 
On the other hand, the Secretariat’s actual power in directing the members is also 
supported by its capacity to move the DAC towards collective action. First, the 
Secretariat’s capacity comes from the fact that most of the staff stay in their post longer 
than the member delegates who move on every 3-4 years or even sooner. Richard Cary, 
former director of DCD, worked as a Secretariat for thirty years. Whenever he made 
references to previous cases or precedents during meetings where discussions were 
ongoing, members would call him “walking dictionary” out of respect.1 Given their 
greater experience, Secretariat staff are more likely to be aware of “all the subtleties of 
the issues discussed” (Dijkerman, interview, 2013).   
 
Second, the Secretariat has a good sense of its ability to balance the various members’ 
demands and the necessity for the DAC to produce results, even when it is almost 
                                                 
1
 This is based on author’s experience in working at the Japanese Delegation to OECD in charge of the 
DAC for two year between 2008 and 2010. 
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impossible that all the members can be satisfied equally. A Japanese DAC delegate 
notes that the Secretariat’s initiative in balancing between each member to achieve 
compromise and general satisfaction is an important factor in getting agreement during 
the process of deciding the DAC’s Programme of Work and Budget (two-years’ plan) 
(Ishize, interview, 2011). In doing this, the Secretariat uses a good sense of how far 
donors are able to agree to the proposal (Riddell, interview, 2012).  
 
Behind this lie constructive efforts by Secretariat staff. When communicating and 
coordinating, the Secretariat tries to be sensitive and responsible for all the members but 
at the same time tries to convince members that “their mousetrap is better than those of 
the members” (Dijkerman, interview, 2013). The Secretariat makes use of peer review 
process to create a “fishing point” for changing the reviewed country’s aid policy, as a 
“hidden opportunity for the Secretariat” (Nicol, interview, 2013). The Secretariat’s 
endeavour can also go beyond the policy level by listening to and observing the culture 
of individual members, as one Secretariat says, “Learning about Japanese philosophy 
from DAC delegate was very useful in communicating effectively with Japanese 
delegates” (Nicol, interview, 2013). 
 
So far, the Secretariat’s power over the members has been explained. Although officially 
it is the members holding the reins of decision making, the fact that the OECD and the 
DAC function as research think-tanks backs the Secretariat to legitimise its role in 
trying to persuade members to agree. The Secretariat’s contribution to the policy 
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process can be said to be based on “evidence” which is considered to be free from 
political bias or judgement. Nevertheless, many delegates and Secretariat staff confess 
that their impression about the DAC changed after they began working in the DAC, 
where they found the reality was less like a research organisation than they had 
originally believed (such as interview with UK government official, 2012; Lomøy, 
interview with director of DCD, 2013a). The rest of this section explains the 
discrepancies between the image and the reality in this regard.  
 
To begin with, the rigorous data and statistics from recipient countries are limited or of 
low quality, which means DAC policies cannot be based on pure evidence (Shoji; 
Massing, interview, 2012; Nicol, interview 2013). The DAC policies are based on 
“anecdotal evidence in bringing out lessons and by quoting other works through 
consultations, but not statistics-based evidence which other OECD committees are 
using” (Massing, interview with a DAC Secretariat, 2012). Sometimes the process can 
take the form of collecting existing evidence from published work in order to form an 
agreement, so, the DAC is more successful in synthesising policies which the members 
need than in using just logic or academic evidence to reach its conclusions (Honda, 
interview with Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute (JICA-RI) 
official, 2012). This is reflected by the proportion of economists in the DCD which is 
small compared to other OECD directorates (Nicol, interview, 2012). Hence, a shortage 
of rigorous evidence underpinning DAC policies gives the Secretariat some discretion 
in controlling the process of policy making. 
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Secondly, DAC policies are often drafted by external consultants, and the process in 
which the consultants are selected also gives some members an impression that the 
Secretariat is influential. According to OECD rules, the projects whose costs are under 
30,000 Euros do not have to go through a competitive bidding process. This means the 
projects are contracted through direct negotiation and the Secretariat has right to choose 
consultants for the projects.
2
 Not all the DAC members are fully aware of these rules.
3
 
In the DAC, a substantial percentage of the contracts falls below the cost threshold,
4
 
and Secretariat staff may try to fit projects within the threshold in order to avoid a 
lengthy bidding process. As a result, it is likely or gives an impression that most of the 
DAC’s contracts go to British or Anglo-Saxon consultants (Hayashikawa; Massing; 
Shoji, interview with DAC Secretariats and Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) official, 2012). In practice, Secretariat has specific criteria for selecting 
consultants but only a very limited number of consultants come to the Secretariat staff’s 
mind when awarding contracts, most of them from Anglo-Saxon countries.
5
 Therefore, 
rather than being the Secretariat staff’s own individual preferences, the choice of 
consultants is a reflection of the fact that some countries (the Anglo-Saxon countries) 
have more think tanks than other countries, like Japan (Massing, interview, 2012). So, 
although the Secretariat believes this is inevitable, some DAC members see it as a 
                                                 
2
 Before 2011, the threshold was 50,000 Euros. 
3
 For instance, a former Japanese DAC delegate was not aware of this.  
4
 Indicated by a DAC Secretariat. 
5
 The criteria may include experience in the recipient countries and with donors, communication skills 
including language, and ability to bridge policy and academic research. 
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source of influence they can have over other members. The processes whereby the 
questions and Terms of References are drafted and in which the consultants are selected 
are influenced by the Secretariat staff. And process matters in convincing all members 
that neutrality or impartiality is being observed. Some DAC members, like Japan, may 
hesitate to see DAC policies as neutral when and where they believe that processes for 
choosing topics, consultants, case studies and the conduct of the studies are in some 
way flawed. The DAC’s claims to base its policies on evidence alone then come into 
question (Hudson, interview, 2012).  
 
This section has discussed the role of Secretariat as providing conditions for collective 
action in the DAC. The Secretariat is a mediator among DAC members and has some 
room to manoeuvre when directing the discussions and finalising agreement in the DAC. 
It also has some discretion in moving the direction according to its own judgment, 
through the processes of collecting data and information, making analysis, preparing 
documents for meetings, drafting summary records, and conducting peer reviews. In 
theory, if the Secretariat is seen to be a less than neutral participant, this might impede 
collective action, by making some members resentful or feel threatened. In practice, 
subtle negotiations and communication between individual members and the Secretariat 
often happen under the surface, which heads off problems. In other words, before a 
member officially shows that it feels uncomfortable and reluctant to cooperate, either 
the Secretariat or the member (or both together) will try to resolve the issue first. In this 
sense, the Secretariat’s manoeuvring power within its discretion can also be beneficial 
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to achieving collective action, alongside neutrality in treating members fairly. However, 
as ‘neutrality’ will always be a subjective judgment of individual members, and 
complete neutrality is very improbable anyway, a balance has to be struck between 
securing trust in its neutrality and manoeuvring towards collective action. 
 
4.3: Delegate-headquarter relationship 
 
The previous section has shown that the Secretariat’s performance is one of the 
conditions for collective action. Turning now to the member governments, these can be 
divided into its DAC delegation and the headquarters, when dealing with the DAC. In 
this section, the relationship between the delegate and headquarters is discussed. If there 
is a clearly shared understanding of the government’s position in the organisation or on 
the issues discussed, between the headquarters and delegate, then the chances of 
achieving collective action might be advanced, relative to where there is inconsistency 
or confusion within the government. In addition, a headquarters’ strong interest in the 
international organisation as well as its capacity such as financial or human resource 
also increases the possibility of contributing to collective action in the DAC, since there 
are limits to what a delegate can do by him/herself. In this section, the participants to 
DAC meetings are layered into technical, managerial and policy levels. It examines the 
relationship of each level to the problem of collective action. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the three layers of delegate-headquarter relationship: High Level 
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Meeting (HLM)/Senior Level Meeting (SLM), DAC regular meetings, and subsidiary 
body meetings, which correspond to the participants’ bureaucratic ranking. The right 
and the left rows show the corresponding member governments’ structure, for the UK 
and Japan respectively. The following part of this section explains the level of mandate 
devolved by the members’ headquarters on the DAC delegates (indicated as ①); the 
level of interest/ concern taken in DAC matters by the headquarters in case of Japan 
(indicated as ②)6; and the level of capacity in case of the UK (indicated as ③). 
 
Figure 4.1: Logic of collective action between headquarters (HQ) and delegation (Japan and UK) 
 
Source: author 
                                                 
6
 The meaning of ‘interest’ refers to positive interest to involve or commit, whereas ‘concern’ refers to 
negative or passive interest. In this chapter, ‘interest’ usually refers to positive meaning. 
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First, the extent to which the DAC delegates are mandated from the headquarters varies 
from country to country. Some countries can have strong and clear instructions from 
their headquarters while others may have more discretion to speak and decide for 
themselves during meetings. What is common is that the delegates understand the 
headquarters’ overall policy, regardless of the level of instructions. Even when they 
seem not to receive detailed instructions, they are given overall policy directions within 
which they need to operate. Japan’s DAC delegate was seen as always behaving 
logically in line with Japanese policy direction; by speaking on issues of their own 
priorities or something distinctive like infrastructure (interview with UK government 
official, 2012). On the other hand, a former Belgium DAC delegate had comparatively 
more responsibility from its headquarters to translate government’s policies (Desmet, 
interview, 2012).
7
 Presumably because the DAC is more regarded as an international 
policy think tank rather than a politically sensitive forum where the country’s national 
interest could be threatened, the headquarters tend not to watch specific issues in the 
DAC very closely but instead trust their DAC delegates.  
 
Some countries are systematically more prepared to be able to respond to the DAC’s 
structure. For instance, in the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), 
a DAC network group connects experts in headquarters who attend subsidiary body 
                                                 
7
 At the same time, the delegate was making efforts to read everything coming from delegations of other 
international organisations or embassies in developing countries, in order to have a clear picture about his 
government’s direction (Desmet, interview, 2012). 
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meetings and the DAC delegate (interview with UK government official, 2012). The 
network aims to share information on the activities of each subsidiary body as well as 
overall DAC direction among the DFID officials, by holding a meeting every 6 months 
in DFID. In addition, the DAC’s subsidiary body groupings correspond with the DFID’s 
sector specialist groupings, such as fragile states, gender and aid effectiveness, which is 
why DFID has advantage in covering all the DAC subsidiary body meetings (ibid). 
Nothing comparable can be found in Japan. Organisational structure affects the 
relationship between the delegates and the headquarters, helping it work smoothly and 
effect a clear division of labour. 
 
Second, the relationship between delegate and headquarters is affected by the level of 
interest taken by the headquarters especially at the policy level. When the headquarters 
sees a strategic or political interest in being involved in the DAC, the delegate is more 
likely to receive instruction and attention from the headquarters. In Japan’s case, shown 
as ② in the Figure 4.1, the level of interest by the headquarters is comparatively low 
and is decreasing. The next section will discuss the reason in detail, but one prominent 
sign is the downgrade of the division in charge of the DAC in Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MoFA) over the last decade. When Japanese official development assistance 
(ODA) was the highest in the DAC during 1990s, there were at least two career 
diplomats and one seconded official fully in charge of DAC affairs in MoFA as a DAC 
team (Uesu, interview, 2012). However, during MoFA’s organisational reform, the 
‘DAC team’ was abolished by late 2000s, and, according to former MoFA official, 
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DAC-related work has been pushed into the corner, representing Tokyo’s disinterest in 
the DAC (interview, 2012).  
 
Nevertheless, low interest by the headquarters does not necessarily always correspond 
to the level of involvement shown by DAC delegates in meetings. Delegates may still 
take personal initiatives, and when they do they are highly valued in the DAC. 
Referring to one of the Japanese DAC delegates, a DAC Secretariat official says “He 
had a good reputation among the Secretariat because he always presented his own 
opinion” (Hayashikawa, interview, 2012, italic by author). According to another 
Secretariat official, collective action in the DAC depends on personalities and 
motivation of individuals : the same Japanese DAC delegate was “bridging between the 
DAC and Tokyo not only in taking initiatives within the government parameters but 
also in pushing further what can be done without having instructions from the 
headquarters” (Massing, interview, 2012, italic by author).  
 
This shows the role the DAC delegates play can go beyond just conveying messages 
and directions from the headquarters. In fact, their individual personality and capacity 
adds value to the collective work in the DAC (Murotani, interview with JICA-RI 
official, 2012), and even the distinction between the individual thinking and institutional 
representation is not always clear cut (UK government official, interview, 2012).
8
 This 
                                                 
8
 Yet, it is important for delegates to distinguish between their own opinion and headquarters’ 
instructions, as is pointed out by a Mexican DAC delegate “A Japanese DAC delegate was professional in 
doing so” (Bracho, interview, 2011). 
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is because the DAC delegates not only represent their government and national interest, 
but also see themselves as members of a DAC community based in Paris and tasked 
with contributing to global interest – so, collective action at the DAC is affected by the 
balance between these two interests. According to a Japanese DAC delegate, a great 
proportion of the DAC delegates’ work is based on individual knowledge and capacity, 
and DAC delegates need to work together rather than relying on the headquarters’ 
orders in order to contribute to collective action (Ishize, interview, 2011).  
 
Third, the relationship between the delegate and the headquarters is also influenced by 
the capacity of the headquarters especially at the technical level. One way to measure 
member countries’ capacity here is the frequency of chairmanship in subsidiary bodies, 
because when member countries want to initiate something one of the easiest ways is to 
become a chair. Since the late 1970s, the UK has taken the chair more often than others, 
in DAC subsidiary body meetings. The UK took 17 (co)chair’s positions, while Japan 
took three vice chair’s positions only and none for the chair.9 Nevertheless, as a DFID 
official who chaired DAC Evaluation Network (EVALNET) experienced, chairmanship 
may not necessarily benefit their governments directly (York, interview, 2012).
10
 
Although being appreciated internationally, he was not gaining credit in DFID when the 
pursuit of global public goods (GPGs) was not seen to be a substantial benefit to the 
government in this case. He called it “a real collective action problem”, adding that he 
                                                 
9
 Compiled and calculated by author based on OECD publications: OECD (1970, 1973-1975, 1978-1984, 
1985a, 1986-2004, 2005a, 2006a, 2007, 2008a, 2009a, 2010, 2011a, 2012). 
10
 He chaired EVALUNET between 2009 and 2012. 
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was even asked by his own colleagues back home whether he still worked for DFID, 
after having travelled to Paris so frequently! This shows the complexity of the balance 
between serving the global interest in the DAC and representing one’s own government. 
 
This section has shown the relations between the headquarters and delegate of a 
member government matters for collective action in the DAC. The level of mandate 
from the headquarters varies among the members: some members are more 
systematically organised than others to respond to the different levels of the DAC 
meetings. A strong level of interest by the headquarters in support of the delegates’ 
contribution to collective action in the DAC can be advantageous. But the individual 
capacity of the DAC delegates can also be important to achieving collective action 
within the DAC. At the technical level, the capacity of the sector advisors contributes to 
collective action, as indicated by being chair of subsidiary bodies. Both the DAC 
delegates and the advisors have mixed feelings towards contributing to the national 
interest, by representing their own government, and to global interest, and this too 
impacts on the prospects for achieving collective action in the DAC. 
 
4.4: Member-member relationships 
 
DAC members are the major players and therefore hold a key role in forming collective 
action in the DAC. The relationship among the members is especially important during 
the agreement process, because once agreement is reached it is then down to the 
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members individually to put the agreement into action. Hypothetically, when there is 
trust among members the possibility of getting collective agreement is higher. Mistrust 
among members will make the possibility of reaching agreement more difficult. In this 
sense, the so-called like-mindedness among DAC members helps it form collective 
action. Chapter 3 showed that during the agreement process the like-minded countries 
often lead the agenda, and some other countries then follow, so making collective action 
more possible. This section identifies the leaders in DAC and investigates the 
relationship between leaders and followers more deeply, by comparing the roles played 
by Japan (follower) and the UK (leader). 
 
The US had taken strong leadership in both establishing and developing the DAC, 
before the early 1990s, as was discussed. Because the DAC was created with US 
intention to increase other nations’ ODA, especially in Europe, the discussions in the 
DAC were focused on the volume of aid during that period. In 1990s, the US’s top 
donor’s position was replaced by Japan. Japan then tried to take some initiatives, most 
notably the Shaping 21
st
 Century report as mentioned in chapter 1, but did not develop 
into a position to lead others. From late 1990s, the leadership in the DAC was taken 
over by the UK together with a few other European countries. The leadership of the UK 
and other ‘like-minded’ countries coincided with their initiative in the World Bank 
(WB), notably the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP); and discussions in the 
DAC shifted from aid volume towards the quality of aid.  
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As was discussed in chapter 2, collective action becomes easier when there is a small 
group of leaders. According to the director of DCD, it is normal to have the pattern of 
leaders and followers, but the different layers of the DAC (i.e., the HLM/SLM to the 
subsidiary bodies) allow all the members to bring each other forward, rather than 
influencing from just one side (Lomøy, interview, 2013a). As a head of peer review 
division says, “There are natural cycles of the donors who are in leading position, but 
the leaders and followers change over time just like a cycling race, that is healthy 
political dynamic” (Jorgensen, interview, 2013). In fact, the Korean leadership during 
Busan High Level Forum (HLF) was not anticipated a decade ago (Lomøy, interview, 
2013a).
11
 So the patterns of leadership, let alone the identity of leaders and followers, 
are not fixed for all time. 
 
Asked about the current situation of leaders in the DAC, many interviewees who are not 
based in Paris answered that the UK has strong leadership in the DAC, whereas those 
who are based in Paris, either as Secretariat or delegates, tend to think that leadership in 
the DAC varies accordingly to issues or topics (Shoji, interview, 2012; Jorgensen, 
interview, 2013), rather than “being a monopoly or dominated by the UK” (Dijkerman, 
interview, 2013). This perception gap may be because the UK’s leadership received 
more recognition from outside than within the DAC, as outsiders only see the end result 
whereas insiders experience the full process by which agreements are finally hammered 
                                                 
11
 As will be discussed in chapter 6, Korea hosted the HLF on Aid Effectiveness in 2011. 
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out.
12
 Hence the impressions gained from within and outside DAC can be very different. 
This is especially so in the DAC, where three layers of meetings take place as well as 
covering a range of different topics (i.e., seven subsidiary bodies), and most outsiders 
are aware of only a few very high profile issues such as aid effectiveness.  
 
Nonetheless, a common perception among the interviewees is that the UK has been a 
leader and Japan a follower. The rest of this section draws on this finding to establish 
the conditions for leadership. Two factors stand out: interest, and capacity. Interest is 
important if members are to be actively involved in DAC activities, because otherwise 
they will not direct their resources to this end. Yet even when members are interested, 
there are cases where their limited capacity does not allow them to fully engage in the 
DAC. The level of capacity affects the outcome of collective action, for as a DAC 
Secretariat says, “If all the members have enough capacity, it is more likely that there 
will be a consensus, though if certain members do not feel being involved, then they are 
more likely to block or feel suspicious about certain agenda” (Massing, interview, 2012). 
Therefore, both interest and capacity are necessary for members to behave proactively, 
and without them members may feel at some distance from the discussions and, perhaps, 
more inclined to be obstructive. The issue of interest is explained further below; 
capacity is discussed later (in section 4.5).  
 
 
                                                 
12
 At the same time, there is also an aspect that Secretariat staff are likely to be careful about naming 
specific donors regarding their positions in the DAC. 
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Table 4.1: Comparison of interest towards the DAC between the UK and Japan 
 UK Japan 
Level of 
interest 
Generally perceived as high. Generally perceived as low. 
Kinds of 
interest 
International leadership. Membership to OECD.  
Influencing others. Field level is more important than policy level. 
Reasons Global interest and national interest are 
aligned. 
Global interest and national interest are 
dissimilar. 
Historical reasons. Historical reasons. 
Visible leadership role.  Rarely takes lead but concerned about 
implementation. 
Source: Author 
 
Table 4.1 compares the level, kinds and reasons for interest between the UK and Japan. 
The level of interest of the UK government is comparatively high. The UK is seen by 
DAC members as “playing a positive and important role, leading as a front runner” 
(Choi, interview with a Korean DAC delegate, 2013). The UK displays a political 
interest in exerting international leadership through the DAC. As an advocacy manager 
of Oxfam Japan pointed out, international development is one of the UK’s prioritised 
national policies, which is valued by the UK’s intellectual elite across politicians, 
bureaucrats and media (Yamada, interview, 2012). For instance, Prime Minister David 
Cameron is a co-chair of the High-Level Panel on the Post 2015 Development Agenda 
in the UN, and in 2013 the UK declared it was the first G8 country to meet the 0.7% 
ODA target. In relation to the DAC, the UK Secretary for State for International 
Development has been co-chairing the Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Co-operation, after the Busan HLF (2011).
13
 In fact, international development is seen 
                                                 
13
 A new forum established in 2011 to discuss effectiveness of aid and development is discussed in 
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as a “golden heritage” for the coalition government (Watkins, 2010, p.2). 
 
Exerting its leadership internationally, the UK tries to influence other donors. A DAC 
Secretariat staff who is an ex-DFID official says “DFID has a sense of global 
consciousness about not just making its own aid good but all aid” (Ward, interview, 
2012), because “we want all the possible contribution to be as effective as possible, and 
not just ours” (interview with UK government official, 2012). According to Eyben, who 
previously worked as DFID chief social development advisor during 1990s, utilising the 
DAC in order to disseminate particular policies and influence a wider community was a 
standard practice in DFID (interview, 2012). One of the reasons that the UK participates 
in the DAC is precisely because “It is a useful vehicle to influence others” (Ward, 
interview, 2012); and “DFID can punch above its weight by trying to get their views 
across” (White, interview, 2012).  
 
Behind the way that the UK exerts its leadership, there exists a mixture of global and 
national interest. The way that the UK prioritises international development and 
influences others contributes to global interest in reducing poverty. And yet its ambition 
to take international leadership can also be seen as a national interest, by acquiring 
influential power or voice through soft power; hence, ‘development’ is used as one of 
the instruments to increase the UK’s influence in the world. In reality, it is difficult to 
always distinguish sharply between the global interest and national interest. A DAC 
                                                                                                                                               
chapter 6.  
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Secretariat staff agrees that the UK has a strategic objective to influence global policy 
process, and yet observes subtly that “The UK is not necessarily using the DAC for 
their own pre-defined agenda (that is to say, positions), but they are using it to advance 
their prioritised agenda to be discussed in the DAC” (Massing, interview, 2012). A 
Japanese academic says “the UK’s national interest (i.e., influential voice) and global 
interest (i.e., development) is consistent with each other” (Shimomura, interview, 2012). 
This explains why DFID is able to pursue a global objective while advancing its 
national interest at the same time; DFID does not need to put “national interest” up front 
in their work (Verger, interview with DAC Secretariat, 2012).  
 
How about Japan? Japan’s explicit leadership in the DAC is not recognisable, except for 
a brief time when it made some effort on Shaping the 21
st
 Century report in 1996. Why 
has Japan not taken the lead, even during 1990s when it was the top donor?  
 
To begin with, as DAC norms are different from those that are typical of Japan’s ODA, 
Japan experiences discomfort in trying to become central to DAC. For example, clear 
differences can be observed in terms of ODA provision. Having been the only Asian 
member for long time, the geographical disbursement of Japanese ODA has focused on 
Asia rather than Africa where most DAC donors now concentrate. In 2012, the 
proportion of Japan’s ODA net disbursement to Asia was 48.7%, whereas the DAC 
average was 25.8%.
14
 Japan has indeed increased its ODA to Africa over the last 
                                                 
14
 OECD Stat Extract data (http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/, Accessed: 20 Mar 2014). 
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decade from 10.4% (2002) to 26.9% (2012), whereas DAC average was 34.4% (2012). 
In a second difference, Japan provides more loans compared to other DAC members. In 
2002, the percentage of Japanese loan aid of the total ODA was 34.6% while the DAC 
average was 2.6%.  
 
The existence of these two important differences has consequences for how DAC 
policies are formulated. For instance, the aid effectiveness agenda originated from the 
problems experienced in Africa, where aid fragmentation was undermining development, 
and initiated new aid programmes (e.g., budget support). Since Japanese aid was 
concentrated on Asia through loan aid projects, Japanese bureaucrats did not have 
strong reasons to adopt the new agenda, or even tried to avoid it.
15
 These experiences in 
reacting to the new DAC agenda, which rests on premises that are not shared by Japan, 
increased Japan’s distance from the DAC. A former director of DCD says “It is unfair 
that Japan has been criticised in the DAC because of its different outlook from others” 
(Carey, interview, 2012). As a result, MoFA’s attitude towards the DAC became 
receptive as to the level “to check carefully any signs that may lead to conditions in 
which Japanese aid becomes difficult to be implemented” (Watanabe S., interview with 
MoFA official, 2012).
16
 
 
                                                 
15
 This point will be further discussed in chapter 6. 
16
 A similar point was also mentioned that Japan tries to reduce the level of disadvantage it might receive, 
resulted in obstructing the vision and framework other countries set in DAC (Yamada, interview, 2012). 
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Not only are the ways that ODA is provided affected, but also there is some distance 
between Japan and the DAC over how policies are discussed and agreed in the DAC. 
One of the major criticisms of the DAC among the Japanese community is its excessive 
focus on ideas and impractical theory, which may not truly reflect the reality of 
developing countries. Japan’s ODA policies derive from practices on the ground, as a 
Japanese DAC delegate says, “Rather than entering from idea, we extract cases from 
practices” (Okano, interview, 2012). In fact, Japan’s ODA experiences are based on a 
“hands-on approach” in Asia, with a physical presence, contrary to a typical Western 
“framework approach” that emphasises procedural efficiency (Ohno, 2013, p.10). The 
framework approach predominates in the DAC as it is more focused on the process of 
aid provision. A former Overseas Development Institute (ODI) director’s words 
illustrate this point well: “Japanese may not feel comfortable in this world of normative 
frameworks” (Maxwell, interview, 2012).  
 
The DAC has provided a multilateral forum in which bilateral donors are engaged in 
diplomacy in development. This is different from both bilateral aid (donor-recipient 
relationship) and multilateral aid (donor-international organisations relationship), and it 
is the relationship among the donors that matters most in the DAC. However, because 
Japan’s government tends to care more about the relationship with recipient countries 
than the relationship with other donors,
17
 Japan has “a sense of incongruity, and 
                                                 
17
 For instance, making efforts in responding to recipients’ expectations is taken as more important than 
justifying its positions at the international level (Mitamura, interview with a government official, 2012). 
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therefore, not fully seated in the DAC”, according to one Japanese academic (Ohno, 
interview, 2012).
18
 And this reaction by Japan leaves it less able to lead even during the 
period when it was a top donor (Hewitt, interview with ODI senior researcher, 2012). 
 
Nevertheless, the DAC is not the only example in this regard, in part for reasons deeply 
rooted in Japan’s ODA history; starting from reparations to neighbouring Asian 
countries after World War II, and then addressing the need to balance a growing trade 
surplus with the US (Kurata, interview with House of Councillors Secretariat, 2012). 
Some interviewees noted Japan’s lack of pro-activeness rooted in its defeat in World 
War II, after which renouncing military power and separation from diplomacy became 
standard (Takahashi M., interview with Japanese academic, 2012); Japanese people 
came to feel resistant about exporting their own thinking or attempting to change the 
world order (Yoshikawa, interview with Japanese ambassador to OECD, 2013).
19
 This 
is because some see proposing Japan’s own values as being associated with its colonial 
history (Kurata, interview, 2012). On the other hand, the UK has a sense of guilt as well 
as responsibility for the former colonies (Ward, interview, 2012) and therefore, accepts 
paying for the cost of world order at the same time (Takahashi M., interview, 2012). 
 
So, is Japan a follower in the DAC? One DAC Secretariat official answers “That is a 
                                                 
18
 Professor Ohno participated in DAC meetings such as China-DAC Study Group. 
19
 According to Yoshikawa, Japanese politicians are typically sensitive about Japan contributing to 
forming the global political order, as it is likely to involve not only ideas but military power as well 
(interview, 2013).  
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short selling of Japan, as it is more than a follower” (Jorgensen, interview, 2013). 
However, Japan is not a leader in the DAC, and is perceived as “punching below its 
weight, in spite of interesting initiatives such as Triangular Cooperation or Human 
Security” (Neergaard, interview with Danish DAC delegate, 2012). This is echoed by 
the director of DCD who said Japan (and Germany) are underutilising opportunities to 
project their national image through taking leadership (Lomøy, interview, 2013a). Also, 
in spite of Japan’s long experience in Asia, “how much developmental impact and 
results Japan brought to Asia is not fully understood by others” (Carey, interview with a 
former director of DCD, 2012). Something similar can be observed at subsidiary body 
level, where a former chair of EVALNET thinks “The potential to work with Japan has 
not been fully developed, even it is a big donor, and more involvement could be 
expected” (York, interview, 2012). The factors affecting Japan’s underutilisation not 
only come from the low level of interest but also its limited capacity, which is discussed 
later (section 4.5). 
 
Yet, the direction of wind has recently been changing in favour of Japan. As discussed 
in chapter 1, the global economy is shifting its pivot from West to East, and the DAC 
has no real alternative choice but to adjust itself to the new realities, by increasing its 
membership for instance. Considering the increasing role of ODA in catalysing other 
sources for development, and the increasing influence of non-DAC countries’ aid 
provision, the DAC is now mandated by ministers to revise its ODA definition and 
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standard of measurement.
20
 These can be seen a shift towards where Japanese aid can 
be more appreciated, and Japan may become less distanced (Carey, interview, 2012), 
though the shift was made because of the change of the global architecture and not due 
to any initiative by Japan (Ishize, interview, 2011).
21
  
 
Instead, Japan’s recent initiative is found outside of the DAC, such as setting up the 
Asia Development Forum to discuss emerging policy issues on development among the 
Asian countries.
22
 The Forum aims to represent Asian voices in the new international 
frameworks on development, such as the post-2015 Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) of the UN, or the Busan Global Partnership (MoFA website).
23
 Japanese 
interviewees refer to such initiative as ‘Asian DAC’, in contrast to the one dominated by 
European countries. For the Japanese government, it may be logical to invest its 
resource and knowledge in regional initiatives like that (Okano, interview, 2013), 
especially now the global economy is shifting towards the East.  
 
To conclude, this section has shown that DAC members do not all have the same level 
of interest in the DAC. In forming collective action, a pattern of leaders and followers 
can prove helpful. But the leaders have their own reasons for taking on leadership, 
sometimes using the DAC to achieve their own purposes. This means it has to be done 
                                                 
20
 This should be finished by the end of 2014 (OECD Archives, 2014). 
21
 Some new growth agenda such as Public-Private Partnership have been on the rise but not recognised 
as Japan’s agenda (Okano, interview, 2012).  
22
 The first forum was held in Korea in 2010 followed by Japan, Thailand and Indonesia annually.  
23
 http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/doukou/kaigi/04asia_kaihatsu_g.html (accessed 12 July 2014). 
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with care in order not to jeopardise trust among members, for that effect can then  
make achieving collective action more problematic.  
 
4.5: Domestic environment 
 
The domestic environment of the member countries furnishes another condition for 
securing collective action. In this section, four domestic actors will be presented:  
politicians, bureaucrats, CSOs and researchers. Like many other international 
organisations, the members of the DAC are the ‘governments’. So the involvement of 
politicians and bureaucrats is a more primary concern compared to the roles played by 
academics and CSOs. When politicians show a strong interest in the DAC, bureaucrats 
will have to follow their example. When both the politicians and bureaucrats are 
interested in the DAC discussions and are fully committed to agreements that are 
reached there, then the prospects for achieving collective action all the way through 
from agenda formation to implementation are good. And yet other actors such as CSOs 
and researchers might be able to influence the government’s role, by applying pressure 
or providing support to the government’s capacity to contribute to collective action. 
 
In this section, the domestic conditions are decomposed into government policy and the 
four aforementioned domestic actors. By comparing evidence from the UK and Japan 
this section identifies conditions which affect the two countries’ contribution towards 
collective action in the DAC.  
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Table 4.2: Comparison of domestic environment between the UK and Japan 
 UK Japan 
Government 
policy 
・Development is prioritised as a national 
priority.  
・ Strategy for utilising International 
Organisations (IOs) (Secondment to IOs). 
・National interest= taking leadership in 
international development. 
・ODA is set as a foundation of foreign 
relations, but no philosophy regarding 
ODA. 
・Bilateral relations are prioritised over 
multilateral forum. 
・National interest= materialistic gains 
rather than soft power, and how ODA 
can improve Japan’s economy. 
Politicians ・Political interest on development was 
formed over the history of UK aid. 
・Politicians’ incentives to support for 
international development is low.  
Bureaucrats ・High motivation and capacity of staff for 
development and poverty reduction. 
・Flexibility of staff recruitment (CSOs, 
researchers). 
・Two layers of MoFA for ODA policy 
and JICA for implementation. 
・MoFA has influence over politicians, 
but JICA has more knowledge than 
MoFA. 
CSOs ・Long-established CSO community for 
development advocacy (many HQs in 
UK). 
・ CSOs contribute to monitoring  
government’s compliance and help  
government’s agenda setting as well. 
・CSOs are more involved in service 
delivery than  policy advocacy. 
・ CSOs monitor government’s 
compliance with international policies. 
Research ・Long-established, internationally leading 
research community on development. 
・Consultancy for IOs including the DAC. 
・Research on development and policy is 
weak; universities started development 
studies only in 1990s. 
Source: Author 
 
Table 4.2 compares the domestic environment of UK and Japan. In the UK, the 
domestic environment is favourable for the UK government to take a leadership role 
internationally including in the DAC. Since international development is a UK national 
policy, and as UK takes a lead on global poverty reduction, politicians have an interest 
148 
 
in steering the DAC’s international development agenda. With the benefit of strong 
political leadership, UK bureaucrats are proactively engaged in international forums, 
including the DAC. Within the government, institutional capacity is established in order 
to exert its leadership. There are also long-established CSOs and a research community 
that complement the capabilities of the UK’s leadership. There exists a common 
recognition among domestic actors in the UK that leadership in this field is important. 
 
In contrast, the domestic environment in Japan is not favourable for it to contribute to 
collective action in this way. There is no shared understanding on why Japan provides 
ODA, in other words philosophy, among domestic actors. Politicians are not so much 
interested in ODA policy. And without political leadership, bureaucrats lack incentives 
to engage proactively in international forums like the DAC. The CSOs and research 
community are also recent and not well established. The rest of this section assesses 
these conditions in the UK and Japan in more detail.  
 
Government Policy 
The UK has a clear strategy in utilising international organisations. For instance, the 
DFID began independent assessment of multilateral organisations in 2011, which was 
followed up in 2013 in a report Multilateral Aid Review (DFID, 2013). Although the 
DAC is not included, the report implies the DFID’s seriousness in scrutinising the 
international organisations.
24
 The UK also seconds “25-30 high calibre DFID staff” to 
                                                 
24
 DAC is not included, as it does not directly provide aid to developing countries. 
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international organisations and bilateral agencies in order to “help strengthen the 
effectiveness of the international system and build DFID’s understanding and networks” 
(DFID, 2012, p.1). DFID’s seconded staff are very visible to other actors as well 
(Hudson; Tomimoto; Furukawa, interview, 2012).  
 
An advocacy manager of Oxfam Japan adds that UK aid policy is led by an elite class 
comprising politicians, bureaucrats, CSOs, academics and media, which may not be 
entirely representative or reflective of people in the UK (Yamada, interview, 2012). In 
fact, 64% of respondents to a public opinion survey by Institute of Development Studies 
(IDS) thought UK government should focus more on tackling domestic poverty than 
abroad, and 57% did not support government’s policy of ring-fencing aid spending 
(Henson & Lindstrom, 2010, pp.1-2).
25
 But in recent times the government has been 
committed to increasing UK ODA to the target of 0.7% of GNI. According to a British 
academic, certain political decisions in the UK, including international aid, are not 
reflective of public opinion, partly because politicians are from middle to upper class 
(White, interview, 2012), meaning they do what they believe in regardless of public 
opinion.  
 
In contrast, Japan’s aid policy is characterised as ‘reactive’. In spite of the existence of 
Japan’s ODA Charter in which the purpose of ODA is stipulated, there is no real overall 
vision or firm consensus over what Japan aims for by providing ODA (Jin, interview, 
                                                 
25
 The report was a result of monitoring over 1,000 respondents for two times.  
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2012).
26
 That is why a Japanese ambassador to the OECD argues for establishing solid 
domestic support in the first place by agreeing and sharing the philosophy of aid among 
Japanese people, which may also lead to Japan’s proactive behaviour internationally in 
the long run (Yoshikawa, interview, 2013). Because of the low level of interest and 
support for ODA among the people, Japan’s politicians and media are passive about 
supporting for the ODA. As a result, the bureaucrats have more control in deciding aid 
policy, and, Japan’s interaction with the DAC has been reactive and responsive. Even 
during the 1990s when Japan was providing the largest aid volume, “Japan did not have 
any guts or idea to take initiatives in the DAC” (Hattori, interview with former Japanese 
ambassador to OECD, 2012).  
 
One of the underlying factors for Japan’s reactive position is that Japan has always felt a 
sense of incongruity in the DAC (Sugishita; Ohno, interview, 2012). Since there are 
differences between the European countries and Japan, not only about their aid policies 
but also in the logic of their thinking, it is less likely that Japanese value or voices are 
heard or reflected in the DAC (Araki; Shimomura; Watanabe S., interview, 2012). 
Consequently it is less likely that Japan will utilise the DAC as a channel to proactively 
publicise Japanese aid (Japanese government official, interview, 2012). The situation 
then becomes self-fulfilling and self-perpetuating. Another factor is that the Japanese 
government has valued the importance of aid volume for a long time, in contrast to 
                                                 
26
 The purpose of ODA in the Charter is “to contribute to the peace and development of the international 
community, and thereby to help ensure Japan's own security and prosperity” (MoFA, 2003). 
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DAC’s focus on bringing ideas and knowledge for improving aid quality. This may be 
understood as the government’s strategy in prioritising loan aid (Araki, interview, 2012). 
Here, a Japanese ambassador to OECD’s allegorical explanation of the importance of 
aid volume is worth noting: Although DAC discusses how to clean 10 dollar note, 10 
dollar note cannot be 100 dollar note, no matter how well you clean (Yoshikawa, 
interview, 2013). Yet, as Japanese ODA volume has declined and now ranks only fifth 
among DAC donors, Japan’s government need also in making more effort to improve 
its aid quality as well (Kurata, interview, 2012). 
 
Politicians 
Political leadership strongly influences the level of collective action. In the UK, 
recognition of international aid as a major part of UK’s profile is shared amongst all 
leaders of the three main parties. This reflects how they want the UK to be seen in the 
world (Ward, interview, 2012). Among others, Clare Short’s leadership under the Blair 
Government in 1997 was exceptional. According to a former director of DCD, after the 
Labour Party took power in 1997 the UK became almost a leader of the DAC overnight 
(Cary, interview, 2012), due to Short’s strong and visionary leadership, both her 
idealistic motivation and wanting to make full use of research and develop ideas (Jolly, 
interview, 2012).  
 
Nevertheless, the UK had a structural strength in political leadership even before 1997 
(White, interview, 2012), especially when after the 1980s international aid became a 
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cross-party issue in discussions (Hewitt, interview, 2012). The establishment of the All 
Party Parliamentary Group on Overseas Development in 1984 with the participation of 
150 politicians across the parties was important in building political interest and 
leadership. As a founder who ran the group for over 20 years, Hewitt explains the 
reasons for setting up the group: political interest had to be cultivated, because under the 
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government international development was neglected 
at that time (ibid). The political interest and leadership shown by the UK should not be 
seen as the default condition, but instead, as a result of long-time consolidation. 
 
Politicians also try to influence the public’s views on international development, as was 
the case for Clare Short who tried to mobilise public support through setting regional 
conferences and meeting with local NGOs (Short, interview, 2012). By doing so the 
increase in public support helped change the views of Prime Minister Tony Blair and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, neither of whom initially focused on 
international development but eventually helped lead the Gleneagles G8 Summit in July 
2005. That spotlighted aid to Africa and debt cancellation, in recognition of the growing 
popularity of these causes among the UK public (ibid). 
 
The change of government from Labour to Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition in 
2010 was a big concern for the UK development community, though surprisingly the 
UK’s position as a leader in international development was not damaged. The incoming 
government kept to its predecessors’ promise on the level of ODA. The budget was 
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protected against cuts presumably as part of “detoxifying the Conservative image” 
(Hudson; Hewitt, interview, 2012) and also due to a political calculation that degrading 
the international development policy would cost more, considering the number of aid 
supporters in the UK (Jolly, interview, 2012). 
 
In Japan, political leadership is very weak because politicians are aware that their voters 
in the constituencies do not favour supporting international development. For instance, 
according to a former politician, his voters scold him when appealing for providing 
ODA to poor people abroad. This is because their living conditions are also harsh.
27
 
This dilemma of politicians is fairly common, which is why the number of politicians 
who are supportive of ODA for global interest is very limited (Kanda; Kanayama, 
interview, 2012). Consequently, aid discussions in political fora in Japan tend to dwell 
on relevance to the national interest, through the mechanism of tied aid to benefit 
Japanese companies, for instance (more on this in chapter 5).  
 
Similar to the UK, there was a change of government in Japan in 2009, from Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) to Democratic Party (DP) after more than 50 years’ rule by the 
LDP. However, the change did not alter Japan’s aid policy – political interest remained 
low. Moreover, the Tohoku earthquake in 2011 increased the emphasis on bilateral aid 
                                                 
27
 A comment made by Tadashi Inuzuka on 5
 
Mar 2007 at National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 
during seminar series to discuss reforming Japan’s ODA held monthly over a year, in which the writer 
participated (http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/newpage2008/oda_salon/mtg6/minutes.pdf, accessed 1 July 
2014).  
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with national interest attached.
28
 As a result, Japan’s ODA policy came to focus more 
on bilateral aid at the expense of contributing to international organisations, which has 
annually fallen since 2011.
29
 Also, with a supplementary budget in 2011 of 5 billion 
yen, ODA was used to revitalise the economy in the affected region of Japan, through 
exports of the affected region’s industrial equipment and processed marine products to 
developing countries (MoFA, 2012, p38). So, Japan’s ODA policy has moved closer to 
domestic orientation and away from the global interest.  
 
Bureaucrats 
How do bureaucrats influence the conditions for collective action? In the UK, DFID is 
in charge of international development, handing 86% of UK aid in 2008 (OECD, 2010a, 
p.48). DFID was created in 1997 when the Labour party took power. Before the 1997 
election, Clare Short was asked by Tony Blair to advise him on whether to have an 
independent department for development, and concluded that such a department headed 
by a cabinet minister should stand, after consulting with leading think-tanks and 
Permanent Secretary (PS) of Overseas Development Administration (later DFID) 
(Manning, 2007, p.553-554). Then PS of the Administration, John Vereker, also recalled 
that his discussions with Short established the decision to set up the new department, 
disentangling responsibility for aid from the Foreign Office, in a reasonably planned 
and controlled manner (Vereker, 2002, p.137). Therefore, although DFID’s founding 
                                                 
28
 According to some interviewees, securing ODA budget or getting ODA projects approved became 
difficult without justifying direct benefit to Japan. 
29
 Information on MoFA website 
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/sonota/k_kikan_25/pdfs/gaiyo.pdf, accessed 1 Jul 2014). 
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was led by a political decision the bureaucracy provided significant support. From 2009 
under the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government, DFID has 
remained an independent department with cabinet representation for the first time in the 
history of UK aid (under previous Conservative governments its affairs were integrated 
into the Foreign Office). The establishment of DFID was, then, an important condition 
for the UK to put its resources behind achieving collective action in the DAC. It 
allowed the DFID to be protected from interference by other departments with interests 
that could well conflict with DFID’s aims and commitment to the global interest.  
 
DFID staff are known to be committed to global poverty reduction and to gaining 
special recognition both internationally and domestically. The UK government civil 
service capability review in 2009 states;  
 
DFID is a well-run department. It has impressive leadership that is complemented 
by high-quality and committed staff. It is admired internationally throughout the 
donor community, and is regarded as a leader (O’Donell, 2009, p.7). 
 
According to Myles Wickstead, who has a long time career with DFID in Whitehall 
“DFID and the Treasury have always been the most popular ministries in the UK” 
(interview, 2012), and by recruiting of top-level staff from outside DFID has developed 
as “an enviable reputation in Whitehall as a department with well-respected 
top-management and in particular a strong sense of direction” (Manning, 2007, p.561). 
The UK government’s capability review in 2012 concluded DFID as a leading donor 
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with highly engaged professional staff (DFID, 2013a, p.2). With the UK government’s 
commitment to evidence-based policy making, a large number of technical specialists 
came to be employed in DFID (Barder, 2005, p.26), accounted for 25% of DFID staff of 
total 2,750 in 2011-2012 (DFID, 2013b), contributing to UK leadership in international 
aid. 
 
DFID’s employment is dynamic, inviting academics and CSOs in their mid-career with 
strong commitment to fight poverty, to a level that it sees itself as “a big NGO” rather 
than a part of the government (Wickstead, interview, 2012). Also, as John Vereker who 
spent eight years as a PS of Overseas Development Administration and DFID says, the 
parliamentary environment around the DFID is more supportive than in the US or Japan, 
where bureaucrats have to spend a fair proportion of their time “in a barely disguised 
series of hostilities with their legislators” (Vereker, 2002, p.134). In the UK the 
International Development Act of 2002 clearly stated that aid should NOT be used for 
any purpose other than poverty reduction, which makes it easier for DFID to 
concentrate on its development goals. 
 
In Japan, the condition of bureaucratic structure is much more complex. First, there are 
institutional complications both at horizontal and vertical level. At horizontal level, the 
bureaucratic work in relation to the DAC is linked to three ministries of MoFA, 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), 
depending on the issues discussed. Primarily it is MoFA which is in charge and attends 
157 
 
DAC meetings, although sometimes officials from other ministries also attend. The 
division of labour between MoF, in charge of development banks (the WB), and MoFA, 
in charge of the DAC, undermines effective coordination within the government, 
especially because international development policies are interrelated across multilateral 
development organisations.
30
 MoFA and METI have opposing interests. Whereas METI 
pursues and protects national interests to benefit Japanese companies such as through 
tied aid (see chapter 5), “MoFA can secure its legitimacy by converging to the DAC” 
(Shimomura, interview, 2012). The different positions of MoFA and METI is reflected 
by the fact that two ministries previously published ODA White Paper separately;
31
 and 
unlike METI the MoFA’s ODA White Paper for a long time talked about the need for 
improving its aid quality through aid coordination; A Japanese academic infers that 
MoFA was trying to inform the public about international pressure on Japan in order to 
provide aid in a manner that is not shameful (Takahashi M., interview, 2012).  
 
There is a vertical division in bureaucratic structure as well; MoFA is in charge of aid 
policy, and JICA is an implementation agency. However, in reality, some posts in MoFA 
are complemented by seconded JICA officials because of the lack of specialisation of 
MoFA officials in development.
32
 MoFA officials are diplomats; and more specialised 
                                                 
30
 In the UK, the responsibility for the WB was transferred from the Treasury to DFID by Clare Short’s 
initiative. 
31
 METI published annual report titled “Keizai Kyouryoku No Genjyo To Mondaiten (Situation and 
Challenges of Economic Cooperation)” between 1961 and 1999, in which a few pages were spent on the 
updated activities of the DAC as well. 
32
 While some countries separate the career paths of diplomats and development specialists within the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this is not true for Japan. However, from early 2000s MoFA started 
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knowledge and experience on aid and development are accumulated in JICA. This point 
is well recognised even outside of Japan’s aid community. Asked about the challenges 
for Japan, a DAC chair indicated that with limited expertise on development MoFA’s in 
charge of DAC can be the main issue (Atwood, interview, 2012). A former ODI fellow, 
who also participated in DAC meetings, observed that good technicians are needed at 
the table, to speak openly, implying that Japanese participants at DAC meetings give an 
impression of being bureaucrats rather than experts (Christiansen, interview, 2012). All 
these indicate a subtle structural issue between MoFA and JICA with regard to dealing 
with aid matters, “which is also true for other donors with similar institutional setting” 
(York, interview, 2012). 
 
The bureaucratic divide certainly does not help the Japanese government make an 
effective contribution to collective action in the DAC. The horizontal structure among 
MoFA, METI and MoF is a coordination issue, though the vertical structure between 
MoFA and JICA involves capacity issue as well. For MoFA, the DAC is their own 
matter. It was only after the mid-1990s that JICA started to participate in the DAC 
subsidiary body meetings, and during the early days, JICA had to seek approval from 
MoFA for attendance at DAC meetings (Furukawa, interview, 2012). For MoFA 
officials, it is their job to attend and give presentations, because the DAC is an 
international organisation that involves diplomacy (Uesu, interview, 2012). Yet, the 
                                                                                                                                               
“Specialist System” by which some diplomats are authorised for their specialisations, such as economic 
cooperation and regional specialisation, but the numbers remain small. 
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overall involvement of MoFA in DAC is weak, because of the low level of political 
leadership and support from its headquarters, as was discussed. 
 
JICA itself is not monolithic either: this too undermines its ability to effectively utilise 
its knowledge and expertise. First, JICA officials are generally not interested in policies 
discussed in the DAC. One reason preventing JICA from being involved in the DAC is 
that “JICA’s organisational structure is based on sectors (e.g., education, water) whereas 
DAC subsidiary body is organised around sector-wide issues” (Mitamura, interview, 
2012). This contrasts with the UK, where DFID advisors are structured in line with the 
DAC’s subsidiary body structure. As a result, JICA officials have less incentive to 
contribute fully to DAC meetings and are easily distracted by their own operational 
work. Also, the knowledge and experiences that are diverse at country level are not 
systematically brought together by JICA (Asai, interview, 2012). This makes 
meaningful and effective communication onwards to the DAC that much more difficult.  
 
Within JICA, there is a gap between a handful of people who mainly work for policy at 
the international level, including secondment to MoFA, and the majority who work at 
operational level. The division between the two levels within JICA was referred in 
relevance to “air fight and ground war” by a JICA official (Yamamoto, interview, 
2012).
33
 According to him, most of the important international aid policies are framed 
                                                 
33
 He has worked in France, the US and the UK as well as currently as a JICA EU representative for over 
13 years. 
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in Washington, New York, Paris and London, and those who win the air fight also 
control the whole war – this is why policy level work is important, even if it is slighted 
in JICA. This shows multiple difficulties beset any ambition to connect country-level 
operational work and policy level work. 
 
The complex nature of Japanese bureaucracy obstructs effective involvement in the 
DAC. Compared to the UK’s DFID, where less internal negotiation or coordination is 
necessary, Japanese bureaucratic structure exhibits a “completely different internal 
landscape”, with different incentives applying to different stakeholders (Evans, 
interview, 2012). The lack of political leadership leaves MoFA trying to deal with the 
DAC without institutional back-up. On-the-ground experiences accumulated within 
JICA are not fully integrated into policy-making by Japan’s government (Hayashikawa; 
Yamada; Ijiri et al., interview, 2012), although some JICA officials are aware of the role 
it could play in backing-up MoFA’s work at policy level. This implies the possibility of 
a more proactive contribution by Japan in the DAC if a proper mechanism to utilise 
JICA’s expertise can be established. There is scope for Japan to shape or improve 
international aid policy but the contribution must come from its country-level 
experiences and in ways that resonate with the DAC.  
 
In contrast to a weak institutional setting in Japanese government, individual figures and 
their capacity are relatively strong. Sadako Ogata, a former United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees and later a president of JICA until 2012, is one of a handful 
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of Japanese figures known widely in international aid (Atwood; Hewitt; Riddell; 
interview, 2012). Riddell remembers Ogata’s answer when he met her a few years ago 
and asked about the challenge for Japanese aid; “Japanese aid needs to be opened up 
and international awareness needs to be brought into its bureaucracy” (interview, 2012). 
Similarly in the bureaucracy, individual motivation and capacity can contribute to taking 
proactive leadership. An example is Hattori, who led the report Shaping the 21
st
 Century 
(Sugishita, interview with a former journalist, 2012). According to Hattori, who later 
became Japanese ambassador to OECD, “What matters for organizations is individual’s 
will and motivation in making their work influential” (interview, 2012). As bureaucratic 
inertia prevails in the absence of strong and dynamic political pressure, bold reforms or 
proactive interactions can only happen if individual bureaucrats are committed.
34
 
Consequently, it is possible that although Japanese individuals work actively for 
international development the institutional image of Japanese government still remains 
negative. A British academic who worked for the UN system sees Japanese individuals 
as “the very best aid technicians with strong commitment who understand international 
discourse and try to build local capacity” (Riddell, interview, 2012). In contrast with this, 
he evaluates the Japanese government as “narrow absolutist and reluctant collaborator, 
but not a proactive advance” (Riddell, 2007, p.143). The discrepancy between 
individuals’ willingness to contribute to collective action and the situation at a broader 
institutional level should be recognised even if the individuals are unable to address the 
                                                 
34
 However, this could also give an impression of “individual bureaucrats controlling policies according 
to their own interests” (Takahashi M., interview with Japanese academic, 2012). 
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structural reasons that account for institutional weakness. 
 
Civil society organisations 
CSOs community can contribute to supporting their government’s role in collective 
action in the DAC in two ways: providing information or advice that the government 
needs, and monitoring and trying to put pressure on its activities. This section compares 
the UK and Japan in respect of CSOs and the relationship with government, regarding 
ODA, as summarised in Table 4.3 below. 
 
Table 4.3: Comparison of CSOs aid community between the UK and Japan 
 UK Japan 
Emergence of NGOs Long-established charity culture. From 1980s with international pressure. 
Types of NGOs Advocacy type is dominant.  Service delivery type is dominant. 
Number of 
Development NGOs 
400 registered with BOND. More than 400, with 94 registered with 
JANIC. 
Government-NGOs 
relationship 
Equal, constructive relationship. Superiority of government over NGOs. 
Source: author 
 
The UK’s NGO community for international development is one of the oldest, largest 
and most diverse worldwide (Randel & German, 1999, p.236), and civil society 
including NGOs are the most influential key constituency for international development 
(Hudson & Jonsson, 2009, p.9). In 1995, 200,000 charity organisations are registered 
(Randel & German, 1999, p.236), and through media and volunteering activities, 
developing countries are integrated within British society (Ward, interview, 2012).  
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From 1990s, advocacy and policy activities became a trend amongst the NGOs, with 
“only a few conservative NGOs opting out of the trend” (Hudson, 2000, p.6). British 
Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND) is an overall umbrella body for NGOs 
working in international development to influence government and policy-makers, with 
400 registered members. It was established in 1993 with financial support from 
Overseas Development Administration (and later DFID), after dialogue between the 
Administration and NGOs representatives to set a link between the government and 
NGOs (Randel & German, 1999, p.238). So, there was UK government intention to set 
up such an organization; It received financial support from DFID – in 2012/13 
amounting to £340,000, equal to 15% of its annual income (Sayer Vincent Auditors & 
Advisors, 2013).  
 
In spite of funding support from the government Britain’s NGOs are involved in policy 
and advocacy activities independent from the government, and the relationship between 
the government and CSOs in the UK can be characterized as ‘constructive’ or ‘mutually 
beneficial’. BOND for instance insists on its independence notwithstanding the DFID 
grant.
35
 That a financial donor should become a target of NGO’s advocacy is not 
particularly problematic in the UK, partly because NGOs take a diplomatic approach to 
                                                 
35
 BOND’s submission to the new government’s White Paper in 1997 clearly states that “NGOs do not 
see themselves primarily as contractors for the delivery of DFID objectives using DFID cash, but as 
organisations with similar objectives to DFID but with different strength” (Randel and German, 1999, 
p.239). 
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advocacy interacting with the government in a constructive manner (Hudson, 2002, 
p.413). In fact, the strong NGO community in the UK has been able to “shout louder 
with stronger voices towards the UK government to be ambitious” (Rabinowitz, 
interview, 2012).  
 
The government also counts on the CSOs’ ability to mobilise public opinion as well as 
complement the government’s knowledge. As a former Secretary of State for 
International Development says, NGOs are very important to the minister especially 
when the department is in danger of facing budget cuts, due to their campaigning ability 
(Short, interview, 2012). According to Claire Godfrey, a senior policy advisor at Oxfam 
GB, UK NGOs collaborate with counterparts in other countries in order to influence 
other governments for our own sake; for instance we can influence Japanese 
government through Oxfam Japan (interview, 2012). Given the NGO’s global network it 
is possible that the UK government perceives NGOs as an alternative avenue to their 
own channels. In addition, a number of former NGOs staff serve in DFID, and vice 
versa (Warrener, interview, 2012), helping build a constructive relationship between 
DFID and NGOs.  
 
In Japan, the CSO community emerged only from late 1980s and 1990s – almost 40 
years later than some OECD counterparts (Reimann, 2010). Until the 1980s the number 
of Japanese international development NGOs was the lowest among major OECD 
countries, but international norms and pressure subsequently increased Japanese 
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government’s support for NGOs (ibid). Yet, Japanese CSOs lack professionalization and 
have exceptionally few full-time staff. Pekkanen points out the bureaucrats may be 
fearful that strong growth of NGO’s expertise in policy could come to rival or 
undermine the bureaucracy (2006, p.176). Compared to the UK then, Japan’s advocacy 
CSOs are weak and have very limited resources (Reimann, 2010, p.46). Their 
relationship with the government can best be described as ‘cautious’. 
 
Like BOND in the UK, the Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) 
serves as umbrella body for NGOs working for international development. Established 
in 1987 by an initiative of several NGOs, the body now has nearly 100 affiliated 
members with 20 full-time staff.
36
 However, unlike BOND, JANIC experienced serious 
financial difficulties in its early days; it was using a corner of another NGO’s office, 
with only 4-5 volunteer part-time staff. Despite now having more resources (207 million 
yen in 2012/13) including government funding which accounts for 33% of the total, 
JANIC’s development has been fragile. A great difference of Japan’s NGOs is their 
concentration on service delivery in developing countries (Endo; Takahashi K., 
interview, 2012). Consequently, advocacy activities by Japanese NGOs are restricted to 
a mere handful of people.
37
  
 
                                                 
36
 From JANIC website (http://www.janic.org/en/, accessed 20 Sep 2014) 
37
 For instance, a MoFA-NGO regular meeting on aid effectiveness which was held just before the Busan 
HLF in 2011 was attended by only 13 NGO staffs from six organisations 
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shimin/oda_ngo/taiwa/kyougikai.html, accessed 12 May 2014). 
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As Hirata notes, the relationship between Japanese NGO and government has been 
gradually shifting from confrontation to cooperation (2002, p.130). “Cooperation” 
between NGOs and the government has progressed during 1990s; MoFA’s NGO support 
has dramatically increased from about US$ 10 million to US$ 160 million (Reimann, 
2010, p.89). Various dialogues and meetings have been held, through which NGOs 
could lobby or communicate with the government (ibid, p.93). For instance, a positive 
step forward that a JANIC policy adviser noted is MoFA officials’ increasing 
willingness to ask questions rather than always being asked by CSOs (Endo, interview, 
2012). While this is partly true over the history of Japanese NGOs, anything resembling 
an equal partnership with NGOs is a very long way off. 
 
For the NGOs part, there are capacity issues due to insufficient funding and staff. 
According to a DAC official, this hampers Japanese NGO’s pressure towards its 
government; and the government looks down on the NGO sector (interview, 2012). 
Unlike the UK, where the government sees the NGOs as complementing its own 
abilities, the government-NGOs relationship in Japan does not add so much value to 
Japan’s ability to contribute to collective action in the DAC. Some Japanese 
government officials do not see the ways of Japanese NGOs’ advocacy convincing, 
because they simply adopt DAC policy and recommendations as golden rules and do 
not attempt to understand the government’s position or the problems it faces (interview, 
2012). Yet, a NGO official who attended the Busan HLF expressed his personal opinion 
that it is more convincing to improve Japanese ODA in order to solve practical 
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problems on the ground, rather than comply with international agreements such as the 
Paris Declaration (discussed in chapter 6). 
 
Research community 
How does the research contribute to collective action in the DAC? As the DAC policies 
are based on ‘evidence’, the role of academic or policy research cannot be ignored. For 
instance, as British research institutions such as ODI or IDS directly receive contracts 
from the DAC their research capacity helps form the policies of the DAC. At the same 
time, the research community also contributes to forming member government’s 
knowledge and capacity.  
 
Historically, the UK academic and research institutions have long research experiences 
in development, with strong links with government. For instance, IDS was established 
in 1965 by the decision of the government to serve as a central training institution for 
administrators in developing countries now attaining independence (Jolly, 2008). For 
Vincent Cable, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, ODI and IDS 
completely transformed the way in which British politics thought about aid – towards 
strong commitment (Cable, 2010).
38
 
 
DFID’s budget for policy and research amounted to £893 million in 2012/13, which is 
nearly doubled from 2008/2009, accounting for 11.6% of total budget (DFID, 2012a). 
                                                 
38
 This was at the ODI’s 50th Anniversary in 2010. He was an ODI Fellow as his first ever job. 
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DFID’s research involves innovative links with universities and research institutes both 
domestically and internationally; with 15 research fellows hired part-time in DFID to 
keep in touch with university work (OECD, 2010a, p.61). Also, the large proportion of 
DFID research budget implies the existence of a large number of domestic stakeholders 
who benefit from the budget (Jin, interview with a JICA official, 2012). Since DFID has 
been increasing its aid budget but reducing staff, “the consultancy business have undue 
access to its budget” (Hewitt, interview, 2012). The personnel interchange between 
DFID and research institutes or NGOs has been active as well (Furukawa; Warrener, 
interview, 2012), which helps smooth relationships between DFID and research 
community.
39
  
 
In Japan, the main development research institutions are JICA-RI and Institute of 
Development Economies-Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO). Like the 
UK’s IDS, IDE-JETRO was established in 1958 and was originally focused on 
researching Asian economies, which is why in Japanese the IDE is named Asia Keizai 
Kenkyu Sho (Asian Economy Research Institute). IDS’s original focus on Africa and 
IDE’s on Asia reflects the UK’s and Japan’s historic colonial ties. However, while the 
IDS was supported by the Overseas Development Administration (later DFID), the 
jurisdiction of IDE has been METI. This implies IDE was more concerned with 
economic development and economic relations with Asia, at least in the beginning. As 
                                                 
39
 Not only academics work for DFID but also DFID officials move to academic or research institutes. 
For instance, there is DFID’s senior level secondment post in ODI as a director of Budget Strengthening 
Initiative. 
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opposed to IDE-JETRO, JICA-RI was established rather recently, in 2008, following the 
merger of JICA and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). Compared to 
DFID’s budget on policy and research, JICA-RI is far smaller (DFID spends nearly 300 
times more); JICA-RI spent less than 500 million yen in 2010 which is merely 0.34% of 
total JICA budget (JICA-RI, 2012). Their budget is under the close scrutiny by Japanese 
politicians and has been decreasing.  
 
Historically, the link between academic researchers and bureaucrats was weak. The real 
interaction by researchers towards aid policy began only during the 1980s, and 
universities started to set up international cooperation courses from 1990s. However, 
according to a director-general of research planning department in IDE-JETRO these 
universities employed officials working for international organisations and therefore 
their concern was to follow and catch up with Europeans (Sato, interview, 2012).
40
 
When the Japan Society for International Development was established in 1990, Saburo 
Okita, its founder and a renowned ex-government official, believed that it is imperative 
for Japan to have its own ideas on aid policy rather than to follow Europe (ibid).
41
 But 
only rarely has Japan tried to promote its own way, and the academic link to 
practitioners and policy makers has been weak.
42
 
 
                                                 
40
 He is also a president of the Japan Society for International Development (the largest academic 
association on international development).  
41
 Saburo Okita worked for MoFA and METI including as a Foreign Minister. 
42
 An example is the WB’s “East Asian Miracle” report in 1993. The Japanese government tried to 
influence its content against neo-liberalism.  
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Against this background, three challenges of Japan’s research community can be 
identified. First, the small research budget reflects the likelihood of aid policy being 
decided more by bureaucrats and bureaucratic considerations than evidence-based 
research. Presumably, bureaucrats want to keep some discretion in using ODA for 
pursuing national interest when necessary, rather than be rigidly determined by research. 
A former director of ODI points out a reason why the Japanese government punches 
below its weight in the DAC is because “it does not tell stories grounded on evidence, 
while whole northern European countries are pushing hard on results and evidence” 
(Evans, interview, 2012).  
 
Second, as Japan puts importance on country-level and on the ground work, there is a 
high level recognition that the research should bridge the country-level operation and 
policy. Rather than starting from theory, which the UK is good at, the role of research in 
Japan is to link the field level and policy (such as Sugishita, interview, 2012). In doing 
this, JICA officials recognise the importance of both learning about international 
policies and gathering cases, so that field-level based policy or policy-oriented cases can 
be established (Murotani; Mitamura, interview, 2012). As a participant to the DAC 
International Network on Conflict and Fragility, JICA-RI official felt that just sharing 
Japanese good cases had limited value as they might not fit well in the core discussions 
of the DAC (Murotani, interview, 2012). Therefore, “translation of Japanese field-level 
experiences” is necessary in order to share them at international level (Sato, interview, 
2012). Currently, Japanese experiences on the ground are linked neither to Japanese 
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domestic aid policy nor to international aid policy. 
 
One of the major issues is the gap in recognition between JICA-RI researchers and 
practitioners in respect of the purposes for conducting and utilising research. While the 
researchers see the value of learning from failures, practitioners want successful projects 
to be studied for advocacy purpose (Murotani, interview, 2012). Academic research 
takes time and the scope can be narrow, but these are difficult to be understood by 
practitioners (Honda, interview with JICA-RI official, 2012). Also, there is not enough 
communication between the practitioners and researchers with regard to what kind of 
research should be conducted (Takeuchi, interview with JICA-RI official, 2012).  
 
Behind this lack of communication, there lies a fact that JICA-RI tries to keep its 
neutrality and its high academic standards. After JICA-RI was established in 2008 it 
kept some distance from the operations side, by recruiting its director from academia 
and “prioritising globally important research rather than responding to requests from 
operation” (Honda, interview, 2012). While some see JICA-RI’s neutrality as important, 
others think stronger ties between JICA-RI and the operations side is necessary, 
especially when “there are model projects of JICA that can be gathered and analysed 
systematically” (Mitamura, interview, 2012).43 
 
                                                 
43
 To be free from the issue of neutrality, some suggest establishing independent research organisations 
to avoid financial dependence on the government (Yamamoto, interview, 2012). 
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Third, it is widely recognised within and beyond Japan’s development community that 
Japan needs to speak out more and share its own experiences with other countries. 
According to a British academic, “Japan could have spoken more, insisted for its own 
experience, as Westerners find it difficult to understand about Asians” (Jolly, interview, 
2012). The challenge for Japan is “how” to share its own experiences, as Japanese 
experiences need to be “processed” into what can be understandable to other countries 
(Jin, interview, 2012). This is why it is difficult to generalise Japanese experiences:  
what is valued in it is “what can be read between the lines”, or “what can be reflected by 
Japanese identity”, although Murotani argues that Japan should show the alternatives to 
the international mainstream (interview, 2012). In doing so, according to Sato, Japan 
should not change our ring from circular (for sumo wrestlers of traditional Japanese 
sports) to square (for pro-wrestlers of traditional Western sports), because when the 
audiences’ mind changes they can enjoy sumo wrestling as well (interview, 2012). In 
fact, Japan has not been able to propose new agendas because it has been trying to 
adjust itself to the ring of someone else (i.e., European) (Hoshino, interview with former 
Japanese DAC delegate, 2012). As Sato argues, rather than trying to fit into a Western 
framework, Japan can use or create its own framework: an opportunity to do precisely 
this is now emerging, as “With the influence of China, Europeans started to think that 
their mind-set needed to be changed” (interview, 2012).  
 
This section discussed the domestic environments of the UK and Japan in relation to the 
conditions for achieving collective action in the DAC. The UK’s case has shown that 
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the government’s policy in prioritising international development spurred politicians 
and bureaucrats to use DAC as a venue for exercising international leadership. At the 
time its leadership is supported by DFID’s in-house capacity, CSOs and the research 
community outside. In contrast in Japan the politicians are not so much interested in 
international development, which in turn gives discretion to the bureaucrats in dealing 
with the DAC. In terms of capacity, the bureaucratic segregations within the 
government hinder smooth coordination to contribute to international collective action. 
Also, the CSOs and research community in Japan do not necessarily play supportive 
roles for the government to contribute towards collective action, compared to the UK’s 
case. 
 
4.6: Recipient country level 
 
A peculiarity of the DAC is that while other committees of the OECD deal with policies 
that are to be implemented in the members’ countries, the policy of the DAC is to be 
internalised by the member governments but implemented in the aid receiving countries, 
as discussed in chapter 3. The more the problems at the recipient country level have 
come to attention (i.e., the more that problems are found beyond just ‘changing donors’ 
policies’, such as coordination problems at country level), the more importance has been 
put on the recipient country level. That level becomes relevant to understanding the 
conditions for collective action not least when initiatives taken at donor headquarters 
fail to get through to the donor country offices in recipient countries. This will frustrate 
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collective action conceived in terms of implementation. Also, problems are increasingly 
being found with relations between donors and recipient governments, which mean the 
recipient country level cannot be ignored.  
 
During the 1960s, soon after the establishment of the DAC, the importance of the 
recipient country level was already recognised. One of the DAC chair’s report noted 
that the Thailand Coordination Group was formed by the interested DAC donors, and 
meetings between donors and the government in Bangkok were held as well as in Paris 
(OECD, 1964, p.67). But notwithstanding this early awareness of the importance of the 
recipient country level, only after the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 did 
it become a high profile concern, thereby turning efforts to secure an effective 
relationship at that level into an important condition for collective action in practice.  
 
As will be discussed in chapter 6, the Paris Declaration touched on the responsibility of 
recipient countries as well as the case for better coordination by donors at the recipient 
country level. This was unprecedented, and by setting out detailed indicators it 
incorporated the country level as a necessary condition for achieving collective action in 
practice. Traditionally, being a donors’ club the DAC has been an organisation to 
influence donor policies, and stop at that. The DAC is traditionally serving the HQ’s 
interests, targeting the policies at HQ’s level (UK government official, interview, 2012). 
However, donor officials in the aid receiving countries may have different incentives 
and motivations from those at HQ or the people in Paris. Therefore, bringing the 
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recipient country level into the conditions for collective action in the DAC is a fairly 
recent innovation.  
 
Nevertheless, there are some challenges faced by the DAC in introducing the country 
level orientation. First, the DAC has no offices at country level. The DAC can decide 
the direction of international aid policies but needs to rely on other organisations for 
follow-up activities (Kanayama, interview, 2012). In fact, most often it is other 
international organisations that lead aid coordination at the country level, most notably 
the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for they can 
claim greater neutrality and legitimacy compared to bilateral donors.
44
 The DAC 
cannot fully integrate the country level into its activities and policies without 
establishing country level offices, which is a weakness. 
 
Second, there is a structural problem in integrating between the global and local level 
(Evans, interview, 2012), which can also be seen as a macro-micro paradox in aid 
governance (Hynes, interview, 2012). As has been pointed out by many interviewees 
especially among Japanese, “What they discuss in the DAC are abstractive without 
concreteness, and therefore many Japanese officials may feel the discussions in the 
DAC are distanced from the reality at country level” (Watanabe M., interview, 2012). 
Having worked in Uganda for three years before joining Japan’s delegation in the DAC, 
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 Linn (2010, p.210) argues that recently the World Bank and UNDP have been less keen to lead on 
coordination, which makes it more difficult for donors to overcome collective action problems when the 
recipient governments demonstrate weak capacity.  
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the author was also shocked when she learned that the discussions in Paris often did not 
seem to reflect the reality at the country level. For example, a donor official said during 
one meeting “We want the recipient countries to take ownership”, but this is ironic as 
“ownership” is not something that can be imposed by DAC donors. As donor and 
recipient government officials at the country level need to act urgently in order to keep 
up with a fast-moving reality on the ground, and because the DAC can only discuss 
policy initiatives that are common to most or all recipient countries rather than 
tailor-made action, gaps easily open up between donor thinking at the Paris and the 
country level. 
 
Third, the additional complication for collective action of bringing in the country level 
is exacerbated when – as will be discussed in chapter 6 – donors (and recipient 
government officials) in a country form their own community there, sometimes with 
stronger ties among themselves than they have with their own headquarters. Therefore, 
the incentives for collective action of donor officials based in recipient countries may 
differ from those at HQ. The chances of achieving successful collective action 
especially in terms of policy implementation become more tortuous once these and 
other realities on the ground are taken into consideration. 
 
This section has shown that recipient country level must now be taken into account 
when assessing the conditions for collective action in the DAC, especially in respect of 
policy implementation. This raises challenges and complications connected with 
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structural issues such as the DAC’s lack of physical presence in the aid receiving 
countries, quite apart from question marks against whether an international 
one-size-fits-all policy is always best. 
 
4.7: Member/ non-member relationships 
 
Non-DAC member actors can be emerging countries, recipient countries or CSOs. How 
do these actors influence the prospects for achieving collective action in the DAC? As 
they are not formal members, presumably they are relatively less important, but this 
does not mean they are unimportant – although we should be careful to distinguish their 
significance to the conditions for collective action in DAC and their influence in aid 
more generally, which has undoubtedly grown in recent years. As was noted earlier, the 
DAC is affected by changes in the global aid architecture that has come about as a result 
of the rise of new donors outside the DAC.  
 
The extent to which different non-DAC actors relate to or influence DAC members 
varies. DAC’s Global Relations Strategy distinguishes between non-DAC actors who 
are invited to the DAC as full participants, and those who are invited as observers 
(OECD Archives, 2011, p.7). DAC wants some emerging donors to be involved more 
than others, especially OECD non DAC members and major emerging economies (with 
priority to Brazil, China, India, Indonesia Russia and South Africa).  
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Non-DAC actors become part of the conditions for collective action in the DAC when 
their influence becomes greater or causes problems for DAC members, not only because 
of their increasing volume of aid.
45
 Also, the challenge now comes from the different 
kind of relationship that the emerging donors offer to their aid receiving partners, 
compared to the traditional relationships between DAC donors and their aid recipients. 
This then impacts on the relations that DAC can have with its aid partners in the new 
global aid environment. As Woods argues, rather than attempting to overturn the DAC’s 
own rules, emerging countries offer alternatives, and this in turn puts pressure on the 
existing system, which is “a silent revolution” (2008, p.1221). While the DAC members 
began to converge around the idea of improving aid effectiveness, starting from the 
early 2000s (see chapter 6), the increasing presence of emerging donors made it more 
difficult for DAC on its own to get its own way with aid recipients.  
 
Several perceptions garnered from the writer’s interviews relate to Japan’s position on 
emerging donors. First, some government officials noted there are people who think 
Japan might as well withdraw from the DAC (even in jest), because of the relative 
decrease of its importance in the international aid architecture (interviews, 2012); DAC 
is regarded as outdated organisation, close to collapse as a destiny of history (Araki, 
interview, 2012). On the other hand, a more widely accepted view is that withdrawing is 
not a realistic option for Japan as a responsible international donor, even officials from 
                                                 
45
 In fact, the proportion of aid from Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) occupied 
30% of worldwide aid in 1978 (Manning, 2006, p.373) whereas only 8% of ODA was from countries 
beyond the DAC in 2009 (Zimmermann & Smith, 2011, p.724). 
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Keidanren think strategizing within the given framework of the DAC is realistically 
important (interview, 2012).  
 
Second, there are views that Japan could be better positioned in the DAC once the 
emerging countries become more involved in the DAC; the similarity of the aid 
provision by Asian countries (e.g., Japan, Korea and China), which contrasts with most  
DAC donors, will increase the possibility of adding voices to Japan’s stance.46 As more 
emerging countries are involved in the DAC, Japan’s isolation within DAC will be 
diminished (Honda, interview, 2012), because of the similar value shared among Asian 
countries (Okano, interview, 2012). The aforementioned Asia Development Forum is a 
good example of how dialogue can sometimes be easier among Asian countries than it 
is for Japan in the DAC. “Rather than European ways of enforcing of ideology” 
(Sugishita, interview, 2012), the Forum is “a loose framework aiming to share 
field-based experiences, that is different from the discussions in the DAC” (Watanabe 
M., interview, 2012).  
 
Third, a common view among the interviewees is that Japan is trying or taking a 
bridging role between the DAC and Non-DAC actors.
47
 Like many other DAC 
members, the Japanese government’s position is that emerging donors must be 
                                                 
46
 Korea’s membership to the DAC in 2010 was welcomed by Japanese government officials, as Japan 
had been the only member from Asia until then. 
47
 For instance, Japan was co-chairing the DAC’s Informal Working Group on Non-DAC Providers of 
Development Assistance since 2007. 
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persuaded to follow the international rules of aid provision, in order to reduce the 
burden on the recipient governments (MoFA, 2011). While this rationale is more of a 
global or common interest, DAC members also feel a kind of ‘unfairness’ trying to 
avoid ‘free-riding’ by the emerging countries; “We are following the rules, and why 
should they not?” For instance, in the Japanese government a sense of unfairness arises 
when Japanese untied aid projects are successfully bid for by Chinese companies, 
because China’s own aid is tied to Chinese procurement (Japanese government official, 
interview, 2012). More normative feelings are also expressed, as one DAC delegate 
says “What China does in Africa needs to follow the same principles as we as DAC 
donors do. We don’t like the distinctiveness” (interview, 2012). On the other hand, the 
emerging countries claim “Why should we follow their rules while we are not the DAC 
members?”, which is why reconciling the divergent positions of DAC and non-DAC 
actors is not straightforward, as will be discussed more in chapter 6. In addition, unlike 
other DAC members, Japan has a sense of pride in being a DAC member from Asia 
ever since the 1960s, and positions itself as being able to understand the position both of 
the DAC and the non-DAC actors. A senior MoFA official sums up the predicament as 
follows:   
 
Japan has been sincerely trying to follow the DAC rules, so we cannot just say 
‘good-bye’ to the DAC. However, exactly because Japan has been trying to be 
‘sincere’, it also experienced difficulties of adopting the rules, which is why I 
think the DAC side should also change to welcome emerging countries (interview, 
2012). 
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So far, by taking the example of Japan, we have seen how emerging donors influence 
the ways in which the DAC members position themselves in the DAC. The influence of 
recipient countries has also been increasing. Since the establishment of the DAC, 
recipient governments have been occasionally invited to participate in the meetings of 
the DAC as observers. However, as chapters 5 and 6 show later, the shift in donors’ aid 
discourse has brought the recipient countries more to the fore of aid, by introducing the 
importance of ‘ownership’ and ‘partnership’ on the aid agenda. With the introduction of 
the aid effectiveness agenda some recipient governments gained full seats in the 
Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, and started influencing the DAC. By bringing in 
the recipient a new type of peer pressure is created in DAC, not only among the DAC 
members themselves but from recipient countries as well. This means “Donors would 
feel more difficult to say no” (Massing, interview, 2012). A triangular relationship 
among DAC donors, emerging countries and recipient countries is coming to replace the 
old more simple structure of DAC conversations, and it gives recipients more leverage 
against the DAC donors. For instance, a China-DAC Study Group was formed in 2009 
to share knowledge and experiences between China and the DAC members with some 
African countries. Having participated in it, a Japanese academic observed some 
frustration in the DAC: “DAC probably wanted China to realise the defects of its aid 
through the Study Group, but African participants’ comments were in favour of China, 
providing more options for them” (Ohno, interview, 2012).  
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This section has established the relations between the DAC members and non-members 
are relevant to assessing the conditions for collective action by the DAC. Although the 
role of non-DAC members is not (yet) as important as the other conditions discussed in 
this chapter, their potential to influence how at least some DAC members behave in 
DAC, for example Japan, should not be ignored or underestimated. 
 
4.8: Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out to address the question “Why is there (or not) collective action?” by 
examining the conditions for achieving collective action as encapsulated by the 
indicators disclosed in chapter 3. This chapter has shown conditions that help to form 
collective action and also touched on some that stand in the way, and maintains that the 
conditions also depend on individual members.  
 
Overall, what this chapter demonstrates is that in order to secure collective action a 
favourable balance must be achieved among the various factors that can influence 
prospects, and this in turn is affected by how well the DAC Secretariat executes its 
mandate. For example the Secretariat’s capacity to manoeuvre the direction of DAC’s 
discussion can be both an advantage and also have a negative effect if it causes a 
member to perceive a lack of fairness or neutrality. In regard to delegate-headquarters 
relationships, the different actors can have different incentives. So even when there is 
only weak interest and capacity by the headquarters, an individual delegate can still 
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make a practical contribution to achieving collective action, in a personal capacity. The 
chapter argued that while the leadership of some members can be useful to advancing an 
agenda in the DAC, and give the impression of a purposeful organisation that can ‘get 
its act together’, there are risks one or more members give an impression of wanting to 
dominate for the purpose of achieving their own national ends, and then lose the trust of 
other members – something that DAC has managed to avoid, for the most part. The 
emergence of new donors also has to be factored into consideration. This can have 
direct consequences for relations within DAC discussions, as well as force DAC to 
think about how to respond to the changing global aid architecture, thereby creating new 
opportunities for DAC members to agree or conversely disagree over what to do.  
 
There is no single simple magic bullet that can sum up the conditions that will produce 
collective action. Rather, successful collective action depends on a mix of favouring 
conditions and achieving a balance that outweighs the circumstances that would prevent 
or impede collective action from being achieved. These intricacies will be explored in 
more detail and given specific empirical content in the following chapters, which apply 
the analytical framework provided in chapter 2-4 to an examination of two case studies 
of major policy initiatives by DAC, first aid untying (chapter 5) and then aid 
effectiveness (chapter 6). 
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Chapter 5: Aid Untying 
 
 
5.1: Introduction 
 
The two previous chapters discussed indicators of and conditions for collective action in 
the DAC. In chapter 3, it was shown that the existence of collective action can be 
assessed based on the ease and extent of agreement and compliance. Also, it was argued 
that successful collective action depends on the level and type of meetings in the DAC 
as well as on its members. Chapter 4 explored conditions for collective action by 
unpacking the relationships among various actors in the DAC; Secretariat, delegate and 
headquarters within member governments, relations among members and with 
non-members, and the wider domestic environment within member countries.    
 
This chapter and chapter 6 examine in closer detail the indicators and conditions 
discussed in previous chapters by focusing on two particular issues: aid untying, and aid 
effectiveness, with a specific focus on two member countries – the UK and Japan – in 
relation to these issues.  
 
The reasons for choosing aid untying and aid effectiveness are as follows. The 
recommendation for aid untying was agreed in 2001 among DAC members and the 
percentage of untied bilateral aid rose progressively thereafter, from 54% to 93.5% 
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between 1999-2001 and 2007-2009 (OECD Archives, 2011b, p.8). This suggests 
collective action was a success. In the case of aid effectiveness, however, where the 
actors involved increased and became more diverse, the progress of compliance by 
members has been slow both absolutely and relative to the case of aid untying. 
Comparing these two contrasting cases will shed more light on different indicators of 
and conditions for collective action. 
 
Although aid untying has been discussed in the DAC since 1960 in the Development 
Assistance Group (DAG), a recommendation on aid untying was only agreed in 2001. 
Why did it take 40 years to agree on the recommendation on aid untying, and why was 
it agreed in 2001? In other words, what were the impediments to and the momentum for 
reaching a successful outcome? This chapter addresses these questions by examining 
indicators and conditions for collective action. With regard to the choice of member 
countries to compare, the UK is seen as one of the countries leading in the DAC 
whereas Japan has a reputation for being reluctant to take the lead on new policy 
initiatives. The contrast of different approaches and domestic context between these two 
countries enables us to understand more deeply the conditions for and obstacles to 
collective action in the DAC. 
 
The chapter comprises three sections: overview, indicators of collective action and 
conditions for collective action. The overview begins by explaining the definition of aid 
tying, where three types and two levels of aid tying are identified. Also, it shows that the 
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efforts and attempts to agree on aid untying date from the early 1960s; and related 
policies had been under discussion in the OECD’s Export Credit Group (ECG), where 
agreement there affected the discussion in the DAC.  
 
5.2: Overview 
 
This section will first provide the definition of tied aid followed by an overview of the 
progress made by the DAC’s work on aid untying.  
 
What is aid tying? 
There are different types and levels of aid tying. Broadly speaking, aid can be tied in 
three ways; by procurement (conditional upon purchasing goods and service), by project 
(aid must be used to finance specific expenditures) and by policy (conditional upon 
certain policies) (Morrissey & White, 1994, p.3). However, the term ‘aid (un)tying’ is 
usually mean procurement tying, and this can be further categorised by source (i.e., 
conditional to finance specific commodities and/or services) and by firm (conditional to 
procurement in specific countries or regions including donor country) (Jepma, 1994, 
p.7).  
 
Apart from the types, tying status can be categorised according to levels; (fully) untied, 
partially untied, and (fully) tied. According to 1987 DAC Guiding Principles for 
Associated Financing and Tied and Partially Untied Official Development Assistance 
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(ODA), untied aid is defined as “loans and grants which are fully and freely available to 
finance procurement from substantially all developing countries and from all OECD 
countries”, whereas partially untied aid is “loans and grants which are in effect tied to 
procurement of goods and services from the donor country and from a restricted number 
of countries which must include substantially all developing countries” (OECD, 1987a, 
p.2). Tied aid is “all other loans and grants whether they are tied formally or through 
informal arrangements” (Clay, Geddes & Natali, 2009, p.5). This implies that tying is 
not only determined by formal agreements but may also take the form of informal 
understandings, or even be a secondary consequence of an arrangement already in effect 
(Jepma, 1991, p.20). The DAC Recommendation on Untying ODA (OECD, 2008) tries 
to restrict the ambiguity of definitional understanding by adding that members which 
have rules of origin or minimum national content rules should take all steps necessary to 
ensure that their ODA is untied in accordance with this Recommendation, so that it 
becomes both de jure and de facto untied – untied both in principle and in practice. 
 
Overview of progress of the DAC’s work on aid untying 
Problems associated with tied aid can be categorised into three factors; market 
distortion, inappropriate cost, and donor-recipient relationship. By tying aid 
procurement to companies in donor countries or specific goods and services, tied aid 
can be regarded as a subsidy to promote the donor country’s own national interests in 
international trade, therefore distorting the free market. In fact, the practice of tied aid in 
combination with export credit was common during 1960s and 70s, when developed 
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countries wished to access global markets. Since the core value of the OECD is to 
promote free markets, it served as a forum in which these problems were discussed. 
Jepma calculated the cost of tied aid to recipients was 15-30% higher with tied aid (e.g., 
Jepma, 1991, p. 58) – a figure that is often referred as evidence for abolishing tying in 
OECD documents (e.g., OECD, 2001a, p.3).  
 
More recently, an additional justification given for aid untying is that tying can create 
friction between donors and recipients. In the DAC Secretariat’s words, “a new 
dimension of untying was added to the justification of value for money” (Nicol, 
interview, 2013). This became increasingly clear after the late 1990s, when the idea of 
‘partnership’ between donors and recipients became a mainstream of development 
discourse, in the context of a high level debate about the ownership of development 
initiatives funded whole or in part by international aid. Tied aid increasingly started to 
be seen as problematic because it stands for an asymmetric power relation between 
donors and recipients. And such a power relationship is contrary to the idea of 
partnership understood as a relationship of equals. It can easily frustrate donors’ 
professed aim that aid recipients should take on full ownership of all development 
initiatives, including especially any that benefit from aid. The pressure for aid tying to 
rise up the agenda was reinforced by lobbying from civil society organisations (CSOs), 
who contrasted aid tying with the priority they place on ethical arguments for 
international development aid – something that governments claim to endorse too.  
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The rest of this section provides a brief history of OECD activities on aid untying, 
which began before DAC was created, in the DAG meeting in 1960 (OECD, 1961, 
pp.27-29). Since then, aid untying has been taken up from time to time in other OECD 
forums. Table 5.1 lists different kinds of attempt to agree on aid untying as well as the 
policies that were actually agreed, both in the DAC and in ECG in the OECD. The table 
tells us three things. First, aid untying has been discussed on and off for an 
exceptionally long period of time. As the policies that dominate discussion in the DAC 
tend to change every five to ten years to reflect international trends and members’ 
interests, it is not usual for a specific policy to be discussed over a period of more than 
40 years, as happened with aid untying. For instance, Participatory Development was 
only discussed in the DAC between 1993 and 1996, and the DAC network on Poverty 
Reduction was only active between 1998 and 2011. 
 
Second, the table shows that the impasse experienced during the 1970s was seemingly 
broken first by agreements made in the Export Credit Arrangement (ECA) between the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. Aid untying was a (modest) part of a wider recommendation 
on Financial Terms and Condition made in 1965. However no agreement on multilateral 
untying was agreed there, and only in 1970 was a Memorandum of Understanding on 
untying bilateral loans reached, and even that was agreed by only eight of the member 
countries. Therefore, the DAC experienced real difficulties in forming collective action 
on aid untying throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This impasse seems to have changed 
after the Wallen Package and Helsinki Package (described below) were agreed during 
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the following decades. These initiatives gave the DAC a new incentive to proceed with 
the issue, in order not to be left behind and lose all chance of influencing the outcome to 
serve the goals the DAC supports. 
 
Third, the table shows that the DAC recommendation agreed in 2001 has been revisited 
and adjusted several times since. In 2006, the threshold of SDR $700,000, below which 
activities are excluded from the recommendation, was eliminated. Another revision was 
made on at the Accra High Level Forum (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness (2008), which 
expanded the coverage of target countries from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
among Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) to non-LDC HIPCs. Further attempts 
to increase the coverage continue to the present day. During the Busan HLF of DAC in 
2011 an (unsuccessful) attempt was made to apply the recommendation to food aid and 
technical cooperation, both of which had been excluded from the earlier agreement.  
 
Table 5.1: Efforts and attempts at aid untying in OECD 
Year Agreement/attempt Committee Content 
1965 Recommendation on Financial 
Terms and Conditions  
DAC Measures related to aid tying were 
included in the Recommendation 
adopted by DAC, to untie bilateral 
aid to maximum extent possible. 
1970 Agreement to untie bilateral 
loans was proposed but not 
agreed at High Level Meeting 
(HLM) in Tokyo. (This was 
later agreed in 1973 at HLM.) 
Some members of 
the DAC  
Untying of aid to multilateral 
institutions. 
1974 Memorandum of Understanding 
on Untying of Bilateral 
Eight members of the 
DAC (Denmark, 
To allow developing countries to 
bid on bilateral development 
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Development Loans in Favour 
of Procurement in Developing 
Countries 
Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, the US) 
loans. 
1987 
(March) 
Wallen Package Participants under 
ECA of OECD 
Minimum concessionality level of 
tied aid was raised from 25% to 
35%.  
1987 
(April) 
DAC Guiding Principle for 
Associated Financing and Tied 
and Partially Untied ODA  
DAC Minimum concessionality level of 
tied aid to LDCs was decided to be 
50%. 
1992 Helsinki Package Participants under 
ECA of OECD 
Tied and partially untied aid for 
richer developing countries; and 
commercially viable export 
projects no longer to be counted as 
aid were prohibited.  
1996 Ex ante Guidance for Tied Aid  Participants under 
ECA of OECD 
Guidelines to determine at an early 
stage whether projects are eligible 
for tied aid. 
1998 DAC HLM  DAC DAC HLM mandated the Working 
Party on Financial Aspects of 
Development Assistance (WPFA) 
to work on a Recommendation. 
2001 DAC Recommendation on 
Untying ODA 
DAC The coverage countries are only 
for LDCs. Also excludes Technical 
Assistance (TA) and food aid. 
2006 Revised Recommendation on 
Untying ODA 
DAC Threshold of Special Drawing 
Rights (SDR) 700,000 is 
eliminated. 
2008 Revised Recommendation on 
Untying ODA 
DAC, Accra Agenda 
for Action (AAA) 
Target countries are extended to 
non-LDC HIPCs. 
Source: Führer, H. (1994), OECD (1998a), OECD (2006), OECD (2008), Clay, Geddes & Natali (2009) 
 
During the 1960s and 70s, as the tying practice among DAC members increased, aid 
untying was discussed many times in the DAC. Nevertheless there were always 
opposition from some countries. Untying multilateral aid was proposed by Sweden in 
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1969, and supported by Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Japan “after some 
hesitation” (Führer, 1994, p.25). And during the DAC HLM held in Tokyo in 1970, a 
majority of members were prepared to agree to untie bilateral loans. But France, Italy 
and Canada were more cautious; and the US, which was facing balance of payment 
problems withdrew at the end of the negotiation process (ibid). 
 
From the late 1980s to early 90s, there were two important policy packages agreed 
among participants in the OECD’s ECA. These are the Wallen Package which raised the 
minimum level of concessionality of tied aid from 25% to 35%,
1
 and Helsinki Package 
which prohibited tied aid to richer developing countries and commercially viable 
projects (OECD, 1998a).
2
 The purpose was to distinguish the commercial and aid 
purposes, and to prevent aid being allocated to commercially viable projects. The 
guideline agreed in 1996 was to follow-up on the Helsinki Package and ensure its 
implementation. 
 
Following these rapid advancements in ECA, the DAC HLM in 1998 mandated the 
WPFA under the DAC to work on a recommendation to untie aid. After three years, the 
recommendation was agreed at the DAC HLM in 2001 (OECD Archives, 2001). 
                                                 
1
 A set of reforms agreed in 1987 to phase out subsidised interest rates for export to richer developing 
countries including tied aid. It was named after a chairman of Participants to the Arrangement from 1980 
to 1987. 
2
 Measures agreed in 1992 to prohibit tied and partially untied aid for richer developing countries as well 
as for projects which should be financed commercially. It was named after Finnish capital where the 
Chairman of the Participants originated. 
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Thereafter, the recommendation was revised in connection with the emergence of the 
agenda on aid effectiveness (discussed in Chapter 6), the most prominent occasion 
being the AAA in 2008. 
 
This section has shared background information about the OECD’s attempts to unite aid. 
It was only after agreement was made in the ECA that the DAC was spurred into 
decisive action, in 2001. 
 
5.3: Indicators of collective action 
 
In this section, the indicators of collective action which were proposed in Chapter 3 
(members and meetings, agreement, implementation, and monitoring) are discussed in 
the context of untying aid. Overall, the indicators of collective action give a positive 
account of collective action on untying aid, both because final agreement was reached 
on the recommendation and because a commitment to high level of compliance was 
established. However, the recommendation was not perfect, and the process of reaching 
agreement process was not entirely smooth.  
 
Members and meetings 
In what kind of meetings was aid untying discussed and who were the members of the 
meetings?  
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Aid untying was discussed both in the DAC and ECG in the OECD. Untying of grant 
aid is discussed in the DAC, whereas loan aid is regulated in ECG. The two groups were 
different in their purposes, memberships, and types of agreement. In the DAC, the 
group hosting the discussion of aid untying has shifted over time. Most of these 
meetings were attended by representatives from members’ headquarters, though their 
delegates in Paris have been the main participants in informal meetings during the 
implementation and monitoring processes. Table 5.2 summarises the types of meetings 
in the OECD on aid untying since 1960. In order to ease tension among members, 
informal meetings were also set up. The participants in these are not restricted to 
repeating their government’s formal position. This potentially has favourable 
implications for securing collective action. 
 
Table 5.2: Types and levels of meetings on aid untying in OECD since 1960s 
Committee Subsidiary Bodies 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
DAC 
(1961-) 
       
 WPFA (1964-2003)       
 WPFA informal 
meeting→Informal 
meeting on aid 
untying 
      
 Working Party on 
Aid Effectiveness 
(WP-EFF) 
(2003-) 
      
ECA 
(1978-) 
       
Source: Author  
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First, the transition of the subsidiary body from WPFA to WP-EFF changed not only the 
level of importance which the DAC itself put on aid untying, but also changed the 
underlying rationale as well. Aid untying was originally discussed in WPFA, until 2003 
when it was taken over by WP-EFF as being one part of a much bigger and broader aid 
effectiveness agenda. According to one of the Secretariat officials who has been in 
charge of aid untying since 1996, “it ‘lost ground’ by being integrated into aid 
effectiveness work” (Nicol, interview, 2012). This institutional transition from WPFA to 
WP-EFF shifted the rationale of aid untying in a new direction. Since the WP-EFF was 
more focused on the importance of establishing a sense of partnership between donors 
and recipients, the rationale behind aid untying shifted from easing the market distortion 
among the donors towards valuing the partnership between donors and recipient 
countries. The idea that aid recipients should make procurement decisions gained 
ground too. 
 
Second, the setting up of informal meetings accelerated progress on untying because it 
allowed for a freer exchange of views and positions through “confidence-building 
discussion, finding our way forward without members getting off side” (Nicol, 
interview with DAC Secretariat, 2013). It helped the Secretariat understand the different 
levels of ambition among members, in its efforts to explore the possibilities for reaching 
some kind of agreement and establish the limits of any recommendation that could be 
agreed. One of the important tasks of the Secretariat is to understand exactly where the 
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main areas of conflict of interests among members lie, and to identify the scope for 
flexibility where some members may accept compromise. By using the first names in an 
informal environment, the tensions among the members were eased during the informal 
meetings, according to a DAC Secretariat official (Nicol, interview, 2012).  
 
Third, there was an organisational disparity in the OECD, when both the DAC and ECA 
engaged with the issue of aid untying. The nature of discussions in the ECA and the 
identity of participants differ from the DAC. As shown in the Table 5.3, the ECA’s remit 
is to tackle the issue of export credit, dealing with the commercial side of aid only, 
whereas DAC’s role is to promote development cooperation. Therefore, policies agreed 
within ECA apply only to richer developing countries, whereas DAC policies target 
LDC/HIPCs. Participants of ECA meetings are from Ministry of Finance or Economy 
and Trade (METI), with the discussion focused on “banker’s perspective” (Maeda, 
interview, 2012), using technical terms of finance. The atmosphere in the ECA meetings 
was purely commercial, as if “you were guilty until you prove otherwise”, and members 
tried to bend the rules (Nicol, interview, 2013). A DAC Secretariat official who attended 
the ECA meeting recalled there were “invisible banners of suspicion” among the 
members, trying to reveal who were the cheaters (ibid). In contrast, the participants to 
the DAC are from Development Cooperation Ministries or equivalent agencies, whose 
focus is naturally on a ‘development perspective’. Therefore, ECA and the DAC “share 
quite different DNA” (ibid).  
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Table 5.3: Comparison between the DAC and ECA 
 DAC ECA 
Commencement 
year 
1961 1978 
Purpose To promote development 
cooperation to increase living 
standards in developing 
countries. 
To provide a level playing field, to eliminate 
subsidy and trade distortions relating to officially 
supported export credit. 
OECD Secretariat Development Cooperation 
Directorate 
Trade and Agriculture Directorate 
Members/ 
Participants 
29 DAC members from aid 
agencies. 
Nine Participants (Australia, Canada, European 
Union (EU), Japan, Korea, New Zealand, 
Norway, Switzerland and the US) from Ministry 
of Finance or Economy and Trade.  
Agreement type 
on aid untying 
Recommendation Arrangement (Gentleman’s Agreement) 
Source: Author’s compilation from OECD website (http://www.oecd.org/dac/untied-aid/, Accessed 20 
Mar 2013). 
 
The types and levels of meetings are not the only considerations relevant to identifying 
indicators of collective action. Intensity of the meetings could be measured by 
frequency of the meetings. Generally, meetings for each Working Party take place once 
or twice a year in the DAC. However, between 1998 when the WPFA was mandated to 
form consensus, and 2001 when agreement was made, the Working Party held at least 
ten meetings. In addition there were informal meetings, which were probably even more 
frequent. This was an exceptionally high number of meetings for the period of three 
years. This contributed to moving the agenda further forward, and helped maintain 
contacts and relationship among the member officials.  
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The number of participants taking part also reflects the interest that members had in 
achieving collective action. The number of participants to the WPFA almost doubled 
from 39 in 1997 to 64 in 2002, including officials from Ministry of Finance or Trade as 
a part of members’ delegations.3 The increase of Japanese delegation is noticeable 
during this period from three in 1997 (including two officials based in Paris) to nine in 
2002 (including three directors from MoFA, METI and Ministry of Finance (MoF) from 
Tokyo) (OECD Archives, 1997, OECD Archives, 2002). 
 
To sum up, institutional arrangements hosting the aid untying agenda existed for the 
transition from WPFA to WP-EFF, by establishing informal meetings and a division of 
labour between the DAC and the ECA. The large number of meetings and participants 
during the negotiation period from 1998 to 2001 shows a high level of interest in aid 
untying among member countries.  
 
Agreement  
This section looks more closely at the process of agreement of the DAC 
Recommendation on Untying ODA in 2001 – the first and the most influential 
recommendation agreed, and a clear indicator of successful collective action. Intensive 
negotiation of the content of the recommendation took place over three years, which 
                                                 
3
 These include observers to the meetings. It is also important to note that the recorded participants are 
those who were registered but may not correspond to the actual participants on the day of the meeting. 
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shows both a high level of interest and contentiousness among members.   
 
The DAC Recommendation on Aid Untying agreed in 2001 was “a baby which was 
difficult to give birth to” (Nicol, interview, 2012), one reason being that the agreement 
was in the form of recommendation which is the highest level of non-binding 
agreement,
4
 making the members more cautious about what they will agree to.
5
 Also, 
the diversity of interests among DAC members made agreement difficult. During the 
period of most intensive negotiation between 1998 and 2001, members fell into two 
groups. One group comprised supporters of the recommendation who were united. 
Another group comprised several members who opposed the recommendation, but 
unlike the supporting group they had differences among themselves in regard to their 
reasons for opposing.  
 
Among the first group, the strong supporters of the recommendation were the UK, 
Norway, Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Sweden who were sometimes referred 
to as ‘like-minded’. During meetings of the Working Party, this group tried hard to 
convince by emphasising the urgency in reaching consensus and urging others that 
                                                 
4
 According to OECD Legal Instruments (http://www.oecd.org/legal/oecdlegalinstruments-theacts.htm, 
Accessed 1 Jul 2014), ‘Decision’ is the only legally binding OECD agreement, which the DAC does not 
agree any. ‘Recommendation’ is not legally binding but there is an expectation that member countries will 
do their utmost to fully implement a Recommendation, involving political will and moral obligation. 
5
 On the other hand, according to a DAC secretariat OECD produced many ‘recommendations’ during 
1990s as a fashion and a calling instrument (Nicol, interview, 2013).  
200 
 
failure to reach agreement would undermine the collective effort and reputation of the 
DAC. At the HLM in 1998, the chair of the Working Party pointed out that a clear and 
strong political orientation was necessary, and continued failure to make progress would 
undermine the DAC donors’ credibility (OECD Archives, 1998a). During the following 
HLM in 1999, a Director of Development Cooperation from Switzerland likened aid 
tying to a dinosaur, and Norway’s Minister emphasised that continuation of tying would 
constitute an embarrassment to the DAC (OECD Archives, 1999). This was 
supplemented by a strong statement from Clare Short, UK’s Secretary of State at 
Department for International Development (DFID): 
 
Failure to reach such an agreement would damage the reputation of the DAC and 
the prospects of making aid more effective…the donor community would appear 
insincere about improved collaboration and effectiveness on untying aid. (ibid, p.5)  
 
The advocates of reform also drew participants’ attention to a sense of urgency and 
collective norms in reaching consensus. The Secretary of State for Belgium mentioned 
the group of like-minded countries were ready to start untying amongst themselves, if 
the DAC could not reach consensus (ibid). Implicitly this would have damaged the 
image of members who were not willing to join the consensus. By introducing ECG’s 
work as a counter force, the chair of the Working Party at the HLM in 1998 also added 
to the collective sense of urgency, by insisting that continued absence of consensus in 
the DAC would result in the ECG addressing the issue from a purely commercial 
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perspective (OECD Archives, 1998a). Similarly, during HLM 1999, Clare Short brought 
members’ attention to the Development Partnership Strategy which was agreed in 1996 
in the DAC (OECD Archives, 1999), appealing to the members’ commitment to aid as a 
moral issue (with a focus on recipient ownership and capacity-building) that the 
developing countries should be at the centre. 
 
By the time of the HLM in 1999, the pressure from like-minded group became intense. 
As a political-level meeting, the usage of strong language during the HLM worked quite 
well in persuading other members to stop resisting. For instance the HLM meeting 
record indicates that the Norwegian Minister “expressed her firm belief in the logic and 
arguments in favour of untied aid” (ibid, p.5, italic by author).  Similarly, “the UK 
strongly disapproved of any donors ‘opting out’” – words used by Clare Short in 
concluding her statement (ibid).  
 
On the other hand, the opposing group including Denmark, Japan, US and France varied 
in their reasoning. The most contentious issues were effort sharing and the coverage of 
recommendation, especially the question of whether it should include food aid and TA. 
The notion of effort sharing emerged with regard to the Danish position. During the 
HLM in 1998, the Danish Minister said that accepting the untying proposal was difficult 
for domestic political reasons, insisting that Denmark’s high ODA/ Gross National 
Income (GNI) ratio should be taken into account (OECD Archives, 1998a).
6
 As a result, 
                                                 
6
 In 1998, the ODA/ GNI ratio of Danish aid was 0.99% — the highest among all DAC donors, where 
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an effort-sharing composite indicator was created, solely for the purpose of advancing 
the chance of reaching agreement (ibid), by taking account of wider efforts made by the 
DAC members and mainly reflecting the proportion of ODA to poorer countries against 
GNI, and the proportion of multilateral aid which is regarded as untied aid.
7
 By taking 
this position, Denmark also tried to present difficulties to others such as the US, whose 
ODA/GNI ratio is low, which led a DAC Secretariat official to say “Denmark was a 
good soldier” (Nicol, interview, 2013). 
 
In terms of coverage, the US and Japan objected to the inclusion of food aid and TA 
respectively. Food aid supplied by the US has been nearly fully tied since it began its 
food aid programme in 1954 (Clapp, 2012, p.66), though this excludes food aid from 
the Department of Agriculture which was US $1,890 million in 2011, and the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID)’s emergency food aid.8 This suggests 
the real percentage for all food aid is much higher. In Japan’s case, about 30% of its 
ODA is provided through technical cooperation (MoFA, 2011), but the tying status of 
Japanese technical cooperation has not been reported. During the HLM in 1999, a 
Japanese representative requested for a fairer recommendation, emphasising that 80% of 
Japan’s aid was untied if technical cooperation is not included (OECD Archives, 1999, 
                                                                                                                                               
the average was only 0.23%. 
7
 The indicator represents: (bilateral LDC-HIPC ODA/GNI times the bilateral LDC-HIPC ODA untying 
ratio) + multilateral LDC-HIPC ODA/GNI (OECD Archives, 2012, p.13). 
8
 However, the proportion of reported food aid in total US ODA was approximately only 2% (OECD 
CRS data, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.htm , Accessed 20 Mar 2013). 
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p.6). Japan’s position on technical cooperation was joined by France, who also had 
other reasons for not wanting to accept the recommendation on untying. 
 
One of France’s other concerns was that untying might result in reduced aid flows to the 
LDCs – a point mentioned by some other members too. This relates to the domestic 
political environment of DAC countries, especially over how the untying 
recommendation would be perceived by policy-makers, politicians and the business 
lobby that usually supports aid if it envisages some commercial gain can be made from 
it. While the impact the recommendation might have had on the domestic environment 
in this way is difficult to assess, the DAC reported that the share of ODA to the LDCs 
actually increased from 17.2% to 23.0% between the base line of 1999-2001 and 2006 
(excluding debt relief), while total bilateral ODA to LDCs almost doubled during the 
same period (OECD Archives, 2008, p.7). This is contrary to what might be expected if 
the reduction in aid tying had significantly weakened political support for aid at home 
and if a reduction in support then impacted on the actual budget.  
 
Other points that France raised connect with positions that some other opposing 
members took but without always coinciding with them. For example, France wanted 
food aid to be included in the recommendation, which US certainly did not want. France 
also requested that members’ aid contributions to the European Commission (EC) be 
excluded from the recommendation. Some members tried to minimise harm to their own 
image when they knew that others would be expressing opposition arguments anyway. 
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All these points were negotiated during the meetings of Working Party, including 
informal meetings. The recommendation was finally agreed at the HLM in April 2001. 
However, as some members such as Japan, Denmark and the EC had difficulty in 
committing themselves to join the consensus, agreement was reached on the basis of ad 
referendum with a grace period of another two weeks, at which point agreement on the 
recommendation was eventually made official. 
 
To summarize, collective action can be observed during the process of reaching the 
agreement specifically between 1998 and 2001. Intensive diplomatic manoeuvring 
advanced the discussions; progress was served by the unity of those in support of the 
recommendation and the existence of differences among those who opposed it. 
Furthermore the recommendation to untie aid did not require so much effort in reaching 
agreement among the like-minded members because they had untied most of their aid 
already. Member-member relations among the opponents were more fraught than among 
the recommendation’s supporters, which plausibly may have been helped the 
like-minded group to prevail. 
 
Implementation  
Overall, the compliance of the recommendation by DAC members has been high, with 
an increasing proportion of bilateral aid being untied since 2001. However, a statistical 
breakdown of untied aid data over certain periods suggests that the strong promoters of 
205 
 
the recommendation, especially the like-minded countries, tended to have a higher 
untied ratio even before 2001. The scope for them to demonstrate further progress after 
2001 was relatively limited. Also, in spite of successful formal untying, informal tied 
aid such as de facto tying remains one of the biggest challenges, to the present day. 
 
Between 1999-2001 and 2007-2009, the proportion of untied bilateral aid for LDCs 
under the coverage of DAC Recommendation rose progressively from 54% to 93.5% 
(OECD Archives, 2011b, p.8). A DAC evaluation concludes that the recommendation 
on aid untying has had a significant influence in changing donors’ behaviour towards 
formal untying of bilateral ODA (Clay, Geddes & Natali, 2009, p.viii). However, the 
donor practice differs among the members, as some DAC members had already untied 
most of their aid by 1
st
 January 2002 when the recommendation came into effect. 
 
When the recommendation was made, it was agreed that the DAC members would untie 
ODA to LDCs in most of the areas of aid (excluding food aid and technical cooperation) 
by 1
st
 January 2002 (OECD, 2008). The first progress report noted that members had 
untied all categories of ODA to LDCs with only a few modest exceptions (OECD 
Archives, 2002a, p.2).
9
 However, it is important to note that some members had started 
untying their aid already, especially among EU countries, as the EU moved to establish 
its single market policy (Clay, Geddes & Natali, 2009, p.18 & p.20; Desmet, interview, 
2012). The fact that European countries had already discussed standardising public 
                                                 
9
 Only those covered by paragraph 7i) of the Recommendation. 
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procurement regulations meant that untying in line with the DAC recommendation 
would impose no further additional cost for them anyway (Clay, interview, 2012). 
 
Between 1990 and 2000, the percentage of untied bilateral ODA (commitment) of DAC 
countries rose from 59.4% to 80.4%,
10
 and this was before the DAC recommendation 
was agreed.
11
 Table 5.4 shows the top and the bottom seven members in terms of the 
proportion of their aid that was already untied in 2000, followed by rows showing the 
change of untied ratio for a decade before 2000 and for the decade after 2000 with the 
untied percentage in 2010. The table shows the top seven countries had already untied 
more than 90% of bilateral aid before the recommendation was agreed. For the bottom 
seven countries, it is noticeable that the untied ratio of the bottom four countries was 
below 50% in 2000.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 This includes ODA to all countries that is beyond the coverage of recommendation. 
11
 Comprehensive data for DAC members’ aid untying ODA to LDCs (within the coverage of 
recommendation) is not available. 
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Table 5.4: Top and bottom seven countries of bilateral untied ratio in 2000 and change of untied ratio 
1999-2000 and 2000-2010
12
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Top 7  Portugal Norway Luxembourg Netherlands Switzerland Germany UK 
Untied % 
in 2000 
98.24% 97.73% 96.67% 95.34% 93.64% 93.16% 91.48% 
Change of 
untied % 
1990-2000  
4.56%  36.46% 28.19% 44.18% 30.62% 49.55% 63.26% 
Untied % 
in 2010 
32.92% 100% 99.03% 93.19% 73.97% 96.04% 100% 
Change of 
untied % 
2000-2010  
-65.32%  2.27% 2.37% -2.14% -19.67% 2.89% 8.52% 
Bottom 7  Greece Canada Italy Spain Austria France Australia 
Untied % 
in 2000 
23.46% 24.91% 38.15% 47.16% 59.17% 67.98% 77.40% 
Change of 
untied % 
1990-2000 
N.A. 
 
-13.90% 
 
21.56% 20.57% 20.40% 20.90% 61.64% 
Untied % 
in 2010 
62.20% 99.30% 58.46% 76.17% 67.66% 96.57% 90.84% 
Change of 
untied % 
2000-2010 
38.74% 74.39% 20.31% 29.01% 8.49% 28.59% 13.44% 
Source: DAC CRS data, commitment 
Note: Data for period of change for Portugal was only available from 1991 and for Norway and 
Luxembourg from 1992. 
 
Although the data in table 5.4 is for all bilateral ODA, not just bilateral ODA to LDCs 
that is covered by the recommendation, it reveals general trends: (1) at the time of 
                                                 
12
 Sufficient data on US is not available, but untied ratio was 28.4% in 1996 which increased to 69.81% 
in 2009. 
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agreeing the recommendation, there was a major disparity between those who untied 
most of bilateral ODA and those whose untied ratio was very low, (2) the majority of 
the top seven countries are in the like-minded group, (3) although the degree varies, all 
the bottom seven countries made progress in untying after 2000. It is reasonable to 
conclude from the data that the direct impact of the DAC recommendation for untying 
aid on members’ compliance was greater on these bottom countries, as their changes of 
untied ratio are greater than for the top seven countries. This means that by the time 
when the recommendation was agreed, different DAC members differed in how much 
they had to adjust their aid behaviour in response to the recommendation. In 2002 the 
countries which did not yet meet the target of 60% of untied bilateral LDCs ODA were 
the United States (proportion of untied aid was 4%), Portugal (13%), Greece (20%), 
Australia (48%) and Germany (57%) (OECD Archives, 2004, p.11). The focus of 
monitoring compliance has been on these countries, whose progress fell behind the 
targets. 
 
Apart from the untying ratio of ODA to the LDCs, an effort sharing composite indicator 
was also set up. As the indicator represents a multiplication of GNI ratio and untying 
ratio of bilateral ODA to LDC/HIPC added by GNI ratio of multilateral ODA to 
LDC/HIPC, a higher number for this indicator means a better level of effort made by a 
specific member. The indicator was meant to compensate for disparities of the impact 
the recommendation had on members, because “no matter how we cut the threshold the 
impact on countries varies” (Nicol, interview, 2013). By 2002, the average effort 
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sharing indicator among DAC members already exceeded the target of 0.04 (OECD 
Archives, 2004, p.11). Members below the target were the US (0.01), Greece (0.02), 
Spain (0.03), Australia (0.03); Japan (0.04) and Portugal (0.04) were not much better. 
The good performers, whose indicators were double the average, were Norway (0.34), 
Denmark (0.28), Sweden (0.26), Netherlands (0.24), Belgium (0.19), Ireland (0.19) and 
Finland (0.13), majority of these being like-minded countries. A general pattern emerges 
that many who were at the core of the group arguing for untying had already untied their 
aid and also performed relatively well in terms of effort sharing. They were not 
proposing anything that would require them to change their own behaviour significantly. 
 
However, there is yet another issue in relation to implementation that clouds the picture. 
Although donors’ aid to LDCs has increasingly been untied, as a recent progress report 
points out, some very high shares of procurement continue to go to enterprises in donor 
countries (OECD Archives, 2012, p.3). For instance there is evidence to support this 
especially for the UK aid. DFID reported to International Committee of House of 
Commons that 92% of contracts let by DFID Procurement Group in 2010/11 went to 
UK registered companies (DFID, 2012b). Similarly, a Guardian newspaper article 
revealed only nine out of more than 100 major DFID contract agreements went to 
non-UK firms in 2011/2012 (Provost & Hughes, 2012). An annual DAC report also 
indicates 85 out of 86 DFID contract awards went to UK companies (OECD Archives, 
2012, p.16).
13
  
                                                 
13
 The total amount of 86 projects was worth US$ 656.8 million, including one project awarded to a 
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As Clay, Geddes & Natali suggest, even where international competitive bidding was 
adopted as a result of untying, the project planning and contracting processes of some 
DAC members still appear to work to the advantage of donor-based companies, either 
intentionally or unintentionally (2009, p.54). This practice is called de facto tying, 
meaning that contract awards are still won by a company in donor country under untied 
aid arrangements with open bidding process.  
 
Two interpretations can be given to account for this. One is that when a company is 
highly competitive within the international market, it wins business for that reason. A 
former DFID Secretary of State thinks the UK’s high level of contract bid by British 
companies can be attributed to this (Short, interview, 2012). However, this leads to a 
counter argument, that aid untying should also include consideration of a 
capacity-building component for the recipient countries, favouring support for local 
firms there. In the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD) it was agreed that 
developing countries must strengthen their public financial management including 
procurement and that donors should use developing countries’ system to the maximum 
extent possible. A Secretariat in charge of aid untying also said “Our intention is to 
change donors’ behaviour in a way that they change their aid policies to benefit 
developing countries” (Lammersen, interview, 2012). If it were in the ECG where ‘fair 
competition’ is respected, members’ complying through open competition would be 
                                                                                                                                               
non-UK company worth US$ 0.8million. 
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sufficient. However, the changing discourse in the DAC towards partnership and 
ownership has increasingly shed light on the importance of local procurement (i.e., the 
share of contracts that companies in developing countries can win).  
 
A more jaundiced interpretation of why so much aid funded business still goes to donor 
companies infers some kind of loophole whereby the donor country’s own companies 
still enjoy an advantage within the regulatory framework of untied aid, and sees this as 
unfair. Put simply, even if the donors formally abide by all the rules under which the aid 
can be reported as untied, there remain ways in which donors can promote companies of 
their nationality if they want to. Some see this is the case for the UK, as the 
procurement system has a bias towards UK firms (Rabinowitz, interview, 2012). The 
need to investigate procurement rules and regimes is recognised by DAC Secretariat, 
though in the case of the UK sub-contracting practice by procurement agency is 
complicated so the overall picture of procurement is difficult to see (Nicol, interview, 
2012). Indeed, demonstrating that a certain contract is de facto tying is difficult, as the 
outcome may be either an intended or unintended consequence of the way in which the 
contract is organised (Clay, Geddes & Natali, 2009, p.41). In addition, the limited 
reporting by donors on contracts awarded prevents the DAC from having a 
comprehensive picture (Clay, interview, 2012; Nicol, interview, 2013). Hence, as an 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI) senior researcher who led studies of aid untying 
for the DAC says, DAC has not made any headway at least since 2010 in this area (Clay, 
interview, 2012). 
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And yet the DAC Secretariat has now begun to look at how this problem can be 
identified, for instance by comparing the proportion of ODA contracts awarded to  
companies in the donor country and those taking place under purely market economy 
arrangements, in a specific country (Nicol, 2013, interview). The result of the 
comparison did not reassure the DAC Secretariat that UK firms really were competitive 
enough to win most contracts, although the levels for Japan and France seemed 
appropriate (ibid). At the time of writing there is an increasing awareness in the DAC, 
especially in the DAC Secretariat, of a need to clarify what is really going on around de 
facto untying: more hard information is needed.  
 
To summarize, the high level of untying ratio of the DAC members shows a high level 
of compliance. Nevertheless, members have differed in implementing the 
recommendation; like-minded countries who led the discussions faced little additional 
cost from implementing the recommendation, which may help explain their support. But 
the practice of de facto tying has emerged in recent years, which raises new questions 
about compliance. 
 
Monitoring 
Since 2001, donors’ progress on aid untying has been annually monitored and reported 
to the High Level Meeting (HLM). Also, members’ compliance is monitored through a 
peer review mechanism. Therefore a well-established mechanism to monitor members’ 
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progress does exist. Nevertheless, issues arising from the monitoring practice include 
discrepancies among members’ reporting practices, which impede effective monitoring. 
 
Progress reports for implementing the DAC recommendation on untying ODA have 
been published annually since 2002, and the reports are submitted to the DAC’s HLM.  
The process of formulating annual report can be contentious, as members check the 
content of the report (Nicol, interview, 2013). The Secretariat tries to create an 
environment in which members could be guided or pressured to untie their aid through 
the monitoring process. For instance, by creating a third category of reporting by 
members (i.e., not only tied or untied but also ‘not reported’), the Secretariat aims to 
pressure members to provide as much information as possible. This is significant in the 
case of Japan for example, where most of the “not reported” categories comprise 
technical cooperation that is excluded from the coverage of the recommendation.  
 
One of the problems associated with monitoring is reporting. As a part of reporting of 
statistics on aid flows, DAC members are obliged to report on the tying status of their 
aid. However, members’ reporting practices are not always standardised. For instance, 
the Japanese government has been criticised by the DAC for reporting their projects as 
untied when primary contractors are tied to Japanese companies, even though 
procurement of goods and services is untied for the projects. While Japan’s government 
argues that the procurement of goods and services only matter when judging either tied 
or untied, similar cases have been reported by the US as tied aid (Nicol; Lammersen, 
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interview, 2012).
14
 A different example that has been brought to attention by a 
Secretariat official relates to UK aid to or through non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), as it is not recorded as tied aid though is tied to British NGOs (Nicol, interview, 
2012).
15
 The sums are not insignificant; In 2011/12 DFID disbursed £336 million 
through UK NGOs, which accounted for 8% of total bilateral UK aid (DFID, 2012a, 
p.30). These illustrate some discrepancies among DAC members in reporting on tying 
status. 
 
The discrepancies occur partly due to the fact that the content of the DAC agreement on 
untying was not discussed in detailed when it was agreed. According to a Secretariat 
official, unlike ECA, the DAC does not set out the details of regulation because it is 
based on trust (Nicol, interview, 2013). There is also an aspect that final agreement 
could have been jeopardised if discussions had been held at that level at the time when 
the agreement on untying was negotiated: a trade-off existed between the level of detail 
and the probability of reaching consensus. More importantly now, however, these 
discrepancies on reporting could affect collective action in the DAC right up to the 
present time, if they generate suspicions among members about each other’s compliance 
or undermine their sense of being treated fairly – that is to say equally – by the 
                                                 
14
 It is important to note that the US seems not to be taking monitoring as seriously as it should, for they 
did not report untied aid in 1994 and from 1997 to 2005 (Carbone, 2007, p.104), and according to one 
source they did not care if the respective aid was counted as tied or conversely untied (Lammersen, 
interview, 2012). 
15
 However, the DAC untying recommendation only covers the extent that NGOs are involved in 
procurement-related activities, and excludes donors’ core support to NGOs (such as institutional 
overheads cost). 
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Secretariat.  
 
By reporting annually the level of compliance to the HLM, the individual members’ 
behaviour regarding aid untying is exposed to scrutiny at ministerial or head of agency 
level. Also, monitoring through the DAC peer review mechanism enables scrutiny by 
the wider public and CSOs, for peer review reports are published. For instance, after the 
peer review of Japan in June 2010, the Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation 
(JANIC) published a proposal to follow up on the content of the peer review report 
(JANIC, 2010). During NGO-MoFA periodical consultation meeting, five Japanese 
CSOs (including JANIC) posed about 20 questions including on aid untying to Japan’s 
MoFA. All the information from the meeting including the minutes is then made 
public.
16
  
 
To summarise, indicators of collective action discussed in this section lead us to 
conclude that while successful collective action has occurred, the road towards reaching 
agreement was very long, and unresolved issues remain. Discussions in the DAC started 
to move ahead from the end of 1990s. Both the frequency of meetings and level of 
participants show a high level of collective action among the members, especially 
during the negotiations on a recommendation. The recommendation was successfully 
agreed at the HLM in 2001. The untying ratio of all DAC members has risen since then; 
                                                 
16
 All the meeting documents such as agenda, participant lists and meeting records are on MoFA website 
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shimin/oda_ngo/taiwa/ek_koukankai.html, Accessed 1 Jul 
2014). 
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but several challenges remain, most notably increasing the coverage of the 
recommendation, ending de facto tying; and standardising reporting practices. So, what 
are the reasons that have variously enabled and impeded progress so far? The next 
section will address these questions. 
 
5.4: Conditions for collective action 
 
This section discusses the conditions for collective action in response to the issues 
explained in the previous section; namely why it took very long to agree on 
recommendation, what was the momentum for successful agreement, why members 
eventually complied with the recommendation, and why there are still remaining 
challenges. 
 
Secretariat 
As was discussed, aid untying involves a wider policy community than just the 
development agencies. Each DAC members had different positions, and there were 
conflicts of interests among them. Therefore, the Secretariat’s role was to encourage 
every member to agree with the recommendation, while making it as ambitious as 
possible. In doing so, an approach that insists one size fits all would not work. The 
Secretariat therefore tailor-made the recommendation in ways that maximised the 
number of DAC members who could accommodate to it. Most notable in achieving this 
were the creation of an effort sharing index, the exclusion of food aid and technical 
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cooperation, and by allowing members to attach their ‘letter of intention’ as a part of 
recommendation. The letter of intention allowed the members to express their individual 
concerns, rather than feel they were being ignored or overridden. They could be given 
some leeway to interpret the recommendation in ways they felt comfortable with, 
although not so far as to make the final agreement meaningless.  
 
For at least three DAC Secretariat officials, including a former director of DCD, who 
were heavily involved in the consensus making process, the final few minutes before 
the recommendation was agreed during the HLM in 2001 were probably the most 
dramatic moment (Carey; Nicol; Lammersen, interview, 2012). Just before the 
recommendation was agreed, they were still facing difficulty in convincing some 
members such as France and the EC. On the day when they were discussing the draft 
recommendation in a meeting, the DAC chair, the director of DCD and some Secretariat 
staff sat round a lunch table in a restaurant called ‘La Muette’ near the OECD building. 
Their focus was to formulate an effort sharing index that can be accepted by all the 
members. Understandably this is quite complex, as it would have to accommodate 
different members’ preferences in a balanced way. Nevertheless, the former director 
wrote his idea on a napkin on the table, and everyone said “Here it is!” This was how 
the final adjustment was made by the Secretariat towards agreeing the recommendation. 
As the DAC chair successfully convinced other members in the end, “the director 
brought the science and the chair brought the art”, according to a Secretariat who was 
involved in the process (Nicol, interview, 2013). 
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When asked by the writer if the Secretariat has power, one of the Secretariat officials 
answered “we have a power of persuasion” (Lammersen, interview, 2012). He 
metaphorically compared this power of persuasion in the OECD negotiation process and 
mechanism to completing a jigsaw puzzle: 
  
The pieces of puzzle are willingness of members. Secretariat cannot complete the 
puzzle if some pieces are missing but what we can do is to think of the way in 
which all the pieces are put in the right places. Therefore, we need to create 
conditions under which members are willing to agree by understanding the right 
direction and timing members want to move, the right opportunity to put pressure 
on members such as giving threats of isolation to keep them in the same direction. 
(ibid) 
 
From this statement, we can understand how the Secretariat approaches the task of 
getting members to take collective action. They can even try to manoeuvre the 
relationship among members, such as for example by using threats of isolation or, 
conversely, giving members an incentive to work together. In pursuing such tactics the 
Secretariat makes use of its privileged informational power concerning all the members. 
As each Secretariat official has their personal incentive to advance collective action in 
regard to the programme they are responsible for (otherwise their job could be in 
danger), these individual incentives may sometimes take priority over the neutral 
position that might normally be associated with the idea of a Secretariat. The formal 
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powers of the Secretariat are strictly limited, and this is why persuasion is so important; 
another commentator called it ‘influence’ (Clay, interview, 2012).  
 
Therefore, for a Secretariat official, brokering consensus is a major part of their work, 
as well as one of their aims. In order to achieve their aims, the most important capacity 
they need is not language, nor a university degree in development or economics, but 
rather a sense of balance. In fact, the DAC Secretariat is seen as “having a good sense 
of how far donors would be able to agree on the proposed policies” (Riddell, interview, 
2012). In order to acquire the sense of balance, the heads of divisions attend internal 
Secretariat meetings for peer review, “to seek opportunities to grab the momentum for a 
breakthrough by learning member countries’ individual situations” (Nicol, interview, 
2012). Personal relationships with the officials from member countries also matter. A 
DAC Secretariat attributes the success of the untying recommendation to “an incredible 
mixture of personalities, politics, theories and evidence” (ibid).  
 
As such, the Secretariat has played an important role in persuading members to agree 
with the recommendation and manoeuvered the negotiation process towards collective 
action. The Secretariat showed an ability to recognise and seize the right moment for 
pushing the agenda forward, and formulated the recommendation in a skilful way – 
combining what an official called a ‘mixture of science and art’.  
 
Delegate-headquarter relationship 
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In general, all the meetings on untying aid have been attended by government officials 
from headquarters. Until consensus was reached, it was headquarters staff who attended 
meetings, whereas after the agreement, it is mainly the delegates in Paris who attended 
informal meetings, for the purpose of monitoring.  
 
Officially, the delegates’ work is to coordinate between headquarters and the DAC, by 
conveying the government’s position to the DAC and the DAC meetings’ progress to 
headquarters. Nevertheless, once informal meetings take over, ties among the 
participants’ become stronger and seem to be influenced, either consciously or 
unconsciously, by the other participants — albeit so long as compatible with directions 
from headquarters.  
 
Member-member relationships 
In principle member-member relationships are no less important to securing collective 
action than are member-Secretariat relations, notably where members have conflicting 
interests in relation to a recommendation and where it falls to one or two members to 
take the lead in pushing an initiative forward. This section explores and compares the 
UK’s leading role on aid untying and the contrasting position of Japan, in particular. 
 
The core members of the like-minded countries were associated with the Utstein Group, 
which was formed in 1999. This was an informal alliance among women ministers in 
charge of development, in Norway, UK, Germany and Netherlands. As Clare Short 
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looked back, “The group started opportunistically from the World Bank (WB) 
governor’s meeting where women ministers gradually increased and we started to talk 
about importance of poverty reduction. There was a shared feeling that if we move 
together as women, we can make progress” (interview, 2012). The four ministers wrote 
about the establishment of the Utstein Group in an article posted in The New York Times 
(Herfkens, Johnson, Short & Wieczorek-Zeul, 1999):  
We simply cannot claim success as international politicians if we cannot make 
progress on addressing poverty. This vision of the truth about our world today 
brought the four of us together at Utstein Abbey in western Norway recently. 
With a clear focus on reducing poverty, one of the four priorities they tried to address 
was to improve coordination among donors in regard to untying donors’ aid. 
Subsequently, the Norwegian minister set out aid untying as one of the two future 
challenges for Norwegian aid (Johnson, 1999). The effect of this group formed at the 
political level goes beyond the fact that it provided a strong force pressuring other 
members towards untying aid. For as Short recalls, one minister of the Utstein Group 
wanted her (Short) to promote the untying aid agenda in the DAC because her own 
country was facing domestic deadlocks in pursuing untying (interview, 2012). This 
shows that politicians sympathetic to the recommendation were using international 
pressure to counter obstacles within their own country.  
 
The members of the Utstein group were the core of like-minded countries during the 
process of untying negotiation, and the UK’s leadership was especially very visible. It 
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originated from a domestic scandal – British aid to Malaysia in constructing the Pergau 
Dam in the early 1990s was one of the factors behind the UK taking the initiative for 
untying its aid (Carey, interview, 2012). The project was very controversial because it 
aimed to secure Britain’s own commercial and political interests in Malaysia. There was 
a commitment to offer aid made at Prime Minister’s level before a detailed needs 
assessment had been made. Moreover the project was connected to British arms exports 
trade to Malaysia as a quid pro quo for supporting the dam project tied to British 
companies’ procurement. As Lankester who was a Permanent Secretary (PS) of 
Overseas Development Administration between 1989 and 1994 recalls, the Pergau 
project was taken up in the news both in the UK and further afield every week between 
October 1993 and April 1994, indicating the high level of (very critical) public attention 
on the project (2013, p.98). During that period, formal inquiries and questions were held 
in parliament, and the High Court eventually judged the aid project unlawful. This was a 
turning point for British aid in its movement away from commercial interests and 
towards focusing on poverty reduction, becoming a highly respected donor (ibid, 
p.141). 
 
The turning point was not realised without the benefit of a strong reformist orientation 
at the newly created DFID. After Clare Short became the first Secretary of State of 
DFID in 1997 as a full cabinet Minister, DFID successfully kept the developmental 
purpose of aid from being greatly compromised by purely commercial or political 
purposes. This was achieved in part by legislating the International Development Act in 
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2002, which defined poverty reduction as DFID’s core objective, which had given 
DFID the all the important power to control its own budget for reducing world poverty. 
The Aid and Trade Provision (ATP) – a tied aid scheme through which Pergau Dam 
project had been funded – was subsequently abolished. DFID’s very first White Paper in 
the new government says it will strongly support the discipline which limits tied aid 
credit, and encourage concerted international effort on untying (DFID, 1997).  
 
Short’s personal initiative as minister was important, but a strongly pro-development 
ethos and orientation of the whole department that was formerly the Overseas 
Development Administration was important too. According to Lankester, the culture at 
the Administration was idealistic and professional, with most staff believing strongly in 
aid’s power to assist development and reduce poverty (2013, p.42). The minister and 
bureaucrats shared the same objectives here. They were also shared by Prime Minister 
Tony Blair and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown (Morrissey, 2005, 
pp.161-162). High level agreement across relevant political actors was extremely 
important to undertaking international leadership on an issue like aid untying.  
 
Short’s opportunistic approach worked well in domestic politics as well: “other 
departments were busy dealing with new issues under the new government, so we as a 
new department popped out of others with a strong focus on what we wanted to achieve, 
which in turn gave us stronger position among other departments” (Short, interview, 
2012). The ATP had a long history of being influenced by various interests from other 
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departments, notably the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) (Lankester, 2013), so 
it would be natural for DFID to want to end the scheme – if only so as to exclude further 
interference from other departments. Therefore, by 2002 the UK had gone further than 
almost any other donor in aid untying, when Clare Short announced that British aid was 
effectively fully untied (Morrissey, 2005, p.174).  
 
While the above helps explain the UK’s willingness to try to exert leadership, it does 
not provide a full explanation let alone explain why the UK should be successful in 
advancing the agenda in the DAC. Three further reasons need to be mentioned in order 
to understand what actually happened.  
 
First, because aid untying involves competition between countries for shares of world 
trade and export markets in particular, countries always want to avoid losing out, by 
resorting to tied aid. For instance, the ATP scheme came about because of pressure from 
UK manufacturing firms, who said the UK government was standing idly by while 
foreign governments were giving their national firms an unfair advantage through aid 
provision (Toye, 1991, p.97). This debate was prominent under the Thatcher 
premiership. For instance, the second phase of the Bosphorus Bridge project in Turkey, 
where Japan made the successful bid, provoked Thatcher to agree to the previously 
mentioned Wallen Package in the OECD (Maeda, 2007, p.152). The UK government 
had assumed they would win the contract for the second phase as Britain had 
implemented the first phase, but Japan offered LDCs untied loan (allowing only Japan 
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and companies from LDCs to bid) and won the project. This is why Thatcher’s attention 
turned to regulating trade distortions in the OECD. Similarly, it can be readily 
understood that once the UK unties its own aid, it would want other countries to do the 
same, in order to avoid placing itself at a disadvantage. 
 
However, not even this classic interpretation of international relations (protecting 
national interest through competition) provides a complete account of the UK’s 
leadership, which leads to a second point. Throughout interviews the writer came across 
evidence to support the idea that the UK’s leadership is partly represented by the strong 
individual belief or self-belief of the staff who work for the DFID. As was discussed 
earlier, the staff in the Overseas Development Administration and then DFID generally 
adopt a liberal approach to international economic and commercial relations. Having 
been asked why DFID wants to exerts influence, a British academic who has worked 
closely with DFID spoke about this strong belief or self-belief of DFID staff which 
leads them to promote their favoured approach abroad (White, interview, 2012). The 
strong personal commitment to development and poverty reduction of the DFID staff 
makes them think that what they are doing is right and that it is important to get others 
to follow what DFID does.  
 
Third, the UK’s strong leadership in development and its high profile reputation 
internationally has an influence on UK national leadership at a wider level.  
International development is one of the UK’s important national policies as a factor 
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benefiting the country’s international reputation. Until the DFID was set up in 1997, the 
political ambition of the UK to lead the world in development policy was moderate. For 
instance, Thatcher was convinced of the importance of development assistance only 
when she realised it underpinned the UK’s access to, and guaranteed it seats at the ‘top 
table’ of international decision-taking and diplomacy, according to Adrian Hewitt who 
established the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Overseas Development in 1984 and 
headed the Secretariat for over 20 years (interview, 2012).
17
 The evolution of DFID’s 
influence was a creeping change that began from the late 1980s with the growing 
involvement of DFID staff in World Bank-led initiatives such as Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (White, interview, 2012). In the DFID White Paper the importance of UK 
leadership in reducing global poverty was clearly stated: 
 
Our particular history places us on the fulcrum of global influence…Helping to 
lead the world in a commitment to poverty elimination and sustainable 
development is an international role in which all the people of Britain could 
take pride. (DFID, 1997, p.20) 
 
Joining up with others internationally was seen as a policy of the Labour party when it 
came into office, and there has been a clear UK leadership since then (Evans, interview, 
2012). The fact that UK had already untied its own aid provided motivation to promote 
the same to others, for as Clare Short noted, “it was obvious for me to say let’s take it to 
                                                 
17
 According to Lankester, Thatcher’s disinterest in aid for developmental purpose was her blind-spot: 
she basically thought if there had to be aid programmes then they should be used for political or 
commercial purposes (2013, p.34).  
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the DAC and we might get progress across the world” (2012, interview). Hewitt goes 
further to argue that Clare Short had every incentive to go to the DAC and try to 
persuade others to follow the UK once UK aid was untied, because otherwise UK firms 
would lose out (2012, interview). Her leadership in persuading others most likely 
reassured other ministries, such as those for trade and investment, about creating a fairer 
international environment in which to do business. At the same time, as Short recalled, 
the UK had the space to make its own way in pushing aid untying forward after DFID 
was established, while other countries were watching and listening to us with sometimes 
envious feelings (interview, 2012).  
 
On the other side of DAC were the countries who had problems with the untying aid 
agenda. These included the US, Japan, France, Denmark, and the EC. These members 
provided higher amount of ODA volume compared to others. Japan was the world’s 
largest donor in 2000 followed by the US, and total ODA disbursement of these two 
donors was US$ 23,462 million, accounting for more than 40% of the total aid by all 
DAC members.
18
 The EC and France were the 4
th
 and 6
th
 largest donors respectively. 
The high ODA volume of these countries presumably gave them negotiating power in 
projecting their positions in the DAC, because consensus is difficult to reach when some 
important and big countries oppose (Nicol; Riddell, interview, 2012). If Japan and the 
US had not been such large donors at the time when untying was finally agreed, it is 
possible that food aid and technical cooperation might have been included in the 
                                                 
18
 OECD CRS data (http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/, accesed 20 Mar 2014). 
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recommendation rather than deliberately left out.  
 
While the UK was exerting its leadership through the DAC, Japan historically saw the 
DAC as an entrance to the West. As Japan became a member of the DAC three years 
ahead of its accession to the OECD, membership of the DAC was seen as a stepping 
stone to the accession to the OECD, as discussed in chapter 1.  
 
Historically Japan was supportive of the aid untying agenda for particular reasons. In 
1970 when the DAC HLM was hosted by Japan, many members declared themselves 
prepared to untie bilateral loans, including Japan.
19
 This position of the Japanese 
government was decided during that time solely by MoFA, as it wanted to show 
tangible results as a host country, which later offended METI officials both because they 
opposed the substance of MoFA’s position and because of the way METI had been 
sidelined from the process of deliberation (Maeda, interview, 2012). From the 1970s on, 
when the Japan’s trade surplus with the rest of the world became quite prominent, aid 
untying was used as a means to relax tensions between Japan and its trade partners, 
notably the US. The Japanese government made a cabinet decision to untie its aid in 
1972,
20
 and the Ushiba-Strauss joint communique was announced by Japan and the US 
                                                 
19
 However, it ended up as just “an attempt”, following opposition from the US Treasury (OECD, 2006, 
p.15; Carey, interview, 2012). 
20
 Minutes of the House of Councillors Finance Committee held in 9
th
 November 1972, just before the 
decision was made, show some concern expressed by a president of the Bank of Japan on the necessity to 
respond to the needs of developing countries through untying. Parliamentarians’ statements on Japanese 
aid being perceived unfavourably are also mentioned. These factors probably influenced Japan’s decision 
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government in 1978 expressing Japanese intention to untie loan aid (Maeda, 2003, 
p.119; Lancaster, 2007, p.118). Since 1980s Japan’s loan aid has increasingly been 
untied. 65.2% of Japan’s ODA loans were untied in 1980, which increased to 97.7% in 
1995 (MoFA, 1996). As such, the untying motivation of Japanese government primarily 
rested on such foreign or economic purposes as gaining international reputation and 
averting criticism of Japan’s trade surplus.  
 
All this shows that collective action can be arrived at, through a plurality of different 
reasoning relating to instrumental purposes, some more overtly self-interested than 
others. However, not all reasonings offer the same degree of stability of support. For as 
Japan began to experience economic downturn in the early 1990s it became more 
reluctant to endorse aid untying (Lammersen, interview, 2012). 1995 was the peak year 
for Japanese ODA, which started to shrink shortly after.
21
 From 2002, Japanese 
government introduced a special scheme to accommodate tied aid called Special Terms 
for Economic Partnership (STEP), within the limits of the existing international 
agreement.
22
 Soon afterwards, in 1998 negotiations on the untying recommendation 
started in the DAC, where Japan did little to push the agenda move forward.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
on untying as well (http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/070/1140/07011091140002c.html, 1972). 
21
 In 1995 Japan provided 25% of total ODA from all DAC members. 
22
 The Scheme allows only Japan’s companies to bid for specific loan aid projects provided to countries 
eligible for loans and tied aid under OECD rules (therefore, excluding HPICs or LDCs). 
(http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/types_of_assistance/oda_loans/step/c8h0vm000053zae9-att/c8h0
vm000056jr3z.pdf, Accessed 1 Jul 2014) 
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To sum up, this section detailed the UK’s preparedness to take a lead on untying and 
Japan’s rather different behaviour. UK leadership followed criticism of its aid and a 
change of government, while in Japan tied aid was linked closely with commercial and 
diplomatic interests which early on made Japan more receptive to engaging in collective 
action. The contrast between the UK’s use of the DAC to show international leadership 
and Japan’s rationale for becoming a DAC member helps explain differences in the two 
countries’ involvement in the DAC. 
 
Domestic environment 
The domestic environment plays a crucial role in deciding members’ position, and 
thereby influences their commitment to collective action and the chances of securing 
agreement in the DAC. As the untying of aid affects economic and political interests 
both in the business community and among national politicians, domestic pressures to 
take strong leadership either in favour of or against untying aid is an important factor 
influencing the possibilities for collective action. In addition, NGOs’ influence in 
changing donors’ behaviour is not negligible. However the domestic environment can 
change over time, and move in unfavourable as well as favourable directions, for the 
policy of untied aid. 
 
Table 5.5 summarises domestic actors and related policy on untying aid both in the UK 
and Japan, by disaggregating the role of government (political power and bureaucratic 
organisation), commercial lobby (private sector) and development lobby (CSOs, 
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research community).  
 
Table 5.5: Domestic actors on aid untying policy in the UK and Japan 
 Political 
power 
Bureaucratic 
coordination  
Policy related to 
(un)tied 
Commercial lobby  Development 
lobby  
The 
UK 
Conservative 
(-1997) 
Overseas 
Development 
Administration 
under FCO, DTI 
ATP ・Confederation of 
British Industry 
・Export Group for 
the Construction 
Industry 
・British Expertise 
(former British 
Consultants Bureau) 
・Strong NGOs 
(Pergau Dam 
lobby by 
World 
Development 
Movement, 
untying aid by 
Action Aid) 
・academics 
・journalists 
Labour 
(1997-2010) 
DFID, FCO, 
DTI 
100% untied, 
International 
Development Act 
(2002) 
Coalition 
(2010-) 
DFID, FCO, 
DTI 
Business 
partnership, 
promoting aid 
contract 
Japan Liberal 
Democratic 
Party (LDP) 
(-2009) 
MoFA (JICA), 
METI, MoF 
Untied loan aid in 
early days 
・Keidanren, 
Engineering and 
Consulting Firm 
Association (ECFA) 
・Advocates for tied 
aid less public 
support for ODA 
・Weak NGOs  
・Weak 
academics 
・Weak 
journalists 
 
Democratic 
Party (DP) 
(2009-2012) 
MoFA (JICA), 
METI, MoF 
No change in aid 
policy 
Source: author 
 
In the case of the UK, as the table shows, the change towards aid untying policies 
reflected a change of government. Under the Conservative Party government up to 1997, 
tied aid through ATP was prominent not least in public debate and perceptions about 
UK aid, although in actual fact aid accounted for only a relatively modest component of 
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all UK expenditure on ODA.
23
 The new Labour government’s decision to untie all UK 
aid in 1999 enabled the UK to take a lead in promoting aid untying in the DAC. There 
was a push for this from bureaucrats as well as the political leadership, for as Clare 
Short remembers “DFID officials such as Richard Manning who was then the 
second-top DFID official had strong concern about tied aid, so I grabbed the moment 
and pushed it through in the DAC” (interview, 2012). So long as responsibility for 
Overseas Development Administration was under the control of the FCO, it was 
difficult for the aid budget to be protected from being used for largely political or 
business purposes.  
 
However, the creation of DFID by the new Labour government, with a full-fledged 
cabinet minister in the shape of Clare Short who had a strong belief and commitment to 
reform, and the legislation of the International Development Act in 2002, were game 
changers. The Act has helped keep aid untied even under the coalition (Conservative 
Party and Liberal Democrats) government that succeeded the Labour government from 
2010. This is because it prohibits the UK from using aid for purposes other than poverty 
reduction. Therefore, although Short’s leadership encountered some resistance notably 
from the business community (Short, interview, 2012), the reforms adopted under her 
leadership have had a lasting effect. 
 
                                                 
23
 For instance, the average percentage of ATP in UK bilateral aid commitments between 1980 and 1988 
was around 9% (calculated based on Toye, 1991, p.108). 
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Even so, a shift in attitudes towards aid untying reflecting a stronger business 
orientation may be detected in the period since. In April 2011, guidance for the overseas 
staff of DFID, UK Trade and Investment (UKTI), and FCO was announced (DFID, 
UKTI & FCO, 2011), under the new coalition government. The guidance explains the 
new government’s policy to promote UK commercial interests, and encourages three 
departments to work together to pursue commercial diplomacy, even while UK aid 
remains untied. In the end of 2011, when the then Secretary of State for International 
Development, Andrew Mitchell, announced a decision to allocate £1.2 billion over the 
next five years to India, he said it was part of a broader partnership that also included 
the hoped-for sale of fighter jets to India (Buncombe, 2011). His successor, Justine 
Greening, said in her speech that “what’s good for companies comes first, rather than 
what’s good for developing countries” (Greening, 2013). This seems to signal a 
departure from what would be expected of an altruistic motivation for aid-giving.  
 
This recent shift of attitudes towards aid in the UK is linked with erosion of DFID’s 
autonomy and growing links with other departments, signalling new priorities under the 
names of business partnership and a so-called win-win strategy. The World 
Development Movement – the NGO which took the government to court over the 
Pergau Dam project and won the case – has started campaigning for an independent 
parliamentary inquiry into how the DFID works with business (Ford & Provost, 2013).  
In reply to a question posed by a Labour Member of Parliament about the line 
separating tied and untied aid, Secretary of State Greening replied “Although there are 
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risks in working with business, we should see opportunities too” (House of Commons, 
2013). While the coalition government committed itself to keeping aid untied from 
commercial interests soon after the election in 2010 (HM Government, 2010, p. 22), 
developments since then could be telling a different story. 
 
In marked contrast, Japan’s political leadership on international development is weak, 
and this too owes in part to the domestic environment. “I had respect for Japan as I 
knew Japan had to make more effort than some of DAC members by agreeing to the 
recommendation, given its different environment”, answered Clare Short when asked 
about Japan’s policy towards aid untying (interview, 2012). Table 5.5 shows the 
difference of Japanese domestic environment compared to the UK. In 2009 there was a 
dramatic change of government after 55 years of rule by the LDP, but no change of 
Japanese aid policy occurred. In contrast to the UK where change of political leadership 
influenced the direction of its aid policy, the continuation of Japan’s same aid policy 
reflects the continuing low level of political interest in international development.  
 
For a long time, Japanese policy making has been described as ‘dominated by 
bureaucrats’ without political leadership; and exactly because of that, the DP argued the 
need to break away from bureaucracy, and for government policymaking to be led more 
by politicians. In Parliament there has indeed been some recent debate on aid untying. 
According to a Secretariat official at the House of Councillors in charge of a cross-party 
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committee to discuss ODA,
24
 politicians who speak about aid untying issue in the 
committee express their preference for tied aid to secure national interest, and those who 
are in favour of untying tend not to express their opinion in public (Kanda, interview, 
2012). This is because speaking in favour of aid untying will bring no electoral benefits 
to politicians. As a result, debates in parliament now are more or less occupied with 
reversing the untied policy. For instance, during a Special Committee in February 2012, 
a LDP politician asked one of the expert witnesses “What would happen if we tie our 
aid by ignoring the regulation decided by the DAC?” (House of Councillors, 2012, 
pp.7-8). 
 
Despite some expectations by the aid community in Japan that aid policy might change, 
along with a determination to exert leadership on aid – and notwithstanding the 
discussions in parliamentary forums – to date there has been no significant change in 
policy. The fact that international aid is not on the national agenda, and receives no 
attention from the public helps explain this.
25
 Just as important is the deeply embedded 
nature of weak political leadership on international development, where for a long time 
the bureaucracy has exercised comparatively stronger power in deciding aid policy.
26
 
                                                 
24
 The forum is named Special Committee on ODA and Related Matters. 
25
 Former Minister Okada was widely esteemed by the development community for his endeavour to 
improve ODA policy, though it was rather seen as his individual initiative, and his LDP successor 
subsequently moved ODA policy closer to economic diplomacy. 
26
 It is worth noting that the combination of weak political leadership and strong bureaucracy means 
continuity is very likely – the steady implementation of the DAC recommendation on untied aid, even 
though Japan does not take a lead. This is reflected in a DAC chair’s comment: “Frankly, Japan is an 
excellent country in fulfilling its commitments and this is exactly why the country is so reluctant to take 
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The domination of bureaucrats in aid policy decision-making has in fact long been 
pointed out (see Arase, 2005; Lancaster 2007). It is mainly the MoFA and METI who 
have influenced decision making for aid untying, albeit offering different points of view. 
As Arase points out, researchers have tried to explain Japanese aid either from the 
perspective of endogenous national interest (kokueki) or by exogenous membership 
obligations in international society (tsukiai), or by some combination of the two (2005, 
p.10).
27
 Lancaster, for instance, analyses Japan’s difficulty in converging its aid policy 
with the policy of major Western donors by examining factors of internal pressure 
(naiatsu) and foreign pressure (gaiatsu) (Lancaster, 2010). This dichotomy reflects the 
structure of bureaucracy related to aid untying; METI tries to maximise the national 
interests which can be gained from tied aid to the benefit of Japanese companies and its 
economy (kokueki), often representing internal pressure (naiatsu), whereas MoFA tries 
to align ODA policy to the international norms agreed in the DAC (tsukiai), and is more 
susceptible to foreign pressure (gaiatsu).  
 
Japanese untying aid policy has been fought over by a divided bureaucratic structure 
that pits MoFA and METI against each other, reflected by a mixture of kokueki and 
tsukiai, or naiatsu and gaiatsu. Some examples are given here. First, the reason behind 
Japan’s positive initiative on aid untying during the 1970s and 80s was to reduce strong 
                                                                                                                                               
on new commitments— because it’s so true to its words” (Atwood, interview, 2012).  
27
 The direct translation of tsukiai is “acquaintance”.  
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international criticism due to Japan’s economic strength during that period. The level of 
Japan’s foreign reserve reached its peak in 1987, and export promotion was slowed 
down; Japan’s government had to seek a path for international harmonisation (Araki, 
interview, 2012). Hence, there was an intention to hide kokueki by using tsukiai factor. 
Second, one year after the Wallen Package was agreed in 1987 Japan’s government 
declared to untie its aid in the MoFA’s ODA mid-term policy. According to Maeda, a 
former METI official, this measure was a strategic one, because the government tried to 
pretend the decision was its own will (even though the Wallen Package was the main 
reason in reality) in order to dodge criticism by business lobby (interview, 2012). This 
shows the government’s endeavour to ease naiatsu by hiding gaiatsu. The third example 
illustrates MoFA’s using tsukiai factor or gaiatsu to protect its aid from kokueki or 
naiatsu. In 1996, MoFA’s ODA White Paper led growing public support for re-tying of 
Japanese loan aid, following a fall in the percentage of contracts awarded to Japanese 
firms below 30%. However, the Paper cautioned against re-tying, mentioning the 
likelihood of international criticism (MoFA, 1996, pp.56-57).  
 
These examples show Japan’s aid untying has always been determined by the balance 
and a mixture of kokueki/naiatsu and tsukiai/gaiatsu factors, often through a tug-of-war 
between METI and MoFA. MoFA certainly receives pressure from METI and 
politicians who represent commercial lobbies, but takes the view that tied aid benefits 
only a small group of companies supported by only some politicians.
28
 Nevertheless, 
                                                 
28
 A MoF official also expressed his opinion that what is good for Japan and what is good for these 
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the more recent economic climate in Japan could be thought to strengthen the internal 
pressure from commercial lobbies such as the Keidanren who advocate tied aid.  
 
In Japan development lobbying by NGOs, academics and journalists is much weaker 
than in the UK. Although some advocacy NGOs are now growing, such as the JANIC, 
and they monitor government policy including on aid untying, the numbers as well as 
depth of their activities remain very limited as discussed in chapter 4. 
 
The research community in Japan is weak too, as the link between academics and policy 
is weak (discussed in more detail in chapter 6). In contrast in the UK, the research 
community and NGOs often collaborate to push for government policy reform. For 
instance, Professor Oliver Morrissey at the University of Nottingham – an expert on UK 
ODA – not only criticised British tied aid practices in his publications but also provided 
some advice to NGOs, which they could then use in their lobbying.
29
 
 
A commercial lobby to promote tied aid exists both in the UK and Japan. However, the 
strong political commitment to untie aid in the UK meant a confident approach to 
dealing with opposition from the commercial lobby. A report of the Select Committee 
on International Development in 1997 noted that the UK government’s decision to 
abolish ATP was welcomed by all the parties apart from those by the business 
                                                                                                                                               
companies are two different issues (Kanayama, interview, 2012). 
29
 A report published by Action Aid in 1998, In whose benefit? : The case for untying aid acknowledges 
additional input from Dr. Morrissey (Chinnock, 1998, p.1). 
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association (House of Commons, 1997), even though the business lobby remained 
active in discussions about tied aid (Chinnock, 1998, P.25). In the DFID’s press release 
at the occasion announcing its decision to untie all aid, Clare Short’s intention to 
comfort the business lobby is obvious: “British industry has nothing to fear from aid 
untying. DFID will continue to award consultancy contracts on the basis of quality and 
cost rather than price alone” (DFID, 2000).  
 
The common point in all the discussion and argument in the UK around aid untying 
policy, whether carried out in parliament or by NGOs, researchers, and journalists 
outside, is the importance of the UK government keeping faith with the policy of untied 
aid. The Shadow Secretary of State for International Development recently said, “We 
are vehemently against tied aid” (House of Commons, 2013a); and a wide range of 
other actors monitor government behaviour continue to monitor the government’s 
performance. 
 
In Japan, the largest business lobby, Keidanren has been publishing its own proposals 
for Japanese ODA, for instance, in 2007, 2008 and 2011. Understandably, their main 
argument is that measures need to be taken to offset the impact of aid tying so as to 
make it possible for Japanese companies to win more of the contracts. Nevertheless, 
officials from the Keidanren understand that “It is not realistic that Japan would 
withdraw from DAC’s membership” and, therefore, “we need to think about how we 
can deal with the current situation under the OECD rules” (interview, 2012). The 
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Keidanren’s 2011 proposal suggests the government go out of its way to promote 
Japanese companies’ success in winning untied projects, and send government officials 
who can take a leadership role in the OECD (Keidanren, 2011). ECFA, a group of 
engineering and consulting firms, advocates a return to tied aid. For instance, during the 
Special Committee on ODA and Related Matters held in May 2011, the president of 
ECFA referred to Chinese tied aid and suggested investigating the possibility of de facto 
tying through Public-Private Partnership (House of Councillors, 2011). The 
government’s desire to promote Public-Private Partnership under the current national 
growth strategy offers an opportunity for the ECFA to drive home its argument.  
 
Japanese advocates of tied aid all point to the fact that the ratio of contracts awarded to 
Japanese firms has dramatically decreased over time. This merits some comment. First, 
it is true that the de facto tying ratio of Japanese ODA is comparatively low, and in 
contrast to the UK companies other than Japanese are increasingly winning contracts for 
Japan’s ODA. In 2011, out of 628 contracts reported to the DAC (worth US$ 6,340 
million) only 100 contracts went to Japanese firms (worth US$ 1,358), which accounts 
for about 21% of the total (OECD Archives, 2012, p.16). This corresponds to JICA’s 
annual report; which says 19.7% of ODA procurement went to Japanese firms; 17.3% 
went to firms in other developed countries; 24.1% went to firms in developing countries 
(JICA, 2012, p119). When making a comparison with the high rate of de facto tying 
enjoyed by the UK, one could choose to interpret the difference as a reflection of a low 
level of international competitiveness of Japanese companies. In fact, the percentage of 
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tied loan aid (20.6%) and the procurement rate from Japanese firms (19.7%) were 
almost identical in 2011, which means that almost all the untied aid contracts were won 
by foreign firms. Therefore, some informants both within and outside of Japanese 
government draw a very different conclusion that tied aid is unsustainable, and Japanese 
firms will simply have to become more competitive, without looking to more 
government support (interview, 2012). 
 
This section has shown that a comprehensive account of the conditions for collective 
action on aid tying must factor in the relationships between relevant government 
departments in the member states and the extent to which aid policy is subject to firm 
political direction from the politicians. It must also take account of interested actors in 
the economy and society. These variables are shown to differ from one country to 
another, and they cannot be assumed to remain constant over time. Collective action 
happens (or does not happen) at the end of a long chain of conditioning influences, 
some more direct and others more remote or indirect. Relations among DAC members 
and their domestic conditions greatly influence the chances of there being collective 
action, not least through willingness to exercise leadership. However, even the part 
played by non-members must not be excluded from investigation, as the analysis in the 
next section shows. 
 
Member/ non-member relationships 
Requests by aid-receiving developing countries’ for untying aid had an impact on 
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pushing the untying agenda, according to claims made in meetings by the promoters of 
untying aid, such as like-minded countries and by the chair. And yet with regard to such 
non-DAC countries like China and India, whose presence on the international aid scene 
is far more significant now than ten years ago, the fact that they continue to tie their 
own aid-giving might be thought to exert a negative influence on DAC members’ 
attitude towards their own compliance.  
 
One of the three objectives of DAC’s aid untying is to respond to a preference expressed 
by developing countries for aid untying (OECD Archives, 1997a, p.3).
30
 Developing 
countries repeatedly expressed their preference for untied aid even before the 
negotiation of 2001 Recommendation started. For instance, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), where developing countries are in 
a clear majority, tried to address the tied aid problem ever since the 1960s (OECD, 1968, 
p.67). By the 1990s the DAC’s publication of Shaping the 21st Century (OECD, 1996a) 
influenced the donors’ discourse on relations between donors and developing countries, 
and from the mid-2000s onwards developing countries came to participate in various 
meetings in the DAC, most notably in the WP-EFF (discussed later in chapter 6). As 
before then “few developing countries have power to affect the restrictive procurement 
practices of donors” (Cassen & Associates, 1994, p.220), the inclusion of developing 
countries in the DAC’s WP was an important opportunity to influence donor thinking 
                                                 
30
 Two other objectives are giving real effect to the 21
st
 Century and Partnership Strategies; and levelling 
the playing field among exporters. 
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and behaviour on aid untying.  
 
Nevertheless, not all countries had identical views. Recipient countries showed mixed 
feelings towards tied aid; a few countries objected strongly (e.g., India), some thought it 
‘not insupportable’, and others believed it to be inevitable (ibid). Recipient countries 
request untying at international form such as in DAC meetings, but may not always 
express it explicitly in their bilateral relationship with donors. “No partner country had 
requested France to untie its ODA” – this was said by France’s delegation at the SLM in 
1999, in response to the like-minded countries’ pressure that cited aid partner countries’ 
preference for untied aid (OECD Archives, 1999a, p.10). The writer’s own informal 
conversation with a government official from a recipient country revealed a preference 
for tied aid compared to untied aid that might sometimes be badly managed and 
incurred long delays, resulting in extra costs to the government. We should be reminded 
that how aid is perceived can differ from one place to another, and recipients’ views 
may not always comport with those articulated by the donor.  
 
The role of CSOs has been significant too. Action Aid, a UK based NGO, launched a 
campaign on the case for untying aid in 1996, a year before the Labour Party took office. 
For instance, they proposed several options for the British government to pursue on 
untying aid, including making announcements of aid untying, to show UK’s leadership 
(Chinnock, 1998, p.32). When the UK government announced it would untie all aid, 
Action Aid recognised it as a major victory and encouraged other donors to follow 
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suit.
31
 Their campaign went beyond the UK, as Action Aid International together with 
40 European NGOs launched a legal complaint against the EC for its aid tying. This 
received the support of the 900 members of the European NGO Liaison Committee 
(Carbone, 2007, p.107). 
 
The Action Aid campaign with its well-researched analysis on untying aid reinforced 
the newly created DFID’s intention to change both the UK’s policy and that of other 
donors as well. Moreover, from the end of 1990s the level of interest shown by CSOs as 
well as journalists on the actual negotiations over untying aid in the DAC increased. 
NGOs started to gather around the OECD building during untying meetings and 
protested “We want untying!”, which was rare to see such scenery around OECD events, 
as a DAC Secretariat recalled (Nicol, interview, 2012). The strong pressure from CSOs 
together with increasing public awareness on untying issue created a “sense of 
frustration and embarrassment” among the DAC members (ibid).  
 
While in the UK as well as elsewhere in European CSOs advocated untying aid during 
the time when the DAC negotiations became more intense, nothing comparable 
happened in Japan. There is a structural difference between Japan and other OECD 
members in that a majority of Japan’s NGOs concentrate on delivering services in 
developing countries, rather than engage in policy advocacy. Japanese civil society is 
                                                 
31
 Based on Action Aid website on aid untying (http://www.actionaid.org.uk/aid/untie-aid, Accessed: 1 
July 2014). 
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made up of members without advocates, because few professional advocacy 
organizations exists (Pekkanen, 2006). Yet, some efforts and improvements were made 
to foster dialogue between MoFA and NGOs; a periodical consultation meeting was set 
up in 1996, with a special policy consultation session after 2002. International aid 
policy only started to be discussed there from 2008, when the aid effectiveness agenda 
was included.
32
 
 
Non-DAC countries too have indirect influence on the DAC members’ aid untying 
policies. However, non-DAC countries’ influence could work towards undermining 
collective action in the DAC, unlike that of CSOs who may promote collective action. 
Non-DAC countries’ own increasing aid, most of which is believed to be tied 
(Kragelund, 2008, p.559; Grimm et al, 2010, p.48), potentially undermines the aid 
untying discipline which has been established among DAC donors. Compared to the 
early 2000s when the untying recommendation was agreed, the incentives of DAC 
members to continue striving for collective action are now reduced. In respect of aid 
untying, a sense of unfairness arises when DAC countries face competition from 
non-DAC countries who act outside the DAC’s aid untying discipline, winning 
contracts funded out of DAC member country aid. An illustration is the winning of 
projects funded by Japanese loan aid by Chinese companies; Japanese companies are 
not allowed to bid for China’s aid projects in developing countries. The total amount of 
                                                 
32
 Based on Japan’s MoFA website on MoFA-NGO Consultative Meetings. 
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shimin/oda_ngo/taiwa/kyougikai.html, Accessed 1 July 2014).  
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contracts that Chinese companies won from Japanese loan aid rose significantly from 
5.9 billion yen in 2000 to 31.8 billion yen in 2011 (JBIC, 2000, p102-108; JICA, 2012, 
p.193-196).
33
 Resentment can be seen not only at government headquarters in Tokyo 
but also among Japanese diplomats based in developing countries when they witness 
Japanese ODA projects being constructed by Chinese workers. It is not surprising then 
that at least some Japanese diplomats have suggested reverting Japan’s policy back in 
the direction of aid tying. It was partly in response to this that Japan’s government 
created the new loan aid scheme of STEP in 2002, aimed at promoting Japanese 
technology by tying to Japanese companies, within the OECD rules. 
 
This section has shown that collective action in the DAC cannot be explained solely in 
terms of the members and the Secretariat, and that even actors outside the DAC may 
exert an influence, positive or negative, indirectly and without even attending DAC 
meetings. Relevant outside actors can be of different sorts, including both 
non-governmental or CSOs and major non-DAC countries. The influence exerted by 
these actors on participating DAC members varies across DAC members, as shown by 
the comparison of CSOs in Japan and Britain or Europe more broadly, and Japan’s 
exceptional sensitivity to the challenge of competition from China. 
 
5.5: Conclusion 
                                                 
33
 This excludes projects in China; and information is only available for projects above 1 billion yen for 
the main projects and 0.1 billion yen for the consultancy projects. 
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Aid untying has always been a contentious issue in the OECD. This is why in spite of a 
long history of discussion the DAC agreed a recommendation only in 2001, following 
substantial agreements in the ECA. Although there are some unresolved issues still, by 
and large the indicators of collective action show that DAC members reached agreement 
and have acted accordingly. A united leading force by a small number of countries with 
the UK at the front prevailed against countries who differed in their reasons for resisting 
reform. Even so, there seems to be uneven compliance among the members, once de 
facto tying is identified. That de facto tying can be observed among countries that have 
attained a high level of formal compliance suggests that tests to assess whether 
collective action is achieved (or not) may have to become more sophisticated. 
 
In respect of the conditions for collective action, the chapter showed that domestic 
conditions inside member countries are influential on members’ positions in the DAC. 
Since the late 1990s a shared commitment formed around the like-minded countries, 
and this was crucial to lending momentum to the process of reaching agreement. Other 
conditions also mattered, for example the Secretariat’s ability to balance interests among 
the members on both sides of the debate. In addition, pressure from developing 
countries, as well as from NGOs inside the DAC member states, exerted leverage to 
counteract obstacles to change. However, integration of the untying aid agenda into an 
aid effectiveness agenda opened up the discussion to non-members, and this too played 
a role. It is to this issue of aid effectiveness that chapter 6 turns, providing the second of 
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two case studies that explore in detail the indicators of and conditions for collective 
action in the DAC with specific reference to the lessons that can be learned by 
comparing the UK and Japan. 
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Chapter 6: Aid Effectiveness 
 
 
6.1: Introduction 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 discussed indicators of and conditions for collective action in the DAC. 
Chapter 5 and this chapter examine in closer detail the indicators and conditions 
discussed in chapter 3 and 4 by examining two specific issues: aid untying and aid 
effectiveness. They also make specific inquiry into two member countries, the UK and 
Japan, in relation to these two issues, in order to analyse members' conditions and 
incentives for collective action.  
 
The two cases of aid untying and aid effectiveness demonstrate distinctive nature and 
types of collective action. While the chapter on aid untying showed successful 
collective action both in agreement and compliance, this chapter indicates low level of 
compliance even when policies are agreed. In addition, the scope and the actors 
involved in collective action was limited or targeted for aid untying because DAC 
Recommendation on Untying ODA (2001) only covers Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs), and non-DAC actors did not participate in the discussions. In contrast, this 
chapter on aid effectiveness demonstrates different features: the scope of the agenda has 
widened and increasing numbers and types of non-DAC actors have come to participate. 
Comparison of these two cases illuminates the evolving nature of collective action 
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(problems) in the DAC. 
 
DAC is widely recognised to have led on aid effectiveness, with successive agreements 
of the Rome Declaration in 2003, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD) in 2005, 
Accra Action for Agenda (AAA) in 2008 and Busan Partnership in 2011 during its High 
Level Forum (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness. The agenda has influenced donor policies and 
raised the level of awareness among policy makers and practitioners in aid agencies. 
Overall, indicators show successful collective action up until agreement stage but the 
level of implementation of the agreed policies has been lower than the targets originally 
set. The increasing number of delegates from 100 during Paris HLF to over 3,000 
during Busan HLF reflects the growing level of interest in this agenda. Also, different 
kinds of actors have become involved. While the Rome Declaration only dealt with 
donors’ commitment, more representatives from non-DAC members such as recipient 
governments, emerging donors and civil society organisations (CSOs) have participated 
in the discussions since PD.  
 
All this has inevitably made collective action more difficult. However, in spite of 
critical phases during the negotiations of outcome documents, the DAC as a (co)host of 
the HLF was successful in getting the actors on board and reaching agreement. In 
between each Forum, the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) advanced the 
work on aid effectiveness, backed up by monitoring frameworks such as indicators and 
targets set in the PD. Pressure from outside the DAC to achieve successful collective 
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action on aid effectiveness has shifted over time. At first, pressure came from the 
research community as well as CSOs, but during the last HLF (2011) the DAC reacted 
to changes in the global economy by trying to include non-DAC emerging countries. 
This, represented an attempt to sustain its legitimacy but at some cost to the DAC’s own 
agenda. DAC’s survival strategy as an international organisation means that it must 
remain relevant to the wider international community if its members are to continue to 
commit to participating in the DAC. 
 
Nevertheless, compliance over aid effectiveness has been low. After five years from PD, 
only one out of 13 targets was met (OECD, 2012a). In his opening remarks at the Busan 
HLF, OECD Secretary General Angel Gurría referred to the level of implementation as 
“sobering” (Gurría, 2011), and many CSOs expressed their disappointments. So, this 
chapter examines the obstacles to implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda, by 
assessing the domestic conditions in Japan and the UK.  
 
The pattern of leaders and followers which was observed in the case on aid untying has 
similarities for aid effectiveness. Again the UK led the discussions inside the DAC, 
together with the DAC chair and research community. However, this chapter will show 
that over time the pattern has changed, as more and more non-DAC actors began to 
participate in the meetings. The convening power and influence of the DAC Secretariat 
and DAC members were watered down; the pattern of leaders-followers is no longer 
simple but instead came to involve a complex dynamism of divergent relationships 
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among different actors. 
 
In addition, while the main locus of collective action on aid untying lay between Paris 
and members’ headquarters, a new focus on the recipient country level in developing 
countries has to be included in the case of aid effectiveness. This, again, makes 
collective action more difficult, as a community comprising recipient governments and 
donor actors active at the recipient country level generates its own logic and incentives, 
which may differ from those in Paris or at donor headquarters.  
 
Aid effectiveness was a critical turning point for the DAC: it changed the types and 
levels of collective action, with new actors being involved, and also saw the beginning 
of change to the norms of the DAC. As aid effectiveness became such an influential 
agenda internationally, it has inevitably affected the works of other subsidiary bodies of 
the DAC as well. Nevertheless, DAC had to loosen its control of the aid effectiveness 
agenda once the Busan HLF set up a new platform of Global Partnership to host 
discussions outside DAC. The issue of which institutional setting should host the aid 
effectiveness agenda has opened a new debate on global governance for development, 
as elaborated later in the chapter. 
 
This chapter begins with an overview of aid effectiveness – definitions and a snapshot 
of progress made in the DAC. Sections on indicators for and conditions of collective 
action follow, mirroring the structure of chapter 5. The indicators explain the level of 
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collective action: the conditions explain the collective action, as well as the particular 
ways and forms it took.  
 
6.2: Overview 
 
The aid effectiveness debates 
Most research (notably by economists) on aid effectiveness analyses the impact of aid 
mainly on economic growth (i.e., whether aid works and produces intended objectives), 
but the DAC’s work dwells on how aid is provided (i.e., how to provide and manage aid 
in order to achieve intended objectives). The DAC does not discuss the allocation or 
effective level of aid volume in economic terms.  
 
During the 1980s and 90s academic research was dominated by macro-level 
cross-country research investigating aid’s impact on economic growth and then poverty 
reduction in developing countries. Many concluded that no positive correlation between 
aid and growth can be found (see Mosley, 1986; Burnside & Dollar, 2000), or aid works 
only in certain environments with certain conditions such as for countries with good 
governance (World Bank, 1998). Summer and Mallett note “a bewildering array of 
academic studies into aid effectiveness” during the last twenty years (2013, p.28), and 
by the end of 2004 ninety seven econometric studies on aid effectiveness were 
conducted (Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2009). But while some research concentrated on 
whether aid works, other strands started to examine why aid has been ineffective. Some 
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of the influential studies are; Cassen and Associates (1994) that systematically 
identified fragmentation and poor coordination of aid among donors, damaging aid’s 
effectiveness; and Helleiner et al. (1995) which highlighted the negative impact of 
un-coordinated aid on the recipients’ administrative capacity.  
 
The DAC has in a sense responded to questions about why aid has not been effective by 
“identifying weakness in the way development resources are managed and delivered” 
(Chandy, 2011, p.8). Changing donors’ behaviour for effective aid has become a core 
aim of DAC’s work on aid effectiveness. This means the discussions and negotiations in 
the DAC came to focus on the process of aid delivery, as well as on relations between 
donors and recipients, rather than aid’s actual impact on growth or poverty. Definitions 
of aid effectiveness are rare in official DAC documents (e.g., PD), but the DAC defines 
it as “the efforts of the development community to improve the delivery of aid to 
maximise its impact on development” (OECD, 2012b, p.289). This demonstrates the 
DAC’s distinctive approach. 
 
In recent years the debate has moved from aid effectiveness to development 
effectiveness. A common understanding of what “development effectiveness” means 
does not exist (Kindornay, 2011). The PD evaluation report says “aid effectiveness” is 
an “effect of the PD” in terms of intermediate outcomes whereas “development 
effectiveness” is the “impact of the PD” on longer term outcomes such as reducing 
poverty or inequality, increasing growth, building capacity and accelerating the 
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Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (OECD, 2012a, p.4). Development 
effectiveness both has a longer term horizon and wider scope that includes other 
financing resources, such as those of non-DAC countries whose financial provisions 
linked to trade may not qualify as aid on the DAC definition of assistance. 
 
Overview of progress of the DAC’s work on aid effectiveness 
It was only 2003 when the subsidiary body on aid effectiveness (i.e., WP-EFF)
1
 was 
created in the DAC, in spite of awareness of the problems related to aid effectiveness 
since 1960s in the DAC (mainly about aid coordination). In 2012 the aid effectiveness 
work by WP-EFF was transformed into a Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Co-operation (Global Partnership), which is an independent open forum outside the 
OECD/DAC. This chapter will focus on the nine years during which the WP-EFF 
operated. 
 
Table 6.1 shows the evolution of aid effectiveness over the period of four HLFs between 
2003 and 2011, in line with the indicators of collective action. In spite of the increasing 
types and numbers of actors, each HLF was able to produce outcome documents that set 
out common understandings on future work on aid effectiveness. The agenda was 
originally led by the UK together with the World Bank (WB) and a small number of 
developing countries, supported by the research community, growing from an informal 
                                                 
1
 Originally it was named Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and Donor Practices. 
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forum of Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA) outside of the DAC.
2
 Once the 
WP-EFF was set up and the actors started to increase, coalitions of interest were formed 
according to issue area. These discussions later came to be criticised for being too 
technical and intelligible only to insiders of the aid community. Partly because of this, 
the agenda shifted from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness during the Busan 
HLF, making the issues more accessible and relevant to a wider community. 
 
Table 6.1: Indicators of collective action on aid effectiveness from Rome HLF to Busan HLF 
 Rome HLF 
(2003) 
Paris HLF 
(2005) 
Accra HLF 
(2008) 
Busan HLF  
(2011) 
Meetings Members DAC donors + Developing countries + CSOs + non DAC donors 
Numbers  100 1,700 3,000 
Agreement Outcome 
documents 
Rome Declaration Paris Declaration  
(5 principles, 56 
commitments, 13 
indicators) 
Accra Agenda for 
Action (AAA) 
Busan Partnership 
Agenda Harmonisation Aid effectiveness Aid effectiveness Development 
effectiveness 
Leaders UK, research 
community, WB, 
developing 
countries 
UK, research 
community, developing 
countries 
UK, European 
Union (EU), 
developing 
countries 
? 
Implementation   1/13 targets met (2011)  Global Partnership 
Monitoring  Three monitoring 
surveys (2006, 2008, 
2010) 
 Global Partnership 
Source: author 
 
                                                 
2
 Established in 1987, the SPA is an informal association of donors and African partners at technical level 
that aims to improve the quality and increase the quantity of assistance to Africa by discussing emerging 
issues within the international aid architecture.  
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Table 6.2 is an overview of the conditions for collective action. In terms of agreement, 
some DAC chairs contributed to forming consensus during the HLF. In regard to 
members’ relationships, the UK exercised leadership with like-minded countries 
progressing the aid effectiveness agenda; Japan and the US among others were not 
enthusiastic. 
 
Table 6.2: Conditions for collective action on aid effectiveness from Rome HLF to Busan HLF 
 Rome HLF 
(2003) 
Paris HLF (2005) Accra HLF (2008) Busan HLF (2011) 
Secretariat Some DAC chairs contributed to reach agreement on outcome documents. 
Delegate-headquarter 
relationship 
    
Member-member 
relationship 
Like-minded vs others 
UK leadership contributed to reaching agreement, while 
undermining trust between the members.  
Divided groups as to 
how to respond to 
emerging countries. 
Domestic environment UK leadership is supported by domestic actors advocating for aid effectiveness 
internationally. 
Recipient country 
level 
Key to implementation/compliance though different and new layers of incentives for 
collective action. 
Member/non- 
member relationship 
Recipient 
countries 
Recipient countries CSOs Emerging countries 
Source: author 
 
6.3: Indicators of collective action 
 
In this section, the indicators of collective action (members and meetings, agreement, 
implementation and monitoring) are discussed in the context of aid effectiveness. 
Overall, the numbers of members and meetings have expanded especially with the new 
actors, who have different positions in response to the DAC. The implementation of the 
PD has been slow notwithstanding the monitoring framework to assess members’ 
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compliance.  
 
Members and meetings 
The literature on aid effectiveness has little to say about the process of discussions in 
the DAC, which enables this section to add to existing knowledge of how meetings 
came to be organised and who attended. Unlike the case of aid untying, the structure of 
WP-EFF meetings has evolved in ways that exhibit the changing nature of the DAC 
itself. The participants to the WP-EFF were expanded to include non-DAC members, 
notably recipient countries and emerging donors.  
 
The WP-EFF was set up only in 2003, but issues related to aid effectiveness had already 
been taken up in the DAC. Aid coordination was always the core concern of the DAC 
since its inception in the 1960s, but some guidelines and principles began to be agreed 
from mid-1980s: the Guiding Principle for Aid Co-ordination in 1986, and the DAC 
Principles for Effective Aid in 1992 (OECD, 1992a). During the 1980s aid coordination 
problems were increasingly taken up by other forums too. One which influenced the 
DAC’s initiation of aid effectiveness work was the SPA, an informal donor coordination 
forum started in 1987 outside of the DAC. The SPA has been “a precursor in building a 
basis for collective action around African issues, and many ideas discussed in the SPA in 
1980s were taken by the DAC in 1990s” (Evans, 2012, interview). With the growing 
recognition of the necessity to address aid effectiveness, the WP-EFF was created in 
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2003.
3
  
 
The WP-EFF started from a small open forum but gradually grew into a large coalition 
of the willing (OECD, 2010b). From a donor-only forum, the Working Party evolved 
into a multi-stakeholder platform including non-DAC actors such as emerging countries, 
recipient countries and CSOs. Table 6.3 shows the meeting structure of the WP-EFF 
between 2003 and 2013. Plenary meetings were held a few times annually, whose 
members consisted of DAC members, non-OECD/DAC members and multilateral 
organisations (i.e., invited organisations). From 2005, the number of non-OECD/DAC 
members came to equal DAC members. An Executive or Steering Committees were 
formed to support Plenary Meetings, with small number of members representing their 
regional and political constituencies. Technical contributions were elaborated at the 
sub-groups level, where various joint ventures and clusters were formed, and in which 
more frequent and informal communications were made. 
 
In addition to these layers, consensus groups were formed during the negotiation of 
HLF outcome documents. For instance, Table 6.3 lists 15 members of AAA Consensus 
Group and 18 Busan HLF so-called ‘sherpa’ who were elected to advance and negotiate 
the content of the outcome documents. The composition of the consensus group shows 
that over the period the number of recipient and emerging countries increased, while 
others such as the DAC members stayed constant. This is a sign that recipient and 
                                                 
3
 This was at the occasion of the reform of DAC’s subsidiary body structure. 
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emerging countries gained more power to influence the outcome of the HLF.  
 
Table 6.3: Meeting structure of the WP-EFF 
Source: Compiled by author from Directory of Bodies of the OECD in respective years, OECD (2005a) 
OECD 2008a), OECD (2011b), Hayman (2012). 
 
The participation by aid recipient countries was not straightforward. Recipient countries 
 2003-2005 2005-2010 2010-2011 
Plenary 
Meeting 
(2-3 times 
annually) 
・Chair (Vice Chair): France 
(-2007) (Japan, Denmark) 
・ Members: 23 DAC 
members, 14 participating 
countries, 11 invited 
organisations 
・ Chair (Vice Chair): Sweden 
(2007-) (WB, Ghana), 
・Members: 23 DAC members, 23 
Non-OECD members, 12 invited 
organisations  
・Chair (Vice Chair): Egypt, EC 
(WB, Korea) 
・ Members: 29 DAC and 
OECD/non-DAC members, 30 
Non-members, 12 observers  
Executive/ 
Steering 
Committees 
11 (Asian Development Bank, 
Bangladesh, Denmark, 
Ethiopia, EU, France, Japan, 
Nicaragua, UN, US, WB 
(chair)) 
15 AAA Consensus Group members 
(WP-EFF Co-chairs,  CSO 
advisory group chair (Canada),  
EU,  Ghana,  Japan, Nicaragua,  
Regional Development Banks, 
South Africa, UNDP, UK, US, 
Vietnam, WB, DAC Chair) 
18 Busan HLF ‘sherpa’ 
members (WP-EFF Co-chairs, 
South Africa, Better Aid, 
Bangladesh, Rwanda, Mali, 
Timor-Leste, China, Mexico, 
Honduras, France, EC, Japan, 
US, UK, UNDP) 
Sub groups  
 
1Task Team and 3 Joint 
Ventures (Task Team on 
Harmonisation and 
Alignment, Joint Venture on 
Public Financial 
Management, Joint Venture 
on Managing for 
Development Results, Joint 
Venture on Procurement) 
2005-2007: 4 Joint Ventures (Joint 
Venture on Monitoring the Paris 
Declaration- Reference group for 
PD Evaluation,  Joint Venture on 
Managing for Development Results, 
Joint Venture on Public Financial 
Management, Joint Venture on 
Procurement, and from 2007 
Advisory Group on Civil Society 
and Aid Effectiveness  
2008-: 5 Clusters (Ownership 
and Accountability, Country 
Systems, Transparent and 
Responsible Aid, Assessing 
Progress, Managing for 
Development Results), 4 
Workstreams (South-South 
Co-operation, Sectoral 
Approaches to Aid 
Effectiveness, Capacity 
Development, Private sector 
support for development) 
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were already participating in the Task Force on Donor Practices from 2001, which was a 
forerunner of the WP-EFF,
4
 but the first WP-EFF plenary meeting was only attended by 
DAC members. The second plenary meeting held in 2003 concluded that the WP should 
retain its function as a donor forum, in which recipient countries participate only in task 
teams and joint ventures (OECD Archives, 2003, p.3). However, from the following 
year, the recipient countries started to participate in the WP-EFF plenary. They 
gradually gained confidence and the number of participants increased over the period. 
As shown in Table 6.4, the increase of Non-DAC participants is remarkable. The 
number of participating recipient countries rose from 28 in Rome HLF to at least 86 in 
Busan HLF.
5
 A recipient country (Ghana) occupied one of the vice-chairs posts of 
WP-EFF from 2007. Also, recipient countries tried to form and then institutionalise a 
southern platform, such as an informal caucus meeting or contact group, in order to 
articulate and convey recipient country views (OECD Archives, 2005a, p.3; OECD 
Archives, 2009, p.3).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 However, recipient countries are only referred in the Terms of Reference of the Task Force that “Task 
Force will interact with the partner countries” and not as members of the Task Force (OECD Archives, 
2001a). 
5
 86 excludes 31 countries who are in the DAC’s ODA recipients but categorised as ‘upper middle 
income countries’, most of whom are emerging countries.  
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Table 6.4: Number of participants attending each HLF by categories 
 Rome HLF 
 (2003) 
Paris HLF 
(2005) 
Accra HLF 
(2008) 
Busan HLF 
(2011) 
Total 
participants 
? 100 1,200 3,000 
DAC members 23 23 23 24  
(Korea joined in 2010) 
Non-DAC  
(emerging, 
recipients) 
30 72 114 160 
CSOs None 14 80 participated, 300 
were associated.  
300 
Others 20   90 parliamentarians, 
over 100 from private sector 
and academia 
Source: Compiled by author  
Note: Circled numbers are the number of countries, not the number of participants. 
 
In fact CSOs’ participation in general deepened after the advisory group on civil society 
and aid effectiveness was created in 2007 (see Table 6.4). Table 6.5 details the original 
14 CSOs who participated in the Paris HLF, representing both donor and recipient 
countries. The need to include CSOs was recognised in the DAC from the early days. 
For instance, the DAC chair sent a letter to the DAC members to invite discussion on 
whether WP-EFF should invite non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as informal 
observers (OECD Archives, 2005b, p.3). Nevertheless, it was only after 2007 that CSOs 
participation became more active because the advisory group was set up, and was 
followed by regional consultations or meetings between WP-EFF and CSOs. By 2008 
CSOs representing the views of 3,500 organizations world-wide were more actively 
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involved than ever (OECD Archives, 2008a, p.6). After the Accra HLF (2008), an Open 
Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness was established in 2009, which connected 
CSOs across the world in sharing their understandings and knowledge of the issue. 
Since then, CSOs have organised their own initiatives to contribute to aid effectiveness, 
such as the Istanbul CSO Development Effectiveness Principles.
6
 In the Busan HLF, 
the CSOs successfully occupied one of the 18 ‘sherpa’ positions for negotiating the 
HLF outcome document. The number of CSOs attending the Busan HLF reached 300 
(Table 6.4). 
 
Table 6.5: List of 14 CSOs participating in Paris HLF 
Africa Humanitarian Action 
AFRODAD 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundations 
Canadian Council for International Cooperation  
Comite Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Developpement  
Cooperation Internationale pour le Developpement et la Solidarite 
Comision Economica (Nicaragua) 
ENDA Tiers Monde 
EURODAD 
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) 
Reality of Aid Network 
Tanzania Social and Economic Trust  
UK Aid Network 
Source: OECD Archives (2005c, p14). 
 
Non-DAC OECD members (e.g., Brazil, Turkey) participated from the first plenary 
                                                 
6
 This was agreed in 2010 among CSOs to increase effectiveness of their development activities (Open 
Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, 2010).  
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meeting of the WP-EFF, though non-DAC and non-OECD members (e.g., China, India) 
participated only occasionally; six non-DAC non-OECD members including India and 
Russia attended in 2007, and the last meeting of the WP-EFF in 2012 was attended by 
officials of China and Russia from embassies in Paris. Participation by non-DAC 
governments created some confusion. Indeed, the original list of signatories of the PD 
was categorised either as donors or recipients – countries like Mexico and India were 
classified as donors but later requested to be categorised as recipients (Bracho, 
interview, 2011). From 2009, the DAC added a category of ‘donor/recipient members’ 
to accommodate countries that are both donor and recipient.  
 
The expansion of participants in WP-EFF demonstrates growing interest amongst wider 
international actors. At the same time, it shows the flexibility of the DAC in changing 
its structure. Although the WP-EFF was just one of the many DAC subsidiary bodies, it 
gradually started to gain independence, for instance, selecting a co-chair from Egypt (a 
non-OECD country) and reporting to the HLF (an independent open forum situated 
outside the DAC). Jon Lomøy, the director of Development Co-operation Directorate 
(DCD), called this exceptional expansion of the WP-EFF as “true legal fiction”. This is 
because the number of non-DAC members exceeded official DAC members in the 
WP-EFF and in practice “the co-chairs of the WP-EFF did not probably feel the WP 
was a subsidiary body of the DAC as they had stronger power to set and define the 
agenda” (Lomøy, 2013a, interview). With the growing number of actors the WP gained 
more international attention, and the aid effectiveness agenda became central to the 
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DAC’s work. This innovation was pioneering, making the WP “a training ground for 
the DAC to engage in real multi-stakeholders” (ibid).  
 
This section has shown that under the aid effectiveness agenda, the meeting structure 
expanded under the WP-EFF. Over the period, issues discussed have evolved with 
various sub-groups. At the same time, the fact that the increasing number of participants 
both from the DAC and outside, such as emerging countries and CSOs, shows growing 
attention to the aid effectiveness agenda. 
 
Agreement 
As was shown in Table 6.1, four major agenda items were agreed by the heads of 
agencies and ministries during the HLF. However, the negotiation processes were hardly 
straightforward. In brief, the Rome, Paris and Accra HLF were led by like-minded 
countries, who advanced the aid effectiveness agenda, whereas a minority including the 
US and Japan took a contrary position. This mirrors the pattern of leaders and followers 
for aid untying discussed in chapter 5. However, the agenda shifted from aid 
effectiveness to development effectiveness during the Busan HLF, and the involvement 
of more actors dispersed the tensions between leaders and followers. The growing 
influence posed by emerging donors, most notably India and China, could not be 
ignored by the DAC if it wished to retain influence as a major international 
organisation.   
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Four outcome documents agreed during each HLF are clear evidence of collective 
action. The Rome Declaration on Harmonization and PD were agreed in 2003 and 2005 
respectively. The PD was based on the Rome Declaration, and provided a foundation for 
expanding and developing the aid effectiveness agenda. During the Accra HLF, AAA 
was agreed in 2008, as a follow-up of the PD. The Busan Partnership agreed at the HLF 
in 2013 widened the scope of agenda. The process for reaching agreement was easier 
when the DAC was less complex (the agenda was simpler) and more homogenous 
(restricted to traditional donors) (Evans, interview, 2012), but this has changed in recent 
years. Nevertheless, once again there were some disagreements among some DAC 
members over aid effectiveness, just as there were over aid untying.  
 
The aid effectiveness agenda originated from a combination of active donor members 
and strong nerve of recipient countries built from a very small modest platform 
(Rogerson, interview, 2012). Among others, the SPA provided a forum in which the 
like-minded countries pushed forward new policies such as Programme Based 
Approaches (PBAs) and budget support, and this initially influenced the aid 
effectiveness agenda in the DAC.
7
 Among the like-minded countries, “the UK was a 
key mover and shaker in the SPA as well as in the DAC in 1990s” (Evans, 2012, 
interview). A UK representative commented during Rome HLF that the Department for 
                                                 
7
 According to OECD’s definition, PBAs is the way for donors to engage in development cooperation 
based on the principle co-ordinated support for a locally owned programme (i.e., recipient government’s 
plan), and  budget support is a method of financing a recipient country’s budget through a transfer of 
resources from an external financing agency to the partner government’s national treasury (OECD, 2005). 
In other words, they aim to provide support in line with the recipient priority. 
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International Development (DFID) played a full part in supporting the SPA to make 
progress on matters like budget support (OECD Archives, 2003a, p.52).  
 
The Rome Declaration was focused on changing donors’ behaviour through 
harmonizing donors’ aid policies. The negotiations involved contestation over aid 
modalities. The new aid modality such as budget support was encouraged, to increase 
harmonization, yet some countries still felt uneasy with it. At the Rome HLF, the US 
representative said;  
 
   We would be concerned if our work on harmonization is used as a platform for 
making judgements on the priority of budget support over project support. The 
purpose of this exercise is to reduce inefficiencies and improve the effectiveness of 
development assistance, not to push one foreign assistance modality over another. 
(ibid, p.51) 
 
Likewise, Japan expressed concern about the unification of aid modality, for this might 
reduce the options offered to recipient countries (ibid, p.31). This concern was echoed 
by France too. 
 
During the initial period, there was a strong collision between the like-minded countries 
who tried to link aid modality to harmonization, and others such as the US, Japan and 
France. In fact, even before the WP-EFF was created the UK triggered a split among the 
DAC donors into two groups for budget support and project support: “They equated 
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budget support with better aligned modality, and alienated those who had difficulty in 
providing budget support” (Christiansen, interview, 2012). The US was very frustrated 
about the DAC being pervaded by northern Europeans’ ideology and lacking neutrality 
(Evans, interview, 2012). As discussed later, this collision produced distrust and 
misunderstanding between the two groups. 
 
The PD was agreed in 2005 and it became a reference point for both the donors and 
recipients, as it set out the indicators for tracking progress. However, as the first draft of 
the PD was circulated only two months before the HLF, and “the indicators were 
proposed too suddenly by the Secretariat” (Rogerson; Christiansen, interview, 2012), 
the time for discussion was very limited. This resulted in an additional five months 
being taken to reach complete agreement among all the members, after the Paris HLF. 
This was because the US made reservations on some indicators.
8
 Japan agreed to the 
PD in the end – though something that a Japanese government official later described as 
“a defeat” (interview, 2012). From the Secretariat side, there was serious 
disappointments, as the PD failed to get large donors like the US and Japan to agree on 
ambitious commitments. Roger Riddell saw a clear contrast between the rhetoric (i.e., 
positive about reaching the agreement) and serious disappointments among the 
                                                 
8
 According to a DAC document, the PD indicators are subject to one donors’ reservations on (a) the 
methodology for assessing the quality of locally-managed procurement systems (relating to targets 2b and 
5b), and (b) the acceptable quality of public financial management reform programmes (relating to target 
5a.ii) (OECD, 2005, p.10). Guidance to USAID field missions (USAID, 2006) states that these points 
were not agreed because of US dissension.  
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Secretariat over failing to get large donors to agree on further commitments (interview, 
a British academic who was at OECD on the PD negotiation day, 2012). 
 
During the preparation for Accra HLF, the negotiation of the outcome document (AAA) 
concentrated on setting the level of ambitions. The first draft of the AAA was presented 
in April 2008, but as in a chair’s summary, everyone wanted a more ambitious one 
(OECD Archives, 2008b, p.5). Reflecting those views, the second draft was tightened 
up with clear wordings of commitments, which was shared in June. However, the 
sharpness was eliminated in the third draft, after being pushed back by donors and the 
WB and to the disappointment of CSOs (Tomlinson, 2008). The final negotiation started 
during HLF, and after three-days intensive negotiation an agreement seemed to be near. 
However, “a high drama” started in the evening of the day before the end of HLF 
(Maxwell, 2008). The agreement was turned over by EU members, as they thought their 
Ministers would not be satisfied with the current level of ambition, causing negotiations 
to continue into the Ministerial level meetings on the final day of the HLF. Together 
with pressure from CSOs and recipient countries that were pushing for further 
commitments (Tomlinson, 2008), the EU members finally managed to increase the level 
of ambitions in the AAA outcome document.  
 
At the forum, it was rumoured that the US and Japan were opposing the EU countries 
(Maxwell, 2008; Kumaoka, Koshita & Endo, 2008). Financial Times critically reported 
that resistance by the US and Japan prevented further promises of improving aid, 
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describing as “a real shame” (Financial Times, 2008). Japanese government’s position 
was that a new draft put on the table by a group of donors on the final day of HLF 
overturned the lengthy and inclusive negotiation process, as there was not enough time 
for other donors and recipient countries to consider it fully. It expressed concern that the 
Financial Time article presented a one-sided view of the donors (Oka, 2008). Again, the 
DAC was divided into the Europeans on one side and the US with Japan on the other. A 
Japanese DAC delegate who was at the negotiation table remembered a criticism thrown 
by the DFID Secretary of State, who said “It is high time for Japan to learn how to 
concede” (Hoshino, interview, 2012). Some European ministers were well briefed and 
fully understood the aid effectiveness agenda including its technical jargons, which was 
a genuine surprise to a Japanese official who attended the meeting. It would have been 
difficult for a parliamentary vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 
the head of delegation of Japan, to expect the same level of capacity on his side.  
 
A year ahead of the Busan HLF, the agenda started to shift from aid effectiveness to 
development effectiveness. A Japanese government official recalls that during the 
WP-EFF meeting held in late 2010, Korea started to pick up on reflections contained in 
a joint publication, Catalyzing Development- A New Vision for Aid produced by the 
Brookings Institution in the US, Korean International Cooperation Agency, and Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which emphasised diversity, differentiation 
and dynamic nature of aid providers and approaches (Mitamura, interview, 2012). By 
the time the Busan HLF was only six months away, the issue of how to get wider actors 
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on board had come to the fore. One important step was an outcome document of DAC 
Senior Level Meeting (SLM), Welcoming New Partnership in International 
Development Co-operation, agreed in 2011. This document recognises the dual status of 
emerging countries as both recipients and providers of development co-operation 
without applying the norms and rules required of DAC members (OECD, 2011c). It 
played an important role in creating a ‘comfort zone’ for the emerging countries, 
according to a Mexico’s DAC delegate who had contributed in bridging DAC members 
and emerging countries (i.e., China and India) (Bracho, interview, 2011).
9
  
 
At the very last minute of Busan HLF, the Busan Partnership (outcome document) was 
agreed. It was widely understood among scholars and CSOs that enlarging the 
partnership and deepening existing commitments presented a trade-off whereby the 
DAC had to make a choice. The Busan Partnership was a compromise between 
reaffirming existing commitment to “common goals and shared principles” and 
inserting “differential commitments” for emerging countries (OECD, 2011d). China’s 
insistence that the document is a “reference for south-south partners on a voluntary 
basis”, with no intention of abiding by DAC rules and monitoring systems could not be 
ignored (Atwood, 2012b, p.23).  
 
                                                 
9
 A former DAC chair commended Mexico’s DAC delegate who helped the committee’s effort to reach 
out to emerging countries by explaining the sensitivities, even the prejudices they had on the DAC 
(Atwood, 2012b, p.9). 
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The shift of agenda from aid to development effectiveness following the inclusion of 
non-DAC countries challenges DAC norms and standards on aid effectiveness. The 
like-minded counties had initially tried to protect the DAC’s norms and standards by 
trying to push the aid effectiveness agenda forward, which led to tension. In the 
WP-EFF executive committee some members expressed concern about jumping from 
aid to development effectiveness as it might compromise the DAC’s role (OECD 
Archives, 2009a, p.11). 
 
Looming behind all this was the decreased legitimacy the DAC enjoyed owing to the 
increasingly influential position of emerging countries in the global aid architecture, as 
mentioned in earlier chapters. The DAC was faced with a challenge in adjusting a subtle 
balance between securing its legitimacy by being inclusive and protecting its existing 
norms and standards. As illustrated in Figure 6.1, different actors have tried to influence 
the balance based on their own positions. Although DAC members were divided into 
like-minded countries and others, it tried to invite emerging countries to take similar 
responsibilities. The emerging countries were clear that their responsibility differed 
from that of DAC members and, just like the recipient countries they expected DAC 
members to live up to their commitments. 
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Figure 6.1: Actors and their positions on aid and development effectiveness at Busan 
Source: author 
 
The canvas of collective action has changed, as shown in Figure 6.2 which represents 
different ways of dealing with collective action problems. The aid effectiveness agenda 
started with the collective action problem of aid fragmentation and lack of coordination 
among multiple donors. This is shown in the left column of Figure 6.2, where norms 
and standards are not shared amongst donors. One way to rectify the situation is to set 
norms and standards that all donors must observe. As the upper right column shows, 
from early to late 2000s the Rome, Paris and Accra HLFs tried to push DAC members 
to conform to minimum standards. However, as the lower right column shows, as the 
actors became more numerous and diverse (at the Busan HLF) so the coverage of norms 
and standards broadened, in order to command buy-in from all the actors. The Busan 
outcome document is said to be “a crowning achievement,” by involving so many (new) 
actors, but it had to pay the price of softening of global commitments (Kharas, 2011). 
This can also be seen differently as a failure “if you think what matters are time-bound 
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measurable commitments” (Glennie, 2011a). Indeed, this was a result of the dilemma 
DAC had to deal with between “deepening” and “enlarging” the agenda (Klingebiel & 
Leiderer, 2011).  
 
    Figure 6.2: Different ways in solving collective action problems 
Collective action problems 
(aid fragmentation, lack of 
coordination etc.) 
 
 
 
 
The least common denominator (Rome, Paris, Accra) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The greatest common denominator (Busan) 
 
 
 
 
 Source: author 
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that information formerly regarded as privileged to the DAC members no longer 
enjoyed that status.  
 
To sum up the section, by successfully involving the emerging countries, the DAC was 
able to secure its legitimacy to some extent in the wider international policy arena. 
However, widening the actors as well as ‘the differentiated responsibilities’ inserted by 
the emerging countries implied that the norms and standards under the aid effectiveness 
agenda came under threat. The traditional DAC donors may be criticised for shirking 
the commitments they had signed up to “on the pretence that emerging countries cannot 
commit to such things” (Espey, 2011), or of moving the goal posts by changing the rules 
of the game (Hobbs, 2011). But seen from a different point of view, these changes had 
to be made in order to accommodate the new global realities, for as a DAC chair says, 
Busan HLF represents an effort to rationalize a global development architecture which 
needed to be fixed by integrating the recognition that the world has changed (Atwood, 
2011).  
 
Implementation 
After six years from PD, its monitoring survey found that only one out of 13 targets had 
been met – showing the slow pace of compliance by DAC members. This merits further 
comment. 
 
The level of compliance can be traced from the PD Monitoring Survey conducted in 
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2006 to build the baseline, followed by the one in 2008 and 2010. Table 6.6 shows the 
progress of DAC members on PD indicators between 2005 and 2010. The first indicator 
measures the level of ownership of the recipients by the percentage of countries which 
have a national development strategy. Indicators between 2a and 8 show the level of 
alignment between donors and recipients by focusing on Public Financial Management 
(PFM), procurement system, co-ordinated technical cooperation, number of Project 
Implementation Unit (PIU), predictable aid, and aid untying. Indicators 9 and 10 
measure level of harmonization among donors by PBAs, joint mission, and joint 
analytic work. Indicators 11 and 12 represent the level of managing for results and 
mutual accountability respectively. Most of the indicators (from 3 to 10) are supposed to 
be met by the donors, while 1 and 2 are for the recipients, and 11 and 12 are for both.  
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Table 6.6: Progress on PD indicators between 2005 and 2010 
Principles Indicators Baseline 
(2005) 
2008 
Survey 
2010 
Survey 
Targets 
(2010) 
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
(R
ec
ip
ie
n
ts
) 1: Operational Development Strategies 
(% of countries having a national development 
strategy) 
17% 24% 37% 75% 
A
li
g
n
m
en
t 
(D
o
n
o
rs
-r
ec
ip
ie
n
ts
) 
2a: Reliable PFM systems  
(% of countries moving up at least one measure on 
PFM/ Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
since 2005) 
- 36% 38% 50% 
2b: Reliable procurement systems  
(% of countries moving up at least one measure on 
the four point scale since 2005) 
- - - No 
target 
3: Aid flows are aligned on national priorities 
(% of aid for the government sector reported on the 
government’s budget) 
42% 48% 41% 85% 
4: Strengthen capacity by co-ordinated support 
(% of technical co-operation implemented through 
co-ordinated programmes consistent with national 
development strategies) 
48% 60% 57% 50% 
5a: Use of country PFM systems  
(% of aid for the government sector using partner 
countries’ PFM systems) 
40% 45% 48% 55% 
5b: Use of country procurement systems  
(% of aid for the government sector using partner 
countries’ procurement systems) 
39% 43% 44% No 
target 
6: Strengthen capacity by avoiding parallel PIUs 
(Total number of PIUs) 
1817 1601 1158 565 
7: Aid is more predictable 
(% of aid for the government sector disbursed within 
the fiscal year for which it was scheduled and 
recorded in government accounting systems) 
41% 46% 43% 71% 
8: Aid is untied 
(% of aid that is fully untied) 
75% 88% 86% More 
than 
89% 
H
a
rm
o
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
 
(D
o
n
o
rs
-d
o
n
o
rs
) 
9: Use of common arrangements or procedures  
(% of aid provided in the context of 
programme-based approaches) 
43% 47% 45% 66% 
10a: Joint missions 
(% of donor missions to the field undertaken jointly) 
18% 21% 19% 40% 
10b: Joint country analytic work 
(% of country analytic work undertaken jointly) 
42% 44% 43% 66% 
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M
a
n
a
g
in
g
 
fo
r 
R
es
u
lt
s 11: Results-oriented frameworks 
(% of countries with transparent and monitorable 
performance assessment frameworks) 
7% 9% 20% 36% 
M
u
tu
a
l 
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
i
li
ty
 
12: Mutual accountability 
(% of countries with mutual assessment reviews in 
place) 
22% 26% 38% 100% 
Source: OECD (2006b, 2008b, 2012a).  
Note: As the number of participating countries increased from 32 in 2006 and 2008 to 78 in 2011, and as 
some adjustments were made to historical data, some of the numbers are not precisely consistent. No 
targets are presented for indicators 2b and 5b because of lack of sample data.  
 
Overall, indicator 4 was the only target met by 2010; and although all the indicators 
improved in 2008 some (e.g., 3, 4, 7, and 8) deteriorated by 2010. Although some 
progress was made, there is not much evidence here in support of collective action 
understood in terms of the level of implementation against agreed targets. 
 
However the evidence does show differences among the efforts that countries have 
taken; and different PD targets were set for each donor, as was the case for the effort 
sharing index of aid untying. Notwithstanding the difficulty in comparing efforts 
amongst the members posed by the fact that the total volume of aid and the set targets 
differ from country to country,
10
 some trends can be identified. First, the number of 
targets reached by individual members varies from seven (in the case of Denmark and 
Ireland) and five (Sweden) to just one (Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, US) or zero 
                                                 
10
 The indicators were established in relation to the 2005 baseline (3, 5a, 7-8), and the targets were 
calculated on the basis of the donor’s baseline value for each of the indicators (OECD, 2012a, p.163). 
Greece is a DAC member, though their data is not available in the Monitoring Survey, because their ODA 
flows granted to the recipient countries participating in the survey were too small to be comparable with 
other donors, according to the Greece Peer Review (OECD, 2011e).  
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(Korea), out of ten indicators.
11
 A majority of countries reached one to four indicators, 
leaving the average rate of targets met by DAC members as 2.87 indicators. Second, 
among the ten indicators the donors made most efforts on indicators 4 (strengthen 
capacity by co-ordinated support), 5a (use of country PFM system), 8 (untying aid), and 
10b (joint country analytic work). More than ten donors exceeded their targets, as 
shown in Table 6.7. These four indicators are easier to be implemented, compared to 
indicators 3 (on budget aid flows) and 9 (PBAs) where no donor and only two donors 
reached the targets respectively.  
 
Table 6.7 shows the number of donors reached own targets and the top five donors for 
each indicator. Ireland appears in ten indicators followed by Denmark in six indicators. 
UK and Japan appears five and four times each, followed by Canada, Spain and 
Portugal for three times. This indicates that the like-minded countries do not necessarily 
all perform well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 The comparison was made with the data on 32 recipient countries. 
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Table 6.7: Donors’ progress on PD indicators 
Indicators No. of 
donors 
reached 
own targets 
Top 5 donors  
3: Aid flows 
aligned on 
national priorities 
0 Denmark 
(60%) 
Austria, Finland (55%) Ireland 
(51%) 
Netherlands 
(48%) 
4: Strengthen 
capacity by 
co-ordinated 
support 
13 Denmark 
(88%) 
Spain (83%) Japan 
(80%) 
Ireland 
(76%) 
Germany (74%) 
5a: Use of country 
PFM  
12 Ireland 
(80%) 
France, Japan (69%) Canada, UK (68%) 
5b: Use of country 
procurement  
- Ireland 
(89%) 
Portugal 
(79%) 
Denmark 
(78%) 
Austria, Spain (77%) 
6: Strengthen 
capacity by 
avoiding parallel 
PIUs 
7 Japan, Portugal (0) Ireland 
(2) 
Sweden 
(6) 
Korea (11) 
7: Aid is more 
predictable 
0 Austria, Ireland, UK (53%)  Denmark, EU (48%) 
8: Aid is untied 15 Canada, Ireland, Norway, UK (100%) Germany, 
Luxembourg 
(99%) 
9: Use of common 
arrangements or 
procedures 
2 Ireland 
(66%) 
Denmark 
(65%) 
EU, UK (52%) Canada, France, 
Japan, NZ 
(50%) 
10a: Joint 
missions 
7 Ireland 
(72%) 
Netherlands 
(50%) 
Australia 
(47%) 
UK 
(43%) 
Sweden (42%) 
10b: Joint country 
analytic work 
10 Spain 
(81%) 
Luxembour
g (77%) 
Ireland 
(76%) 
Denmark 
(72%) 
Portugal (71%) 
Source: Compiled by author based on (OECD, 2012a) 
 
In 2010, a new survey Measuring the Quality of Aid was launched by two major US 
research institutes, examining the quality of aid with the data on aid agency 
effectiveness (Birdsall & Kharas et al., 2010).
12
 It covers four dimensions and 30 
                                                 
12
 Nancy Birdsall is a president of Center for Global Development and Homi Kharas is a senior fellow of 
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indicators including donors’ adherence to PD and the AAA, and is the only quantitative 
survey linked to the PD apart from the one by the OECD.
13
 The main findings of this 
survey are similar to the OECD survey, indicating that Ireland, the UK and Denmark are 
on average in the higher rankings.  
 
Factors affecting the level of implementation include the following. First, some of the 
definitions and wordings agreed in the outcome documents were not clear enough to be 
shared among all the members. Some of the terminologies of the PD indicators had to 
be revisited because different actors interpreted them differently, for example in respect 
of the PBAs. “Ownership”, the first principle of the PD, is measured by “a number of 
recipient countries which have operational national development strategies” (OECD, 
2005), but this invited criticism as being too narrow, limiting to the government 
relationship (Zimmermann & McDonnell, 2008). In almost all countries that conducted 
PD evaluation, the definition of ownership was perceived as inadequate (Wood et al., 
2008, p.8). These problems can be understood from the view that a trade-off exists 
between getting agreement and the tightness of wordings in the outcome documents 
(Rabinowitz, interview, 2012).
14
 It might also be that the gap between the limited 
knowledge of officials negotiating in Paris and the reality on the ground makes 
                                                                                                                                               
Bookings Institution. 
13
 The four dimensions (maximizing efficiency, fostering institutions, reducing burden, and transparency 
and learning) correspond to four principles of the PD (results, ownership, alignment, and mutual 
accountability). Some of the indicators corresponding to the principle of “harmonization” are 
incorporated in “reducing burden” dimension. 
14
 Gideon Rabinowitz is ODI researcher formerly worked as a coordinator for UK CSO network on aid 
effectiveness. 
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disagreement on terminology during implementation process more likely, as was 
pointed out by a head of JICA France office (Shoji, interview, 2012). 
 
Second, there are two types of suspicions among DAC members, preventing them from 
committing to aid effectiveness agenda fully. The first type relates to the members’ 
concerns about the quality of the indicators. For instance, recipient countries raised 
concerns about the clarity, validity and purpose of some of the indicators of the PD, and 
challenged the perceived notion of “one size fits all”, saying it is unhelpful or unrealistic 
(Wood et al., 2008, p.xiii). A different suspicion is whether implementing the PD would 
truly improve the situation of developing countries on the ground. A widely shared view 
amongst my interviewees was that the PD started without genuine evidence that it 
would result in better development (such as Evans; Glennie; Watanabe S., interview, 
2012). This is a flaw in the aid effectiveness agenda, as PD only deals with the input 
side of aid but without the scope of development outcomes (Ishize, interview, 2011). As 
a former Overseas Development Institute (ODI) director says, ODI’s work on aid 
effectiveness was based on hypotheses derived from possible alternatives to solve the 
problems of fragmented aid, so there is no evidence yet that the alternatives would 
actually improve aid effectiveness (Evans interview, 2012).
15
 Already a decade ago an 
ODI researcher cautioned donors not to adopt a new aid agenda too quickly, arguing that 
they were not well based on empirical evidence (Killick, 2004). These doubts 
                                                 
15
 As will be discussed later in the section on recipient country level, these unrealistic assumptions of the 
PD impeded successful implementation at the country level (See Andersen & Therkildsen, 2007). 
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undermine trust among members and can get in the way of a more determined 
commitment to implement agreed objectives. 
 
In spite of the low level of implementation and the factors responsible for it, the PD is 
also seen as useful in changing donor behaviour, as many interviewees both from DAC 
member governments and research organisations commented (such as Lomøy, interview, 
2013a). It provided leverage to push donors’ aid reform (Honda, interview with JICA RI 
official, 2012), changing donors’ mind-sets about aid quality and generating a valuable 
discourse on what effective aid is (Kharas & Chandy, 2011, p.3). The PD has changed 
the ways that aid is implemented on the ground, as illustrated well by a British 
academic: 
 
   Anyone who has been involved in aid implementation efforts for the past 20 or 30 
years cannot help but notice the tangible differences these events and processes have 
had on the rhythm of aid work…official donors are devoting enormous resources at 
a scale unprecedented a decade ago on aid effectiveness (Riddell, 2007, p. 384). 
 
As a result, the PD clearly gained ground as part of the new conventional wisdom 
(Armon, 2007, p.653), and understanding the Paris agenda has become a requirement 
for donor officials especially in country level offices (Asai, interview with JICA official, 
2012).  
 
This section has shown that the level of compliance of the PD against its targets has 
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been generally low but variable across DAC members and the indicators. Definitions in 
the outcome documents were not sufficiently shared among members, and members had 
suspicions about the PD indicators. These feelings suggest that collective action was not 
as strong as it might have been. 
 
Monitoring 
Among the four outcome documents of HLF on aid effectiveness, only the PD contains 
a monitoring framework with specific time-bound. In addition, aid effectiveness has 
been integrated in the peer review, which also creates pressure for implementation. Yet, 
the monitoring process was not easy. One of the major challenges during monitoring has 
been donors’ different understandings and interpretations of the indicators. 
 
There are two ways by which members are monitored on their implementation of the 
PD. One is the peer review, where aid effectiveness has been included in its content 
guide since 2007. Aid effectiveness has been added as one of the reviewed issues. 
Another way is through the PD indicators, which was controversial. Even after the PD 
was agreed, there were disagreements around the issues on the indicators. For instance, 
the indicators and targets were continuously discussed during the WP-EFF plenary 
meetings after the Paris HLF, where the members discussed the appropriate level of 
ambition for each target (OECD Archives, 2005d, p.3). Some members wanted 
ambitious targets whereas others did not, making agreement difficult. Accepting the 
reasons for settling on a particular target also proved to be problematic. 
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In addition, the indicators created an accountability mechanism between the donors and 
the recipients, especially for the donors to be scrutinised. As Rogerson recalled, “the 
moment when the indicators were presented by the Secretariat was a turning point for 
the recipients to gain power over the donors”; Recipients can now push the donors to 
comply by using the monitoring results (interview, 2012), implying that the existence of 
indicators was more important than the content. Whether the recipients can fully use the 
opportunity or not, the indicators certainly added some value apart from measuring the 
level of compliance. By setting the time-bound indicators, PD has proven its worth in 
promoting accountability, knowledge and learning (Chandy, 2011a, p.1). 
 
The PD monitoring process itself increased the level of awareness of the PD and issues 
of aid effectiveness well beyond what would have occurred without the evaluation, and, 
in many cases, induced greater commitment to and implementation of the PD (Patton & 
Gornick, 2011, p.3). The number of recipient countries voluntarily conducting PD 
monitoring survey increased from 34 to 76 between 2005 and 2011, which is clear 
evidence of growing interest. PD evaluations were conducted in 2009 and 2012 in order 
to supplement the quantitative survey from a rather longer-term qualitative perspective, 
in which 29 recipient countries and 18 donor countries participated. This level of 
participation and even the very existence of monitoring mechanisms are clear 
indications of collective action involving both DAC members and recipient countries.  
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Yet, PD indicators alone are not sufficient to capture the full picture of progress, as it 
contains room for “choice”, “adaptation”, “interpretation” and “judgement” by 
individual donors (Blunt, Turner & Hertz, 2011, p.179). Also, it creates space for 
donors’ divergence, by encouraging donors’ efforts “to the maximum extent possible” 
(Martens, 2005, p.661). Rogerson also says the indicators are unreliable guides, because 
of their unbalanced focus (i.e., too much on efficiency, not enough on development 
impact) and the short-cuts used in framing the indicators (2011, p.4). Exactly because of 
this aspect whereby different members could interpret the definition of effectiveness 
differently, suspicions can arise about whether all members are being honest in how 
they compile data on their implementation. For instance, one interviewee mentioned 
that one donor in a developing country submitted the data on PIUs as being zero, which 
other donors knew was untrue. In addition, some see Japan’s relatively strong 
performance of the Paris indicators as difficult to reconcile with perceptions on the 
ground (Barder & Perakis, 2011); others think the UK’s claim of 100% compliance on 
aid untying is not a fair reflection (Rabinowitz, interview, 2012). As such, PD indicators 
invite different understandings and critiques.  
 
In sum the PD monitoring mechanism has been instrumental for collective action, 
helping reconcile different interpretations of the PD and creating an accountability 
mechanism for recipients to use against donors. This finding leans in the direction of the 
conditions for collective action as well as serving as indicators of collective action, and 
it is to a fuller consideration of the conditions that the next section turns. 
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6.4: Conditions for collective action 
 
This section discusses the conditions for collective action, both in regard to reaching 
agreement and translating that into actual implementation, where the record has been 
less impressive. As in chapter 5, the Secretariat, delegate-headquarter relationship, 
member-member relationships, domestic environment, recipient country level, and 
member/non-member relationships will each be discussed in turn. 
 
Secretariat 
The capacity and character of the DAC chairs is identified as beneficial for collective 
action by some interviewees, especially in forming a common position during 
negotiations.  
 
Members saw Richard Manning, who chaired the DAC during Paris HLF as “an 
absolutely outstanding figure with whom unity of vision was shared” (Desmet, 
interview with Belgium DAC delegate, 2012). Especially during the initial stage of the 
aid effectiveness agenda, he was “very influential and persuasive” (Riddell, interview, 
2012), as he deeply understood both technical issues and political sensitivity (i.e., 
listening to people whose voices were not heard) (Christiansen, interview, 2012). With 
him, “the DAC became a real forum” (ibid) by “getting donors on board to act together” 
(Riddell, interview, 2012), and “the whole DAC community moved towards the 
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direction of aid effectiveness” (Desmet, interview, 2012).Without Manning, it is very 
likely that collective action among the donors on aid effectiveness agenda would have 
been different. Having served in UK’s DFID for almost 40 years including as a 
Permanent Secretary, Manning had extensive knowledge on aid and an ability to 
understand members’ positions. He also collaborated closely with the Secretariat, 
especially Richard Carey who was the director of DCD, as “it was difficult to say where 
the boundaries between the views of chair and the director of DCD”; the two ‘Richard’ 
discussed the agenda on the daily and hourly basis (Rogerson, interview with former 
WB DAC delegate and DAC Secretariat, 2012).  
 
Likewise, Brian Atwood is also recognised as having played a critical role as a DAC 
chair during Busan HLF. He served most of his career for the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) including as Administrator. The commonalities of 
both chair-holders are not just long-serving for major development agency but useful 
links with key political leaders (Clare Short for Richard Manning and Hillary Clinton 
for Brian Atwood), which increased their presence.  
 
Apart from the chair’s influence in forming the collective action, there were tensions 
between the Secretariat and members, as well as within the Secretariat. For instance, as 
a former WB DAC delegate remembers, the monitoring indicators were initiated and 
quickly proposed by the Secretariat, which took members by surprise (Rogerson, 
interview, 2012). Yet, the Secretariat makes an important contribution to making 
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agreements happen, especially when the chances of reaching consensus at first look 
difficult. This was the case when disagreement was foreseen towards the Busan HLF 
and moving the agenda from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness.  
 
The Secretariat too has its own internal tensions, as there appears to be competition 
among subsidiary bodies within the Secretariat. The WP-EFF has more power and 
resources relative to other subsidiary bodies who tried to influence the outcome 
documents for the HLF. For instance, WP-EFF did not initially allow the WP on 
Statistics to be involved in the discussions on PD indicators, although this was requested 
(Shoji
16
, interview, 2012). While the WP-EFF’s resistance to interference by others is 
understandable, the expertise of WP Statistics certainly enhances the overall activities of 
the WP-EFF from a wider DAC point of view. This increased power of WP-EFF 
Secretariat was a source of tension with other subsidiary bodies, which contrasts with 
the case of aid untying where the Secretariat’s size was very small.  
 
This section showed that the Secretariat played an important role in forming collective 
action. Among all, the personality and capacity of the DAC chair affected the direction 
of successful agreement. Manning and Atwood both played major roles. But as the 
WP-EFF’s profile grew, the Secretariat’s own ability to exercise control and oversight 
declined. Co-chairs of the WP-EFF took over the handling and direction of the 
discussions. There may be lessons here for the Secretariat’s ability to contribute to 
                                                 
16
 Former vice-chair of the WP on Statistics. 
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collective action in the future.  
 
Delegate-headquarter relationship 
As the aid effectiveness agenda became a flagship of the DAC, the attention and level of 
involvement by headquarters became stronger. Also, with wider participation from 
outside the OECD members, information sharing mechanisms such as an aid 
effectiveness portal and HLF special websites were created. This enabled the 
participants in the WP-EFF to gain easier access to necessary information.
17
 The 
expansion of the WP-EFF beyond the structure of the DAC and the OECD diluted the 
role of the DAC delegates, and the delegate-headquarter relationship became weaker. 
On the other hand, as discussed later, the relationship between the headquarters and 
country offices became more relevant, in respect of aid effectiveness. 
 
Member-member relationships 
Similar to the aid untying case, member-member relations counted as an important 
factor for successful collective action. The early 2000s was a critical period when the 
UK was trying to reform international aid policy through the aid effectiveness agenda, 
while others like Japan disagreed and tried to voice its own position by fostering a 
bilateral relationship with the UK. By focusing on Japan and the UK, this section will 
show how the members’ relationships are influenced by trust and mutual understanding. 
 
                                                 
17
 http://www.aideffectiveness.org/index.html (Accessed: 1 July 2014). 
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At the final meeting of WP-EFF in June 2012, the OECD Secretary General said “Trust 
is central to our collective action for development” (Gurría, 2012). As was discussed in 
chapter 2 briefly, trust encourages people to take an active role in their community, and 
active and virtuous people overcome collective action problems more readily (Uslaner, 
1999, p.130). Ferguson (2013) argues that solving collective action problems requires 
establishing reliable commitments, which are in turn dependent on achieving sufficient 
coordination, enforcement and trust. Trust is often defined to be linked to (either a 
product, or component of) social capital, which generates cooperation, collaboration and 
collective action (Rathbun, 2012; Ferguson, 2013). Even when consensus is reached, the 
level of trust can still influence the level of commitment that members make in 
implementing the agreement and, hence, the level of compliance. This is especially so 
when there is only soft law without a true enforcement mechanism, and where 
implementation relies mainly on the good faith of the members, as in the DAC. The 
importance of trust building was evident during the early days of aid effectiveness 
agenda between the UK and Japan. 
 
The strong lead that the UK took in promoting the aid effectiveness agenda came at the 
expense of other members who were unable or unwilling to change their aid policies so 
quickly. A gulf emerged not only in Paris and at the international level, because some 
donor coordination meetings were organised excluding those donors who do not provide 
aid in the form of budget support. These meetings shared information about recipients’ 
core economic policies. Asked about the UK and Japan’s relationship during this period, 
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some informants expressed that “There was a time when the British bullied the 
Japanese” (Evans, interview, 2012); the UK’s way of alienating Japan was “stupid 
without strategy, for it resulted in Japan being in the corner, slightly snarled” 
(Christiansen, interview, 2012).  
 
However, it was also true that “Japan was misunderstanding the UK’s motives”, says the 
director of ODI. And she continues, Japan took a very purist position that “we only do 
what recipients want us to do through project aid”, insincerely trying to justify for not 
joining the international collective effort (Evans, interview, 2012). Behind this position, 
there was some kind of loathing among Japanese bureaucrats that the new types of aid 
such as budget support and Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs) were too intrusive 
because donors monitor the recipients’ whole budget plan and execution in detail.    
Taking a slightly different stance on governance and democracy from other DAC donors 
by putting more weight on ‘non-interference’, some Japanese government officials see 
the aid effectiveness agenda as undesirable. The extract from Evans’s interview 
recorded below clearly illustrates the relationship between the UK and Japan during this 
period; 
    
The idea that Japan is always taking this line which slightly makes us (Japanese) 
better people than you (British) because we simply do what countries are asking us 
to do….ah come on…and the British bashing Japanese delegates over the head for 
continuing their project aid is equally based on a deliberate misunderstanding. So, 
it’s been unfortunate and it was not handled well. (2012) 
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What this shows is that a breakdown in understanding on both sides of a relationship is 
always possible, and it cannot but get in the way of securing collective action – the lack 
of trust relationship. The origins of misunderstanding can be quite deep. For there 
always was a suspicion among Japanese that the rules of the game were already built by 
the UK, and Japan would anyway lose out as a latecomer. During the early 2000’s some 
high-ranked Japan’s government officials did not want to become actively involved in 
the aid effectiveness agenda as they thought Japan would be raising a ‘white flag’ by 
being coordinated by leading donors (Japanese official, interview, 2012). This Japanese 
perception reflects what Whittington and Calhoun say about aid more generally: “All 
donors want to co-ordinate, but no one wants to be co-ordinated” (1988, p.307). 
 
There is also a clear difference between Japan and the UK with regard to the 
geographical distribution of their aid. Historically, Japanese aid has been concentrated 
on Asia, and the UK has prioritised Africa, chiefly its former colonies. This is relevant 
here because the aid effectiveness agenda was first conceived because of the problems 
with aid in Africa. Japan does not share this background and did not see this as their 
concern; on the contrary Japan is said to have strong confidence in its own ability to 
solve problems it encounters in Asia (Christiansen, interview, 2012). Yet those Japanese 
officials who have worked in Africa do tend to be supportive on the issue of aid 
effectiveness, unlike those whose experience is confined to working in Asia (Warrener, 
interview, 2012).  
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Because of these differences, the aid effectiveness agenda could be seen as a threat to 
MoFA officials who wanted to protect their “project aid regime” formed within Asia 
(Kurata, interview with a Secretariat of Japanese House of Councillors, 2012). Japan’s 
aid to Asia during the 1980s and 90s focused strongly on supporting economic growth 
through infrastructure investment. MoFA officials who were reluctant to support the aid 
effectiveness agenda saw these as being more important (Furukawa, interview with 
JICA-RI official, 2012). The failure to see eye to eye can be founded on genuine 
disagreement as well as on a perceived conflict of interest, and often these two sources 
intertwine, making collective action much harder to achieve. 
 
Nevertheless there were some attempts to foster the mutual understanding between the 
UK and Japan. When Motohide Yoshikawa (Japanese ambassador to the OECD)
18
 
became deputy Director-General of the Economic Cooperation Bureau in MoFA in 2002, 
he made cooperation with the UK a priority, believing that “the UK could be Japan’s 
supporter rather than opponent” (Yoshikawa, interview, 2013). A few months after the 
Rome HLF in 2003, a high-level policy meeting between the UK and Japan was held in 
Tokyo, where concrete ideas of cooperation were discussed. For instance, Vietnam was 
decided to be a model country, with a special focus of infrastructure (and this later 
expanded to Tanzania), and personnel were exchanged between DFID and MoFA. At 
the same occasion, with Yoshikawa’s suggestion, DFID’s Asia regional meeting was 
                                                 
18
 He has been a Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations (UN) since 2013.  
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unusually held in Tokyo, not London. Through these initiatives, a more friendly 
relationship was developed. Japan’s peer review held in OECD in December 2003 was 
attended by DFID’s Director-General, contrary to the normal practice of participation by 
DAC delegate level (ibid); and Japan won the UK over to its side. Japan-UK 
cooperation could then be described as win-win; Japan was a top donor in Vietnam with 
much experience there, which explains DFID’s interest, whereas DFID was influential 
at the international level and could tone down its criticisms of Japan.  
 
None of this prevented the UK from taking a lead on aid effectiveness internationally 
and trying to influence others. A DFID official who reconfirmed DFID’s commitment to 
implementing the PD said “We will influence others to do the same through the DAC or 
EU” (UK government official, interview, 2012, italic by author). The DAC’s UK Peer 
Review in 2006 commends the UK for inspiring the PD and motivating other donors to 
promote aid effectiveness, but also recommends the UK to be more inclusive in its 
approach by encouraging all donors to participate. Some donors felt DFID was more 
interested in promoting its own model of aid (e.g., budget support) than in encouraging 
complementarity of donor action (OECD, 2006c). This point was taken up at the UK 
Parliament House of Commons International Committee, where the DAC Chair 
reported “Maybe when a climate is created that is too pushy, it does not stimulate more 
cooperation” (House of Commons, 2008, p.10). Too much pressure to force the pace of 
change risks alienating others. This can damage the chances of securing collective 
action.  
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UK’s approach to promoting aid effectiveness was seen as problematic not only by 
other donors but by certain UK stakeholders as well. The aforementioned Parliament 
House of Commons International Committee recommends DFID to reassess its 
engagement with other donors on aid effectiveness and secure some flexibility (ibid, 
p.11). A former DFID official was somewhat critical of DFID's ‘influencing’ approach, 
as “it is based on an assumption that DFID is always right which cannot be certain and 
this kind of confidence has the risk of sometimes slipping into arrogance” (Warrener, 
interview, 2012). Of course this kind of mindset might not be the mainstream in DFID, 
but research institutions like ODI who work with DFID may not be entirely exempt 
from criticism either. A former director of ODI confided that ODI is “rightly criticised 
for being a bit too bullying with ideas, too much telling mode rather than listening 
mode,” continuing that “Other donors were feeling a hegemonic set of views coming 
out of DFID, ODI and Institute of Development Studies (IDS) that were all speaking the 
same language and disinclined to compromise” (Evans, interview, 2012). This shows 
the research community and UK government (are perceived to) work closely together, 
especially after “Claire Short took a lead in using more research both in the UK and 
abroad, recognising the importance of thinking and ideas in development” (Jolly, 
interview, 2012). This has been an asset for the UK’s leadership on aid issues but also 
something that potentially can get in the way of collective action, if it generates 
unfavourable reactions among other DAC members. 
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The perceptions that British consultants are often contracted by the DAC to conduct 
studies can be seen in a similar light. In the view of a Japanese official who had long 
participated in DAC meetings, “In the DAC, when documents written by ODI are tabled, 
people think that it’s a DFID’s initiative again” (Shoji, interview, 2012). ODI is 
generally perceived to have a strong influence on the work of the DAC and shape its 
agenda among others (Hynes, interview with a DAC Secretariat, 2013). The DAC 
Secretariat is also relying on consultants such as ODI, as a director of ODI says “When 
the DAC’s head of aid effectiveness team confronts with challenges, she would most 
likely phone us first to ask for advice” (Evans, interview, 2012). In fact, a former 
director of ODI sees the DAC as “a Paris branch of the ODI” (Maxwell, interview, 
2012). All these show the strong link between research institute and the DAC. 
 
Although the UK’s leadership on aid effectiveness was occasionally felt intrusive both 
outside and inside the DAC, leadership is an important condition for collective action 
nonetheless: “it is hard to herd sheep without a sheep dog, and the UK was keen to set a 
path” (Evans, interview, 2012). Although some donors were sometimes annoyed, 
probably DFID could not have done it differently (Hudson, interview, 2012). An 
ex-DFID official and current DAC Secretariat sees the DFID as having global 
consciousness which is why it tries to influence others in addition to its own aid (Ward, 
interview, 2012). Japan, in contrast, is not proactive because it lacks a sense of 
obligation to pay the price for addressing global issues (Takahashi M., interview, 2012). 
It is not only that the UK was leading others but also because it walked the talk: In this 
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sense, it is “a unique leader as a responsible actor” (Evans, interview, 2012). While 
many of these comments were made by interviewees who have worked closely with 
DFID and might be thought to be partisan, it is also the case that the DAC’s peer review 
commended the UK’s leadership in terms of implementation.  
 
The strength of UK leadership came into question as more actors became involved and 
the agenda changed from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness as a result, 
notably during the Busan HLF. This echoed a more general shift in power away from 
Europe and towards Asia, which also meant that Japan’s prioritisation of aid for 
economic growth and infrastructure started to receive more interest than hitherto, among 
other DAC members. 
 
This section has argued that weak trust between Japan and the UK from the initial 
stages of the aid effectiveness agenda probably made collective action in the DAC more 
problematic than it might have been; but a considered response by the actors can 
prevent this state of affairs becoming permanent. Behind this, there was a certain level 
of ignorance or misunderstanding of their different aid approaches. Even so, it is 
important that someone is prepared to take on the role of leadership if there is to be 
collective action.  
 
Domestic environment  
During the early 2000s in particular the UK government was backed up by the country’s 
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CSOs and research community when taking a leading role in the DAC. In Japan these 
actors are weak, and the government was left to respond to the effectiveness agenda 
largely on its own, although it is worth distinguishing component parts such as MoFA, 
JICA, and the country offices within the government.  
 
A clear comparison can be observed from press releases about the Busan HLF between 
the UK and Japanese government. Most of DFID’s press release is devoted to 
explaining how its Secretary of State, Andrew Mitchell, contributed to reaching 
agreement especially by persuading China to join the agreement (DFID, 2011a). 
Mitchell’s report to the House of Commons also stressed the role played by the UK 
during the Busan HLF (DFID & Mitchell, 2011). In contrast, Japan’s MoFA press 
release reports the Busan HLF but conveys little about the role Japan had played (MoFA, 
2011a). This illustrates the different ways of the two government’s public 
communication as well. 
 
The UK’s politicians are well aware of the problems of aid effectiveness. For instance, 
the Select Committee on International Development at the House of Commons held a 
session exclusively on the PD in 2008 and gathered responses from 14 organisations 
and individuals. In Japan no equivalent discussion can be found in the Special 
Committee on Official Development Assistance and Related Matters at the House of 
Councillors. Some Secretariat officials of the House of Councillors are concerned about 
the insufficient level of awareness in the Committee with regard to aid effectiveness 
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issue (Kurata, interview, 2012), but Japan’s politicians are likely to be more interested in 
involving China in DAC activities rather than considering Japan’s role in the DAC.19 
 
In the UK many CSOs engage in advocacy work on aid effectiveness. UK Aid Network 
(UKAN), an advocacy coalition providing a platform to coordinate UK CSOs during the 
Busan HLF process, has 38 CSOs members. UKAN has brought its own research on 
implementing the PD to DFID’s attention; and DFID has been interested to listen to 
UKAN and other CSOs (e.g., Publish What You Fund or ONE), because they share  
similar interests such as in transparency (Godfrey, interview with Oxfam GB Policy 
Advisor, 2012). For instance, UK NGO position paper for the Busan HLF states that 
given its leading role in the PD and AAA, the UK government has an opportunity to 
play a crucial role for the HLF (UK Aid Network & Bond, 2011). As Godfrey 
comments, the government was very open and interested in listening to CSOs’ views 
during meetings with DFID officials including the Secretary of State (interview, 2012).  
 
One of the assets CSOs have is their global network, which allows UK NGOs to 
collaborate with NGOs in other countries and encourage them to put pressure on their 
own government. Indeed, when the UK government and NGOs share the same interest, 
it is very likely that “DFID would ask us, why don’t you lobby and push other 
governments as we are showing leadership while others are behind?” (Godfrey, 
                                                 
19
 This was based on writer’s experience at the Japanese Delegation to OECD, when a few Japanese 
politicians made an official visit to OECD/DAC in 2009. 
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interview, 2012). This is another way in which DFID can find CSOs useful, in addition 
to the long history and capacity of Britain’s CSO which gives them a “stronger voice in 
influencing the UK government to be ambitious in pursuing aid effectiveness” 
(Rabinowitz, interview, 2012). 
 
In Japan JANIC is a network NGO whose activities include advocacy for aid 
effectiveness. From 2010 on joint meetings on aid effectiveness was held between 
MoFA and NGOs six times, especially to discuss Busan HLF. Because the nature of 
government-CSOs relationship in Japan has traditionally not been particularly 
constructive – but rather “confrontational” (Hirata, 2002, p.128) – “the existence of 
such meetings was a progress by itself”, says a former JANIC policy advisor (Endo, 
interview, 2012). Yet, there is also some structural limitation in the CSOs side as well. 
As was mentioned in chapter 4, most of the Japanese NGOs are categorized as ‘service 
delivery type’ rather than ‘advocacy’; they are not interested in aid effectiveness unless 
discussions are directly linked to their own project activities (Endo; Takahashi K., 
interview, 2012). Japan’s advocacy NGOs are few and have few financial resources 
compared to those of many other OECD countries (Reimann, 2010, p.46). As a result, 
advocacy on aid effectiveness relies on a few individual CSO staff. Yet, there are some 
positive signs regarding relations between the government and CSOs. MoFA began to 
put questions to CSOs, instead of always just responding to CSOs questions, during the 
joint meetings (Endo, interview, 2012). During Busan HLF, daily meetings between 
MoFA and CSOs were organised where MoFA explained the government’s grounds for 
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not agreeing with some of the new proposals in an open way (Takahashi K., interview, 
2012). These may suggest some positive changes in CSOs-government relationship in 
Japan. 
 
The UK also has a strong research community on development, especially relevant 
since the late 1990s when the idea of evidence-based policy gained political currency at 
the expense of more ideologically-driven policy (Sutcliffe & Court, 2005, p.iii). This 
trend is reflected in DFID’s research budget: In 2010, DFID had the largest budget 
among OECD of £ 220 million, nearly doubled from 2005. DFID also has a strong 
reputation in feeding useful research into international development community (DFID, 
2008, p.13); DFID-funded research on gender equality, human rights and social 
inclusion were integrated into the aid effectiveness agenda, and was used to build 
international consensus in the run-up to the Accra HLF (DFID, 2009, p.196). Research 
institutions (e.g., ODI, IDS) and universities all contribute to the capacity of UK 
research as well. 
 
The situation is very different in Japan, where the research budget for international 
development is very limited (in recent years the budget for JICA Research Institute 
(JICA-RI) has been around 500 million yen, equivalent to one sixtieth of DFID’s 
research budget); lack of research capacity is identified by many interviewees right 
across the development community. Nevertheless, disseminating research output is a 
core activity for the JICA research institute. How far the aforementioned book  
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Catalyzing Development- A New Vision for Aid, published before the Busan HLF 
(Kharas, Makino & Jung, 2011) influenced the Busan HLF agenda towards the 
perspective of ‘development effectiveness’ and away from ‘aid effectiveness agenda’ is 
hard to measure, but the initiative it took at least shows Japan’s willingness to try to 
exercise influence. Tatsufumi Yamagata, researcher at the Institute of Development 
Economies-Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO), when summoned as a 
witness in a special session on Official Development Assistance (ODA) at the House of 
Councillors mentioned this publication as an example of aid coordination where Japan 
can take a lead (House of Councillors, 2013). 
 
This section has shown the domestic environment of the DAC member countries plays 
an important role in backing up the capacity of the DAC members in contributing to 
collective action. The UK’s leadership draws support from the research community and 
from civil society too, but Japan’s case compares less favourably. 
 
Recipient country level 
While DAC used to focus on changing donor policy through the members’ headquarters, 
the aid effectiveness agenda has added a further locus for collective action at the 
country level. The additional level of collective action at the country level implies that 
actual implementation of the agreed-upon policies becomes more complicated, with the 
increase in number and type of actor involved.  
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The issue of recipient country level started to emerge in WP-EFF in the mid-2000s, 
when reservations were still expressed because of the limited capacity of Secretariat 
staff, limited finance and absence of direct relations with the field (OECD Archives, 
2005e, pp.4-5). Nevertheless, during Busan HLF in 2011, a clear emphasise was put on 
monitoring at country level, rather than just changing donor behaviour at the global 
level. The shift was made as the DAC realised that the real motive for change must lie at 
the country level (Evans, interview, 2012). Behind this, there exists a mismatch between 
the realities at the country level and the global commitments of the PD (Sdewakiryanga, 
2011); similarly, a ‘one size fits all approach’ of the PD does not always relate well 
when the context differed at country level (Kharas & Chandy, 2011). McGee and 
Heredia (2012) also caution about the risks of applying universalist and normative 
frameworks to the diverse context found at country level.  
 
Country level experiences show the obstacles to implementation. Hyden argues that by 
adopting the PD the donors at country level are now a part of the political process, and 
this requires considerable attention if it is to be understood (2008). Responses to the 
writer’s own interview questions suggest that the PD is so technical (to the extent that 
only aid technocrats can understand the discussions) that it fails to engage politicians or 
make much sense to them. Put differently, the PD tried to solve political problems in a 
bureaucratic manner (Chandy, 2011a). However, as implementation process involves 
beyond technical and bureaucratic matter, as Martens (2005) or Barder (2009) suggest, 
donors still have multiple and sometimes competing objectives. This means they “want 
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to have freedom to operate unilaterally” (Riddell, interview, 2012). These are 
impediments to achieving collective action at the level of in-country implementation of 
the aid effectiveness agenda.  
 
For donors, there are different aspects to making aid more effective. One entails 
information sharing among donors, which can be categorised as “aid coordination” 
(Woods, 2011) or “horizontal dimension” (Yamamoto, interview, 2012). Another aspect 
is harmonising donors’ system and policies, which can be categorised as “aid 
cooperation” (Woods, 2011) or “vertical dimension” (Yamamoto, interview, 2012). 
While it is ideal to harmonise donors’ policies vertically under the PD, “it is difficult to 
push donors to go beyond it” (Hattori, interview, 2012) and cooperation is limited in 
practice than coordination (Woods, 2011, p.119). To illustrate, a Division of Labour 
exercise that was promoted under the PD with the intention of reducing aid 
fragmentation by reducing the number of donors active in each sector, yielded not much 
success.
20
 This lies beyond just information sharing (i.e., coordination), requiring the 
donors to take lead or to cede responsibility to other donors.  
 
There is a gap between what is discussed globally and implementation at country level. 
The PD is often interpreted as aid coordination through holding meetings, as has been 
identified in Indonesia (Blunt, Turner & Hertz,, 2011), but what donor officials at 
                                                 
20
 Division of Labour sets out to determine who would be a leading donor, who would be an active donor, 
and who would withdraw from each sector in recipient countries or delegate funds to be implemented by 
another donor.  
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country level can actually do to change donors’ aid policy is limited. Problems persist in 
HQs in regard to their rules and practices, which can only be solved there, even when 
coordination is working well at the country level (Browne, interview, 2012). 
Notwithstanding that a “global light, and country heavy” approach was emphasised 
during Busan HLF (Ssewakiryanga, 2011), the reality remains that HQ too must be 
involved if donor behaviour is to change (Christiansen, interview, 2012). As such, the 
country level brings further complications to the endeavour of securing collective 
action. 
 
Three points about implications for collective action stemming from the country level 
can be mentioned. First, because of the intensive communications and meetings on a 
daily basis, a ‘donor community’ is created there comprised of donor officials and 
recipient government officials. The structure of the donor coordination meetings depend 
on each country, though in general sector working group meetings in major sectors (e.g., 
education, water, agriculture) are attended by the line ministry officials. Economist 
group or budget support group discuss overall budget and national policy issues by 
donors and Finance ministry officials. The institutionalisation of the idea of a ‘donor 
community’ has shifted the code of conduct of donors at country level from a 
competitive to a more cooperative relationship. When the donors provided support 
largely on a project basis only, their main objective was to find the best projects to 
support, which often meant competing with other donors. But now that donor 
coordination has risen up the agenda, donor officials have begun to think about 
 307  
 
developing whole sectors or the entire country. 
 
Second, once the ‘donor community’ is established at country level, new collective 
incentives come into play. In terms of the PD, the more the donor community works 
with the recipient government in an attempt to improve aid effectiveness, the more they 
will be seen as a model both internationally and by donor headquarters. Consequently, 
the incentives of donor community converge around ‘showing good practice’ emerge. 
Once international targets are set, performance against these targets provides a 
benchmark both for future funding and international reputation, where donors and 
recipients alike have a mutual interest. On the other hand, the incentive to be seen as a 
model may exceed the level of aid coordination at country level, which donor staff at 
that level (not just HQ) feel as appropriate (Owa, 2011). For example the time spent in 
coordination meetings comes at a cost of donor officials’ time that can be spent on 
actually implementing projects that could deliver much needed support to poor people 
on the ground (See Blunt, Turner & Hertz, 2011, p.179).
21
 
 
However, the collective incentive at the country level does sometimes help push other 
donors forward for collective action, as in Japan’s case. With the rise of the aid 
coordination mechanism at country level, it became more difficult for Japan to 
implement its project aid unilaterally, as can be confirmed from the writer’s own 
                                                 
21
 Barder also reports that a country director of a donor agency spent more than half of his time in 
coordination meetings (2011). 
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experience working in Uganda. Japan’s aid was affected especially in African countries 
where the aid effectiveness agenda developed quickly and where Japan’s aid presence 
was modest. This explains why a horizontal informal network was established among 
Japanese embassies and JICA offices in Africa, to share problems the officials were 
facing. The network sometimes served as an advisory role, and sometimes became a 
force to push the HQ to comply with the PD, if only in order to resolve the practical 
problems they were facing. For instance, some Japanese embassies in Africa sent a 
proposal to Tokyo seeking improvement in Japan’s ODA system including on aid 
effectiveness – a case of collective effort from field offices attempting to make up for a 
lack of institutional incentive at HQ in complying with the aid effectiveness agenda. 
 
Third, in addition to the collective incentives, there exist individual incentives. Figure 
6.3 summarises the different layers of incentives for aid effectiveness, at different levels. 
Importantly, the layers are not completely divorced from one another; Individual 
incentives are connected to country level incentives in which they work, and they are 
also connected to institutional incentives at donors’ HQ level for which they work. 
Naturally, as the donor staff at country offices work for the donor agency the 
institutional incentive must be their main priority. And ideally, the institutional incentive 
aligns with the international targets, as has been the case for the UK.  
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Figure 6.3: Layers of incentives for aid effectiveness at country level 
International targets (PD) at international level (DAC) 
Institutional incentive at donor HQ 
Collective incentive at country level 
 Individual incentive at country level 
Source: author 
 
For DFID staff at the country level, their individual incentives are set to be in line with 
institutional incentive. According to an ex-DFID official, around 40% of his job 
description at DFID country offices (in Uganda and India) was for coordination with 
other donors (Ward, interview, 2012). This means DFID officials have more time and 
capacity to coordinate others (rather than being coordinated), compared to other donors. 
More explicitly, DFID staff in country offices believe that demonstrating commitment 
to aid effectiveness will support their own career progression, as DFID rewards good 
performance of its staff in pursuit of corporate priorities (Thornton & Cox, 2008, p.36). 
DFID’s decision-making power has also been decentralised, so that the country offices 
have greater flexibility and ability to act promptly than before, unlike donors such as 
Japan where the decision-making is more centralised. This explains how DFID can take 
the lead at the country level as well as in Paris. UK delegates at country level have been 
frustrated by other donors, whose commitments in the DAC were scrambled by the 
relationship between HQ and country offices, which can be the main reason for the low 
Policy making 
Implementation 
Decision making 
Implementation 
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level of implementation (Evans, interview, 2012).  
 
This section has shown that the new dimension presented by the recipient country level 
has created new layers of incentives for donors to engage in collective action, but poses 
additional obstacles too. In the case of aid untying, it was the officials from HQ who 
joined the agreement and then had the task of implementing it. Donor officials at the 
country level were much less involved, but in the case of aid effectiveness they are the 
ones who have to implement the PD. In brief, there is potentially a principal-agent 
problem. The section has shown how incentives at the country level (and personal level) 
can both promote and undermine collective action, depending on their relationship to 
the institutional incentives at HQ, by comparing the UK and Japan.  
 
Member/ non-member relationships 
A combination of recipients, non-DAC countries, and CSOs was influential on the 
direction of the aid effectiveness agenda. DAC’s relationships with these non-member 
actors have evolved to the point where they can affect the prospects for the nature and 
level of collective action in the DAC. This section looks at each type of non-members in 
turn. A further point is that debates have arisen around the issue of global governance on 
development, with relevance to determining which institutions should host what types 
of discussions.  
 
Recipient countries put pressure on the donors to make progress on the aid effectiveness 
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agenda. This pressure also served to provide the DAC with a rationale to push more 
reluctant donors to move forward. One area they focused on was on the principle of 
alignment – to make donor policies better aligned with recipient policies. For instance, 
the opening remarks of Rwanda’s President during Busan HLF was noticeable: “There 
is still resistance on the part of some donor countries to channel their aid through 
national systems…there has been reluctance from some donors (to be accountable)” 
(Kagame, 2011, p.62, italics by author).  
 
During Busan HLF, there was also an initiative to agree what a group of seven fragile 
states called a ‘New Deal’, which aims at tailoring aid goals and commitments to the 
needs of fragile states.
22
 During the process of reaching agreement, donors initially 
pushed back the draft written by fragile states, but the DAC’s resistance was overcome. 
The leadership and initiative taken by fragile states urged the donors to reflect on their 
rhetorical commitment to ‘ownership’ by recipient countries as opposed to what they 
actually do (Massing, interview with DAC Secretariat, 2012).  
 
Collective action among DAC donors can be seen as undermining the scope for 
ownership to be taken by recipient countries, in contradiction to the stated aim of the 
PD. Ideally aid coordination at the country level should be led by recipient government, 
as has been pointed out in DAC publications ever since 1960s, but some problems 
                                                 
22
 Further information can be found at http://www.newdeal4peace.org/about-the-new-deal/ (Accessed: 20 
September 2014). 
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remain. For instance, it is often the case that recipient governments have less capacity to 
lead.
23
 Furthermore, the more the DAC donors get to coordinate with each other, the 
prominence formerly given to their bilateral relationships with recipient governments 
comes to be challenged: “aid coordination” and “policy dialogue” may be perceived as 
“ganging up” by big donors on small governments in developing countries – already 
pointed out in the DAC chair’s report in 1980s (OECD, 1985, p.35). In any case DAC 
donors have long been seen as “an effective aid cartel, imposing a hegemony of ideas 
about aid practice and the content of aid programmes” (Brautigam, 2009, p.134). Aid 
coordination aims to reduce the transaction costs for recipient governments, but at the 
same time it may mean that recipient governments have less leverage in bilateral 
negotiations with individual donors – implying that recipients may not always agree that 
better aid coordination serves their own interests well. 
 
Emerging donors comprise the second category of non-members of DAC who now have 
influence on collective action in the DAC, exemplified by their success in bringing 
about the shift from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness at the Busan HLM. 
The DAC was partly responsible for this in as much as it came to see that emerging 
donors must be engaged in the discussions and include even those who did not want to 
be labelled ‘donors’ and did not want to be bound by DAC norms and standards. 
However their influence touches on the DAC’s fundamental rationale by fact that some 
                                                 
23
 Linn argues that such cases need a leader among donors in aid coordination to overcoming collective 
action problems (2010, p210). 
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are economically much larger than some DAC members and their impact on 
development cooperation activities as whole is now considerable.  
 
The questions over whether and how to engage with emerging countries created 
divisions among DAC members. For some, priority is to maintain DAC norms and 
standards. The dialogue with emerging economies on the DAC norms and standard was 
important, but it should not lead to watering them down (Neergaard, interview, 2012). 
For others like Japan who always tried to involve them without requiring the same level 
of standards, a more open, gradual and flexible strategy makes more sense (Okano, 
interview, 2012). As the Busan HLF approached, DAC members converged around the 
conviction that emerging donors must be included for the sake of keeping DAC relevant 
to wider community, which meant agreeing to their demand for recognition of 
‘differentiated responsibility’. It was “DAC’s tactic to involve new actors even by 
diluting norms and standards in the short run, with a hope that they will be persuaded 
eventually” (Riddell, interview, 2012). No clear answer can be given yet as to whether 
this will prove successful.  
 
Even after Busan, the views of DAC members remain varied in regard to what kind of 
standards and to what extent emerging donors should try to conform (Okano, interview 
with Japanese DAC delegate, 2012), and over whether DAC donors should keep to the 
old norms and standards (Lomøy, interview with director of DCD, 2013a). The DAC’s 
comparative advantage on aid, compared to the WB or the UN, will decline if it fails to 
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attract emerging countries, especially now that DAC donors have experienced a severe 
economic downturn (2007 onwards) that hits their willingness to provide aid (Watanabe 
M., interview with senior Japanese government official, 2012). Therefore, DAC needs a 
reform to meet a changed global economic situation (the rise of emerging countries, in 
particular) – continuing to dwell on aid effectiveness will risk itself losing sight of the 
bigger global picture (Tamaki, interview with deputy Secretary-General of OECD, 
2013). Yet, accommodating differences and evolving the norms and standards is very 
challenging (Evans, interview with director of ODI, 2012), and therefore, the DAC’s 
own future is at stake here. 
 
The growing influence of emerging countries extends to individual donors as well. Take 
for instance Japan’s possible perception on China, which can be quite mixed. Japan’s 
government welcomes Chinese involvement in the DAC from the point of view of 
binding China to DAC rules (in the same way that Japan is bound), but also to increase 
Japan’s allies, because China (like South Korea) shares some similar values and 
approaches to Japan’s aid. The similarities among Asian donors in regard to their aid 
philosophies and aid approaches (e.g., emphasis on loan aid, sectoral allocation to 
economic infrastructure) are strongly influenced by Japan as the oldest donor (see 
Söderberg, 2010; Shimomura, 2013), although these Asian approaches are 
“fundamentally different from the mainstream view of the donor community” 
(Shimomura, 2012a, p.179). By involving China more, Japan’s government would gain 
both domestically (responding to the demands of its politicians) and internationally 
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(acquiring allies who might agree with positions that Japan wants to take in the DAC). 
However, from a wider diplomatic point of view, Japanese government is concerned 
about China’s growing power in Asian geopolitics.  
 
On the side of emerging countries, as discussed, while they insist on their ‘differentiated 
responsibility’ compared to DAC donors, they cautioned DAC donors not to use them as 
an excuse for failing to comply with existing DAC commitments such as by lowering 
the norms and standards (Bracho, interview, 2011; Hayashikawa, interview, 2012; 
Lomøy, interview, 2013a). Yet, emerging countries themselves are not a homogenous 
category, as some may see China cooperates less than others. This does not make it any 
easier for the DAC to remain a viable force for securing collective action among its own 
members, let alone make it easier to mobilise collective action on aid issues among this 
enlarged and increasingly diverse international donor community. In fact, in April 2014, 
the first Global Partnership meeting held in Mexico as a follow-up to Busan HLF was 
effectively boycotted by China and India, which shows “a clear manifestation of the 
emerging countries’ less interest in the efforts of the DAC to get donors to attain aid 
effectiveness norms” (Browne, 2014). 
 
CSOs are the third category of non-member to be considered. Their growing importance 
is demonstrated by the award of a seat at the negotiation table of the outcome document 
for the first time in Busan. But even during the Accra HLF, ‘democratic’ ownership was 
included in its outcome document partly because of their influence. Similarly, during the 
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Busan HLF, CSOs successfully inserted ‘human rights’ in the outcome document. 
CSO’s upgraded status as one of the negotiators really mattered. When a group of 
donors approached CSOs to support them in changing some language in favour of a 
specific issue, CSOs adopted the tactic of suggesting ‘human rights’ should be added in 
return for giving their support (Rabinowitz, interview, 2012). At the same time, the 
CSOs’ involvement could be a source of new tensions, since Chinese delegates were 
openly critical of CSO perspectives on human rights and empowerment, during the 
Busan HLF (Mawdsley, Savage & Kim, 2013, p.33). 
 
However, the CSOs too are not a homogenous or united community: different views 
separated CSOs from the south and the north. It was northern CSOs who originally 
advocated aid effectiveness; For instance, a few months before Paris HLF, a letter to the 
DAC chair suggesting some issues for discussion was sent by a coalition of 20 CSOs 
who all came from Europe (OECD Archives, 2004a). As the numbers have grown since 
then, coordination of CSOs has become more challenging. A number of NGOs were 
discontented during the Busan HLF, because a CSOs ‘sherpa’ does not represent all the 
CSOs (Mawdsley, Savage & Kim, 2013, p.33). According to Rabinowitz, who attended 
Busan as a coordinator of UKAN, a difference could also be seen between northern and 
southern CSOs, since the core aim of northern CSOs was to further aid effectiveness 
agenda, whereas southern CSOs were more concerned about human rights and freedom 
of their operation. Nevertheless, mutual learning between the northern and southern 
CSOs was nurtured; Northern CSOs eventually came to appreciate the southern 
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perspective that CSOs have most legitimacy in working for matters directly affecting 
them whereas primary responsibility for aid effectiveness lies with governments 
(interview, 2012).  
 
This section examined the role played by non-members (recipient countries, emerging 
countries and CSOs) in relation to collective action in the DAC. Recipient countries and 
CSOs pushed for a change in donor behaviour, but emerging countries’ undoubtedly 
exercised stronger influence in shifting the agenda. Mawdsley et al. analyse that the 
location of the Busan HLF in Korea represents a subtle signal of the two shifts: a new 
mainstream focus on building partnership with emerging countries as well as recipient 
countries, and a paradigm change in aid and development norms (2013, p.35). The first 
shift, involving emerging countries, was probably inevitable for the survival of the DAC. 
The second shift needs more time to be observed. What is certain is that the DAC has 
been increasingly influenced by non-DAC actors in a way that has changed the DAC 
members’ position on aid effectiveness. This level of influence was not seen in the case 
of aid untying, where the DAC was a dominant player in the whole aid architecture. 
 
6.5: Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented a case study on aid effectiveness. The indicators of collective 
action showed that over the period the number of members to the WP-EFF and HLF 
dramatically increased, especially from non-official members of the DAC, and yet, 
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outcome documents for each HLF were successfully agreed during the HLFs. However, 
when it comes to implementation, achieving results is much more challenging even 
though a monitoring framework with time-bounded numerical indicators now exists.  
 
The DAC was successful in championing the aid effectiveness agenda and offering the 
venue for actors to discuss and agree on collective objectives. The impact the PD has 
had especially at country level is well acknowledged among donor officials, researchers 
and recipient governments: it has changed the ways all the actors perceive how aid 
should be provided. In agreeing the PD as well as other outcome documents during the 
HLFs, the DAC Secretariat played a crucial role. However, the Busan HLF brought a 
significant change, by exposing DAC members to the need to respond to a changing 
global architecture influenced by the emerging countries. In spite of initial reluctance 
from some like-minded donors, the DAC seems to have moved from ‘aid effectiveness’ 
to ‘development effectiveness’, at the cost of possibly lowering the norms and 
standards.  
 
The reasons that the PD has not been fully implemented can be explained from the 
conditions needed for collective action. Strong leadership by the UK was necessary to 
the process of reaching agreement, but agreement itself does not necessarily ensure 
faithful implementation. The addition of an extra venue for collective action in the form 
of the recipient country level poses further obstacles. Donor officials and recipient 
governments at the country level have experienced difficulties in implementing the PD. 
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The relationship between Japan and the UK has shown the importance of trust-building. 
Yet, emerging actors’ influence and the shift of agenda have diverted the DAC 
members’ collectiveness in implementing the PD. 
 
Finally, what this chapter has shown in comparison to chapter 5 is that the nature of 
collective action has shifted from a simple type involving only DAC members to one 
where more and different kinds of actors are involved, bringing in different levels or 
venue for collective action as well. This is reflection of changes in the global aid 
architecture and global economic power more generally. The DAC has had to evolve. 
The role it plays or tries to play in the future, how it goes about this, the value that 
members will place on the DAC, and what the DAC can really deliver, are all topics that 
will merit much closer scrutiny in the future.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The beginning of this thesis quoted a statement by OECD Secretary General: “We need 
a collective jolt for collective action”.1 The first chapter identified a pressing need for 
the DAC, as well as the OECD more generally, to respond to ongoing changes in the 
global economy. In spite of the well-established past contributions that the DAC has 
made to shape the global aid architecture, its role has been shrinking. Hence a jolt for 
collective action was called for in order to reposition the DAC. 
 
Chapter 2 established the concept of collective action in order to assess the levels and 
forms of the DAC’s collective action, along with four indicators and six actor-oriented 
conditions. Overall, the thesis addresses the main research questions which are whether, 
to what extent and in what forms collective action can be observed in the DAC 
(indicators); and how to account for them (conditions).  
 
Detailed evidence to answer these questions was discussed throughout chapters 3-6. The 
aim of this final chapter is to address the overall research questions set out at the 
beginning by interpreting the evidence exhibited in the previous chapters and to draw 
implications for the general context of global governance and development aid.  
                                                 
1
 See page 1 in the Introduction chapter. 
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The next section briefly summarises the rationale, aims and methodology that were set 
out at the start of the thesis. Then, the main findings and implications are discussed, 
followed by the limitations encountered in the course of this research, and suggestions 
for future research. 
 
2. Summary of research 
 
This thesis examined collective action in the OECD DAC by exploring the levels and 
forms of collective action and the conditions that promote or undermine collective 
action. Academic literature on the OECD and the DAC is scarce, and this thesis has 
contributed to fill knowledge gaps by providing detailed analyses of collective action in 
the DAC. In doing so the thesis offers insights into a search for better global governance 
by applying the lens of collective action.  
 
Three aims were set out in the Introduction to this thesis. The first is to fill some 
academic knowledge gaps on OECD DAC. The second is to contribute to knowledge of 
global governance in respect of international aid, by applying the concept of ‘collective 
action’. The third is to unveil the complex reality of the DAC by revealing the intricate 
incentives and motivations of the actors in respect of collective action.  
 
This thesis has proposed an original theoretical framework comprising: (a) four 
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indicators to assess the level and form of collective action drawn from policy processes 
(members and meetings, agreement, implementation, monitoring); and (b) six 
conditions for collective action drawn from an actor-centred approach (Secretariat, 
delegate-headquarter relationships, member-member relationships, domestic 
environment, recipient country level, and member/non-member relationships). By 
exploring these indicators and conditions the thesis has been able to identify where 
bottlenecks to collective action lie and how collective action can be formed.  
 
Evidence for this analysis was drawn largely from 84 interviews conducted with staff 
officials at the OECD Secretariat and delegates of member governments, as well as 
other stakeholders both in the UK and Japan (politicians, government officials, 
researchers/consultants, NGOs and business sector). In addition, OECD archival 
documents were consulted. Extensive interviews with stakeholders in the DAC as well 
as in the UK and Japan revealed intricate incentives and motivations that these actors 
possess in their interactions with the DAC. By focusing on actors and their relationships, 
the thesis has highlighted both conditions that promote collective action and 
circumstances that hinder collective action in the DAC. 
 
3. Main findings 
 
The overall main finding of the thesis is that the DAC has achieved collective action, 
but only to some extent. The DAC is good at agreeing policies, but challenges emerge 
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during the process of implementation. Also, an increase in actors and differences among 
their involvement in the DAC affects the forms of collective action in the DAC – from 
closed to open and from homogeneous to heterogeneous. During the process of reaching 
agreement the main condition helping collective action is for some leading members to 
advance the agenda, but balancing members’ relations is important to ensure all 
members feel fairness and build relationships of trust, which can be supported by the 
Secretariat. During the process of implementation, non-DAC actors and an additional 
locus of collective action (i.e., recipient country level) may provide significant 
undermining conditions for collective action through the DAC. Members’ motivations 
and incentives are identified as a precondition for collective action, as they determine 
members’ attitudes and interactions in the DAC. 
 
Indicators of collective action 
A central research question of this thesis is to inquire whether and to what extent there 
is collective action in the DAC. In responding to this question, this section identifies 
three points that represent the main indications of collective action.  
 
First, the records and process of DAC’s agreements show the existence of considerable 
collective action in that the members can agree on common policies. However, second, 
the extent of its collective action is generally limited during the process of 
implementation. In addition, third, the indicator of meetings and members shows 
transformation of the form of collective action in the DAC under the influence of new 
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non-DAC actors.  
 
Elaborating on this first point, the DAC has achieved collective action by reaching a 
number of agreements during its history. Two studies of aid untying and aid 
effectiveness have confirmed this finding. The Recommendation on untying aid and the 
Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness were agreed successfully. However, a list of 
agreed DAC policies is not definitive evidence that collective action is always reached, 
as other policies that have been discussed may NOT have been agreed. Nevertheless, it 
was shown that once meetings on a subject are set up with a budget and Secretariat staff, 
the chances of it is less likely that the DAC ends the discussion without yielding an 
agreement, in order to be accountable for the cost it uses.  
 
Some DAC policies have taken a long time to be agreed because of their controversial 
nature. Both aid untying and aid effectiveness (or aid coordination) were discussed in 
DAC meetings as early as the 1960s, but significant agreements were only made after 
four decades. The thesis examined the momentum that broke the long impasse: Namely, 
political momentum from within the UK, originated from CSOs’ criticisms towards 
donors’ tying practices; external pressure to advance the agenda, which was also 
strongly supported and led by like-minded governments.  
 
Second, the thesis has found that achieving agreement in the DAC does not entail fully 
successful collective action. In order to facilitate and achieve successful consensus, 
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DAC agreements may be worded rather loosely or imprecisely. And because of this the 
implementation and monitoring processes may give rise to misunderstandings or gaps in 
the interpretations made by members.  
 
With regard to the level of implementation, the thesis has shown that when agreement is 
not accompanied by specific monitoring mechanisms to ensure change in donors’ 
behaviour or their policies, then it becomes more difficult to assess the actual level of 
implementation. The thesis showed that there is no way to attribute DAC members’ 
policy reform or change to DAC policies. However, even in these situations there are 
other aspects of DAC activities that still contribute towards global public goods, namely 
a process of learning and sharing among members, based on knowledge and experiences. 
Peer learning and sharing of information or experiences may not be essential conditions 
for collective action but seem to be more highly valued by DAC members than full and 
faithful implementation of agreed policies. And this has encouraged the DAC to 
converge on altruistic norms, as in the case of aid untying, where members’ willingness 
to agree was seen to be much more important than whether they would or could 
implement in full. 
 
For the two case studies that are accompanied by specific monitoring indicators, the 
level of implementation was high for aid untying, but low for aid effectiveness where 
Paris Declaration indicators showed that donors made some efforts, but only one out of 
thirteen targets was met. In contrast, the aid untying ratio improved beyond the target 
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set. Nevertheless, the DAC is still challenged by members’ practices on aid untying that 
do not appear in the statistics; there are issues on de facto tying. Therefore it can be 
concluded that the level of collective action in the DAC is achieved, but only to some 
extent.  
 
Third, the thesis has shown that collective action is not only evident in agreements and 
their implementation, but also in other indicators such as meetings and membership. 
The comparison of the two cases shows that the forms of collective action have changed 
over the period. When the DAC had only limited membership, agreement was led by 
some members who wanted to advance their agenda in the DAC. The pattern of 
leaders-followers existed, though who the leaders and followers are does not have to be 
the same on every issue. Yet, this closed nature of the DAC has changed over time as 
more and different actors have become involved, including an increase in formal 
members. More importantly, as in the case of aid effectiveness, participants in one of the 
DAC subsidiary bodies (the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness) expanded to non-DAC 
actors such as recipient countries, civil society organisations (CSOs) and emerging 
countries. Nevertheless, the negotiation group for determining outcome documents was 
kept small in each case. Keeping the core group small may be a key to making the 
agreement process effective, confirming the theory of collective action. 
 
Conditions for collective action 
How can we account for the levels and forms of collective action summarised in the 
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previous section? In other words, what are the conditions for and obstacles to achieving 
successful collective action in the DAC? This section analyses the conditions by 
correlating the indicators with six actor-oriented conditions (Secretariat; 
delegate-headquarter relationships; member-member relationships; domestic 
environment; recipient country level; and member/non-member relationships).  
 
In sum, four conditions are important in affecting the existence and the level of 
collective action in the DAC. One of the most important conditions for collective action 
is an internal condition relevant to member-member relationships and the role of the 
Secretariat. The existence of one or more members taking leadership promotes 
collective action, as the members who show positive interest in the DAC are the main 
drivers of change. This, however, needs to be supplemented by the Secretariat’s 
important role in balancing the members’ feeling of fairness and promoting trust 
relationship among the members. The second condition is more external, namely the 
influence exerted by non-DAC actors. Third, the recipient country level increasingly 
affects the level of collective action in the DAC. Fourth, domestic conditions in the 
DAC member countries also matter. These are reflected in the interest and motivations 
of member governments in interacting with the DAC. In addition to these conditions, a 
new condition is proposed (below), which was not taken into consideration in the 
beginning of this research. These five conditions are now discussed in turn. 
 
First, successful conditions for agreement include the conduct of DAC members and the 
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Secretariat, who are at the centre of the decision-making. The fact that the DAC has 
been led by some members such as the UK is important. Especially after 1997 when the 
UK’s leadership role in international development became strong, its influential role in 
the DAC increased. Without this, reaching agreement on aid untying and aid 
effectiveness would have been more arduous. This leadership role corroborates what 
collective action theory suggests. 
 
In addition to the existence of the leaders, the Secretariat also plays an important role. 
Its ability to balance the different interests of members and head off feelings of 
unfairness among them is a supplementary condition to one or more members’ 
leadership. The Secretariat’s role in easing tensions among the members is an important 
contribution to achieving collective action. However, its role, even though essential, is 
still only supplementary because it cannot lead the agenda on behalf of the members.  
 
For both the leaders and the Secretariat, building trust with other members is an 
important factor for successful agreement. As was discussed, the UK’s strong leadership 
pushed Japan into a difficult position, which hindered trust between Japan and the UK. 
Similarly, a good relationship between the Secretariat and each member is important. If 
members were to have a sense of unfairness or mistrust towards the Secretariat, the 
result could be greater reluctance to accept proposed policies. 
 
In fact, the level of implementation is largely affected by members’ relationships with 
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other members, non-DAC actors and the recipient country level. From the two studies 
with contrasting implementation (i.e., higher for aid untying and lower for aid 
effectiveness), it can be seen that favourable member-member relationships are a 
condition for collective action. In the aid untying case, most of the European 
governments had already untied much aid, so they faced few additional costs in 
honouring the agreement. For other members, it is likely that peer pressure based on 
trust contributed to promoting implementation. When a majority of members implement, 
those who at first resist would feel more pressure. In contrast, the very different aid 
effectiveness case implies that when the majority do not implement, peer pressure may 
not operate or may be much less effective. In short, since peer pressure is the DAC’s 
core working mechanism, when a majority of members do not implement agreements it 
does not work.  
 
Second, the forms of collective action are significantly affected by non-DAC actors, 
especially during recent years. A stark difference can be observed between aid untying 
and aid effectiveness with regard to the meetings and members. For aid untying, a part 
of the agenda was transferred from the DAC to the OECD Export Credit Group, which 
helped ease the tough negotiations in the DAC. Therefore, DAC members were able to 
focus on a narrowly defined agenda. With non-DAC actors’ involvement, however, the 
aid effectiveness case was rather different; the number and kind of meetings increased 
along with the increase in members.  
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What does this mean for collective action in the DAC? When the participants are 
limited to the DAC donors, the members are better able to understand each other’s 
position. But as the new actors have different rationales for engaging with the DAC, 
they have changed the power balance within the DAC. Recipient countries pushed the 
DAC members to make progress on what they have committed to (notably the aid 
effectiveness agenda), whereas the DAC inevitably has now had to move from aid 
effectiveness to development effectiveness, in order to accommodate emerging donor 
countries like China who say they offer not aid but co-operation. Emerging countries 
have insisted they have a ‘differentiated responsibility’ from the DAC members, even as 
DAC members want them to share a level playing field. The CSOs’ agendas, however, 
diverge from some emerging countries’ policies on issues like human rights, which can 
cause conflicts.  
 
All these complex relationships among the actors imply that collective action in the 
DAC has become more difficult than before. As new actors have different rationales for 
participating in the DAC compared to the traditional members, setting common 
objectives and norms now becomes more difficult. Rather than through the pattern of 
leaders and followers, it becomes harder to reconcile the different interests found among 
all the actors. Implementation may suffer where the process of agreement becomes 
more complicated. When the emerging countries become party to collective action by 
providing development cooperation, but do not abide by DAC rules, they may appear to 
be free riding in the eyes of the DAC members. The reasons for the low level of 
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implementation of aid effectiveness can be identified as the reduced level of DAC 
members’ enthusiasm, when their attention to this agenda was diverted by the bigger 
influence of these new actors. More importantly, a shift of DAC norms away from 
altruism and towards more emphasis on national interests can be anticipated. We can see 
already that the UK continues with some de-facto aid tying practices, and that in Japan 
arguments are now being advanced by some politicians for tying Japan’s aid in order to 
counter China’s growing aid presence. 
 
Third, as with aid effectiveness, the recipient country level came to be the centre of the 
implementation process. Until recently, the DAC was focused on changing individual 
donors’ policies. However, with the increasing awareness that donors’ aid activities in 
each recipient country should be better coordinated, implementation of DAC policies 
became more focused on recipient country level actors. Subsequently, the 
implementation process has been looked at from the perspective of collective effort 
rather than individual endeavour. What this means for collective action in the DAC is 
that some of the control exercised by donors’ headquarters (and not just the DAC) must 
be devolved to actors at the country level, which means the recipient government and 
donor officials there. Therefore, a different level of actors is involved.  
 
Fourth, this thesis has examined members’ domestic conditions through a comparative 
analysis of two member countries, the UK and Japan. The UK is widely regarded in aid 
circles as a leader in the DAC and Japan is not. The thesis makes the comparison 
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explicit and pushes it further. Amongst the domestic conditions discussed in this thesis, 
the interest and capacity of politicians and bureaucrats are the most important, mainly 
because the DAC is an inter-governmental organisation. Nevertheless, other actors such 
as CSOs may play a role in supporting the government’s international leadership and 
nurturing a broader domestic base for international development cooperation.  
 
In the case of the UK, a strong interest in aid has been expressed consistently from the 
political level to government decision-makers and technical advisors. Perhaps because 
the US is more dominant in other international organisations such as the World Bank, 
the DAC has been a forum where the UK can exercise greater influence, which provides 
a good reason for the UK to utilise the DAC. For the UK the DAC is a forum where it 
can exert soft power, and the DAC’s altruistic image makes this attractive. The UK is 
proactive, by taking chairs’ positions and persuading other members to agree on 
policies.  
 
As mentioned previously, leadership by one or more members may be a necessary 
condition, but this thesis has gone beyond that, by arguing that too much leadership – 
exceeding levels other members feel comfortable with – may jeopardises relations of 
trust and become counter-productive, as happened in UK-Japan relations at an early 
stage of the aid effectiveness agenda. Some members also felt the UK was trying to 
promote its own aid model. This too risks undermining the chances of achieving 
collective action.  
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Unlike the UK, Japan does not have similar enthusiasm for the DAC. There are several 
reasons for this. It is Japan’s general attitude to be reactive towards international affairs, 
and the DAC is no exception. This is mainly due to Japan’s loss in World War II, and 
also explains the restrictions on its use of military power. In addition to the historical 
reason, DAC’s image as a Euro-centric, knowledge-based policy forum makes Japanese 
politicians, government officials and others feel at some distance. Rather than a forum 
where Japanese views can be reflected, the DAC is a place where Japanese government 
sees itself as having to defend its own position vis-à-vis Europeans who have a very 
different aid philosophy and aid arrangements; There is a general perception of the DAC 
among Japanese that it is a venue where Japan is criticised. This has created a sort of 
path dependence in Japan’s conduct of relations with the DAC. Yet, even if Japan did 
want to take a lead there, Japan’s lack of domestic political leadership on aid issues and 
bureaucratic divisions (on both horizontal and vertical lines) may still be impediments  
to making a strategic utilisation of the DAC.  
 
Finally, in addition to the four conditions discussed, a new condition is developed as a 
result of this research. One of the aims of this thesis is to reveal the members’ 
motivations and incentives, which are deeply related to the conditions for collective 
action. Members’ motivations and incentives are not categorised at the same level as 
other conditions discussed in this thesis. Instead they may be understood as 
pre-conditions that determine members’ attitudes and interactions in the DAC. In the 
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academic literature, donors’ incentives are widely reported as a hindrance to collective 
action (Gibson et al., 2005; Barder, 2009; Geddes, 2011). And yet the DAC is known as 
a transnational network and policy forum characterised as an ‘altruistic’ and ‘soft’ 
mechanism (Kragelund, 2008; Ruckert, 2008), seemingly free from donors’ national 
interest. How can these different perspectives be compatible, and in what ways are 
donors’ motivations and incentives central to the DAC?  
 
Throughout the thesis it was shown that the members’ motivations and incentives 
cannot be explained solely by national interest or solely by altruism. A distinction 
between member governments’ motivations or incentives and those of their individual 
officials is important to understanding the balance between rationality and social norms 
introduced early in the thesis. These factors are related to individual incentives and 
motivations with regard to the individuals’ interest and capacity, as has been mentioned 
at several points in the thesis. However, distinguishing between the individual and 
institutions is not always easy in practice, because one cannot fully understand whether 
DAC members’ comments are based on policy direction representing their government 
or on an individual’s own opinion instead.  
 
Table 1 presents one way of analysing this distinction, between rationality and 
social/global norms (pendulum of incentives and motivations), both at the individual 
and government levels (level of actors), affecting collective action in the DAC. As 
shown in the bottom row of the table, when individuals represent their government they 
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are influenced by government policy and instructions from headquarters. There is a 
strong element of rationality. But when the government does not assume a strong 
interest in or pay much attention to an issue, then individuals have more latitude for 
their own personal beliefs and motivations to come into play; and these variables will be 
affected also by their relationships with DAC colleagues from other member countries. 
This is the realm of social/global norms. 
 
Table 1: Balance between rationality and social/global norms for collective action at individual and 
member government level 
 Rationality                                         Social/ Global Norms  
DAC               Collective action towards global interest/global public goods                           
Member 
government 
National interest, Leadership, International Reputation 
                                         Global interest, Altruism, Belief 
Individuals 
Government policy, HQ instructions 
                                   Belief, Willingness, Human relationship 
Source: author 
 
The distinction between rationality and social norms also exists at the government level. 
Clearly national interest (both political and economic) counts as rationality, but member 
government’s motivations to join and interact with the DAC (such as leadership in the 
UK’s case and international reputation in Japan’s case) can also be understood as a 
matter of rationality. And these are affected by the domestic environment including 
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domestic politics and pressures from CSOs. In contrast, member governments may also 
respond to such considerations as a genuine belief in serving the global interest, and 
altruism. Their aid rhetoric at times at least suggests this. 
 
The balance between rationality and social/global norms both at government and 
individual level is an important influence on whether, how and how far member 
countries contribute to collective action in the DAC, as the DAC tries to move 
members’ national self-interest/rationality closer towards the global interest in providing 
more and better global public goods. The balance between rationality and social norms 
varies among member countries. It also varies depending on which DAC meetings the 
individuals are attending. For instance, the sphere of social/global norms will be much 
larger at the subsidiary body meetings where technical advisors gather and share their 
knowledge, experiences and opinions on specific detailed issues. Individual capacity 
and interest matter there. On the other hand, at High Level Meetings where heads of 
agencies and department make big decisions and reach agreement on policies, the 
sphere of rationality is likely to be larger, as the participants are representing 
government and protecting the national interest when necessary.  
 
It is also important to note that rationality does not inevitably or always obstruct 
collective action in producing global public goods and serving the global interest. 
Leadership and international reputation are rational factors for a government to 
contribute to collective action. Since taking a leadership role in international 
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development also serves as the UK’s national interest, what the UK proposes may be in 
line with the global interest. This tendency was especially strong during the period 
between 1997 and 2010 under the Labour party government. This goes against a 
dogmatic belief that collective action theory must imply that public goods will be 
under-provided, as a consequence of individual rationality or self-interest. To put it 
simply, DAC members may be able to pursue national interest and contribute to global 
interest at the same time. 
 
By the same token social/global norms such as beliefs may in certain cases actually 
hinder collective action. For instance, Japan’s government and many of its officials 
believe that Japanese technical cooperation should not be untied. This is because 
Japanese specialists build strong working relationships with people in recipient 
countries, where they live for several years and come to share a work ethos based on 
Japanese culture and society. If technical cooperation is untied, then such factors are 
unlikely to be taken into account in the cost-benefit calculations of competitive 
international bidding for untied aid-funded contracts. A conviction in the value of 
Japan’s traditional belief systems may be hard to reconcile with conformity to the global 
norms of the DAC in this case. 
 
So, although the general perception may be that the DAC is a technical forum where 
members gather and share knowledge and experiences, in reality a variety of different 
incentives and motivations account for the members’ behaviour. This is why the DAC 
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can be seen as a diplomacy forum on international development. The DAC has different 
faces; and it is impossible to conclude that it is either a technical forum purely based on 
expertise or a political forum in which members negotiate with recourse to political 
tactics. It has both aspects; and members’ actual motivations and incentives will 
sometimes be only barely concealed behind a thin veil of altruistic norms. 
 
To summarise, the indicators of collective action were stronger for agreement than for 
implementation; and from the indicator of meetings and members we can understand 
that the recent rise of non-DAC actors has changed the puzzle of collective action in the 
DAC, compared to its days as a rather closed, like-minded club. Conditions that help 
agreement can be found in favourable member-member relationships and in the 
Secretariat’s contribution, especially trust. Undermining conditions during 
implementation can be identified as the impact of non-DAC actors and the 
complications of an additional level of collective action at the recipient country level. 
Members’ incentives and motivations can be analysed both in terms of rationality-social 
norms and from individual-institutional perspectives and variables. These enter into an 
explanation of how members arrive at their attitudes and interactions in the DAC. 
 
4. Possible broader implications of the findings  
 
What are the implications of these findings about the DAC for our understanding of 
collective action? This section expands the main findings and exhibits the ways in 
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which we can interpret them with regard to (i) implications for the broader context of 
aid, and (ii) implications for wider global governance, and (iii) implications regarding 
the UK and Japan. 
 
First, the implication of this thesis for the broader context of aid is that donor relations 
affect relations between donors and recipient countries. The DAC has been a forum in 
which donors try to influence each other in a way of ‘peer learning’, but also where 
some try to persuade others through taking leadership. This is the ‘air fight’ among the 
donors, that reflects their views and preferences about the global aid architecture.
2
 This 
implies that leadership among the donors also increases the possibility of taking 
leadership in donor-recipient relationships, because the ‘air fight’ will move to the 
‘ground war’ at recipient country level during the implementation process. Those who 
can set the framework during the ‘air fight’ have an advantage in leading and winning 
the ‘ground war’, helping them take control at the recipient country level as well. 
 
In spite of the DAC’s effort in inviting recipient countries to join the conversation, 
notably in the discussion of the aid effectiveness agenda, the fundamental structure of 
the ‘air fight’ among donors and ‘ground war’ among donors and recipient countries is 
likely to continue. Scholars argued for a new mechanism to recast the aid relationship 
(Riddell, 2007, p.391) and suggest a “Southern DAC” composed of recipient countries 
to counter the DAC (Browne, 2006, p146). As early as 1976, an “OECD for the Third 
                                                 
2
 The words ‘air fight’ and ‘ground war’ are from Yamamoto (2012, interview) in chapter 4 (p159).  
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World” was proposed to provide a similar forum for recipient countries (Helleiner, 1976, 
p.20).  
 
The recent movement in the DAC to invite and include other actors is a good sign, but 
the change was more a response to external influence than a purely DAC initiative, and 
issues such as whether the DAC is becoming a forum for all possibly at the cost of  
organisational efficiency, still remain. Also, the current shift in outlook of the DAC and 
the OECD as a whole is a reaction to emerging countries rather than to aid recipient 
countries (see chapter 1). It responds to the possibility that emerging countries may try 
to set their own territory for ‘air fight’ threatening a loss of status and influence at the 
OECD and DAC. 
 
Second, the implication for wider global governance drawn from this thesis is the 
difficulty of setting a global governance mechanism that will suffice and include all 
relevant actors. As mentioned in chapter 1, the more actors we get, the more collective 
action nightmares we will have.
3
 Organisational effectiveness can erode (see chapter 3, 
p90). Yet, this thesis has explained that collective action problems do not only exist 
among DAC members, but also now involve relations with non-DAC actors. The 
problems will have to be fixed by some kind of universal forum, even if that forum 
turns out not to be the DAC. One way is to work through smaller, regional forums such 
as the Asian DAC, as a stepping-stone towards a universal forum that might avoid 
                                                 
3
 This is words by Alison Evans (interview, 2012) quoted in chapter 1 (p.56). 
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head-on collisions along the way. 
 
Third, an implication of this thesis for Japan and the UK relates to the pattern of leader 
and follower and their contributions to global governance. This thesis showed the clear 
leadership of the UK in the DAC especially since the late 1990s and its interest in 
influencing others. The UK has born the cost of being leader, contributing to collective 
action in global governance. Japan is a (sometimes reluctant) follower vis-à-vis the UK, 
with only weak interest and capacity in contributing to the construction of global 
knowledge about aid. Yet, the leader-follower relationship is not necessarily always 
negative; and, moreover, even followers can contribute to global governance within 
their own capacity.
4
 Furthermore, as was mentioned by some Secretariat officials,
5
 the 
pattern of leader and follower may change. In fact Japan’s government recently started 
to increase its interest in being involved in the OECD. At the time of writing this thesis, 
Japan chaired the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting in May 2014 with a keynote 
address of Prime Minister Abe.
6
 As such, collective action can be nurtured within the 
leader-follower relationship. 
 
5. Limitations of this thesis and future research 
 
                                                 
4
 For instance, Schirm (2009) argues that followership is a core condition for the success of global 
governance. 
5
 See Jorgensen (interview, 2013) and Lomoy (interview, 2012) in chapter 4 (p136).  
6
 This was Japan’s second chairmanship after 36 years. 
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Along with the findings and implications above, there are some limitations of this 
research. First, only two studies of aid untying and aid effectiveness were investigated. 
They were chosen because specific targets and monitoring frameworks were set up, 
unlike other DAC agreements. The thesis adopted the DAC’s own monitoring data to 
assess members’ implementation, without consulting other ways in which DAC 
agreements may be utilised by its members (such as whether members take the 
knowledge learned during DAC meetings back to headquarters and incorporate it in 
future policy-making). How this compares with less binding agreements and looser 
forms of policy guidance would make an interesting area for further research. This 
thesis found that tracing the impact of DAC agreements and guidance on members’ 
policy is not a straightforward exercise. There is scope to develop better methodologies 
for this. In respect of aid untying and aid effectiveness most of the DAC meetings were 
attended directly by members’ officials from headquarters, which means that the 
delegate-headquarter relationship (which features in the conditions for achieving 
collective action) was not examined as closely as the DAC meetings themselves, but 
could be researched more in the future. 
 
Also, the research did not analyse implementation beyond what is reported by the DAC. 
Collective action in implementation should be assessed first according to what is agreed 
to be implemented. But the fact that other ways of assessing the effectiveness of donors’ 
aid have been proposed by academics and think tanks may mean there is a weakness in 
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the DAC’s own monitoring.7 The implementation process at recipient country level is 
one area that could be taken into consideration more. This was not fully examined in 
this thesis, because the interviews that were conducted concentrated on the OECD level 
and member countries’ headquarters. So this suggests another area for future further 
research. 
 
Third, although this research showed that the forms of collective action have expanded 
with the increase in number and variety of actors, its central focus was kept at the level 
of DAC members and their own collective action. Hence, interviews were not 
conducted with non-DAC donors or recipient governments. From one perspective this 
may have limited the inquiry into collective action, because these other actors now 
participate in international aid or development cooperation and contribute to the aid and 
development effectiveness agendas. Nevertheless, this restriction enabled a more 
in-depth comparison of two DAC members, namely the UK and Japan. Moreover, other 
actors outside the traditional DAC members were included in the analysis, which 
discussed their influence on DAC members, as well as on (changing) forms of 
collective action in the DAC. 
 
Each of these limitations points to possibilities for future research. Compared to other 
international organisations, the DAC may be seen as a talking-shop which does not 
                                                 
7
 For instance, chapter 6 introduced an alternative way to assess quality of donors’ Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) conducted annually by Centre for Global Development. 
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yield practical results, because it does not have financial tools to provide aid to 
developing countries, and dwells on policy discussions instead. As the scope of this 
thesis is limited to studying collective action in the DAC – that is to say, whether it 
agrees on what it does and whether it does what it says – assessing the DAC’s impact on 
the volume and quality of aid provides yet one more important candidate for further 
research. There is at least a possibility that even when the DAC does what it says, the 
donors’ aid provision and/or its effectiveness might not actually improve very much in 
practice. In addition, and especially given the growing impact of non-DAC members, 
the question of how DAC policies are implemented at recipient country level with the 
involvement of non-DAC actors should be followed up, too. This could help furnish 
more insights into the interactions between DAC members and emerging countries on 
the ground. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined the existence, levels and forms of collective action by 
assessing four indicators (meetings and members, agreement, implementation, and 
monitoring), and concludes that the DAC achieves collective action to some extent. 
Evidence for the first two indicators supports this finding, though assessing 
implementation as part of collective action is more complicated. Agreement does not 
necessarily lead to implementation, and not all the agreed policies or guidance include 
specific monitoring mechanisms to establish the level of compliance.  
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The grounds on which the findings about indicators of collective action are based can be 
linked with the conditions for collective action: that is, the conditions that make it 
possible and help explain it when it does take place. Favourable relationships among the 
members facilitate agreement, because DAC’s decision-making is based on members’ 
consensus. The Secretariat’s ability to balance the members’ differences is a 
supplementary condition that can help dispel feelings of unfairness or mistrust between 
members, which would hamper collective action. Maintaining trust between members 
and the Secretariat is also important here. Leadership by some members in advancing 
the agenda may be necessary if agreements are to be initiated and reached, although 
when leaders run too fast or the gap between leaders and followers becomes too deep, 
the trust relationship may be undermined, to the detriment of collective action.  
 
The implementation process brings complications; and this is connected to the gap that 
may exist between agreement and implementation. In order to achieve an agreement, the 
details of the content are not drawn too tightly, which makes it easier for all members to 
agree. But precisely because of this looseness, there is scope for misunderstandings and 
disagreements about the details of agreement to emerge later, casting a shadow on 
implementation and potentially making collective action much weaker.  
 
In addition, the thesis demonstrated that while the DAC is a forum in which altruistic 
ways of aid provision are discussed, the processes of negotiation, agreement, 
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implementation and monitoring involve various motives of members and officials. Peer 
pressure on a country by other members is more effective when a majority of DAC 
members implement an agreed policy. The growing aid presence of non-DAC actors 
whose aid terms and conditions differ considerably from what the DAC aspires to 
achieve harbours the potential to harm DAC members’ own implementation. The 
recipient country level becomes a centre of implementation process, and makes 
collective action more challenging to assess and to achieve. Collective action in the 
DAC is changing because of this and because of the DAC’s transformation away from a 
closed donors’ club with a very limited membership, which formerly allowed the DAC 
to reach agreement grounded on fairly widely shared norms among its members. 
Balancing members’ sense of fairness as well as building relationships of trust among 
members and with the Secretariat will likely become more challenging in the future, 
owing to the structural transformation in the global aid scene that is underway. The 
thesis also maintained that both at the government level and the individual level, 
considerations of both rationality and social norms may exist. It is the mixture of these 
factors that represents members’ incentives and motivations. 
 
The three aims set out in the beginning of this thesis were achieved as follows. First, by 
examining collective action in the DAC this thesis has filled some knowledge gaps in 
academic literature on the DAC’s operational mechanisms (i.e., origin, purposes and 
meeting structure), organisational issues (i.e., role of the DAC in the wider international 
context and within the OECD), and specific issues (Shaping the 21
st
 Century report, aid 
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untying, and aid effectiveness). Second, this thesis has adopted an analytical lens of 
collective action in examining the DAC. The theoretical framework provided 
justification for using the collective action lens in analysing an international 
organisation like the DAC in the pursuit of global governance. It has been shown that 
this analytical lens is a useful tool to reveal the inner logic of the DAC, especially 
exposing the complex reality of the DAC and the intricate incentives of the actors, 
which is the third purpose of this thesis.  
 
The thesis’s research design was instrumental in achieving these aims. The comparison 
between aid untying and aid effectiveness chapters brought out some similarities in the 
conditions for collective action, such as favourable relations among members and the 
Secretariat’s contribution. The studies also revealed some contrasts, such as in regard to 
policy implementation. The thesis built on these empirical findings to make theoretical 
points pertinent to (explaining) collective action. The comparison between Japan and 
the UK also brought some illuminating distinctions, most notably with regard to their 
incentives for interacting with the DAC, the roles they play in the DAC (i.e., leader and 
follower), and their domestic conditions that either underpin or undermine collective 
action in the DAC. The choice of research methodology – both the semi-structured elite 
interviews and the archival research – contributed substantial new empirical knowledge 
about the DAC and helped uncover some of the complex realities there. The interviews 
were especially helpful on the conditions for collective action; OECD documents 
provided firm evidence on what has happened mainly on the indicators of collective 
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action. These original empirical findings form an essential counterpart to the analytical 
framework provided by the idea of collective action. 
 
As introduced in chapter 1, the global aid architecture is changing, and so is the DAC. 
Hitherto the DAC has played a major role in setting norms and rules for ODA, so that 
common objectives for global interest are shared. The DAC connected members around 
the image of altruism as being appropriate to the status of ‘proper’ donors. Some 
members (UK) exerted leadership to gain a good image, whereas others (Japan) joined 
in search of international status. For a long time, aid was provided almost exclusively 
by DAC donors, which is why the DAC could be at the centre of the global aid 
architecture: what was discussed and agreed there seemed relevant to all international 
aid. It is probably fair to say that the global aid architecture of the last fifty years would 
have been different without the DAC.  
 
The arrival of new actors is changing this. Donors are now categorised into at least two 
groups (DAC and non-DAC), and aid recipients too are becoming more diverse (some 
low-income countries developed into middle-income countries, and emerging countries 
declare themselves as recipient countries). Other kinds of actors including civil society 
organisations (CSOs) have increased their activities both in aid provision and policy 
advocacy. The increase in numbers of different actors diversifies the motivations behind 
aid and development cooperation. The DAC moved members’ motivations towards 
more altruistic purposes, but the emerging countries’ aid is based more on self or 
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national interest.  
 
The DAC will have to reflect anew on how best to achieve a common objective of 
providing global public goods (in the shape of more and better aid). The process of 
achieving collective action will be more difficult. The difficulties will likely begin at the 
very beginning of the process of setting up meetings and agenda-setting and continue 
through the involvement of new actors in the deliberative processes, as these actors have 
different interests or may not want to be formally a part of DAC processes anyway. 
Compared to the past the chances that the agreement process will be energised by a 
unilateral leader (such as the UK) with many followers look slimmer, in the face of a 
need to engage multiple groups of actors with divergent motivations and incentives.  
 
Finally, what is the future of the DAC? As remarked in the thesis Introduction, some 
have called the DAC a classic sunset organisation, coming to the end of its role in the 
international aid architecture, while others think the DAC will remain relevant once 
reformed.
8
 But the DAC will only survive if it can provide a forum that other 
organisations do not and cannot offer and if the members still find it useful. One 
possibility would be to restrict participation in DAC meetings to formal members only, 
but the already considerable impact made by non-DAC emerging countries makes this 
look untenable. Instead, the DAC will have to explore new ways of inviting and 
embracing new and different actors, and reflect on how the global public good of more 
                                                 
8
 See page 5 in Introduction chapter. 
350 
 
and better aid can be served notwithstanding the overt presence of self or national 
interest. This is a challenge not just for the DAC, but in respect of global governance in 
international aid more generally, and it sets terms of reference for the continuing quest 
for collective action in aid and the global aid architecture in the future. 
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Annex A: Background on Japan and UK 
 (OECD/DAC, aid profile, and literature) 
 
 
1. Basic information on OECD/DAC with regard to Japan and UK 
 Japan UK 
Year of DAC membership 1961 1961 
Number of staff from HQs at Permanent 
Delegation to OECD (as of Jan, 2013) 
39 Diplomatic Staff  
31 Administrative 
Staff 
11 Diplomatic Staff 
10 Administrative 
Staff 
Percentage shares of OECD Part I budget 
contributions (2014) 12.86% 5.24% 
Voluntary Contribution to DAC activities 
(2011-12) EUR 107,000 EUR 1,624,000 
Number of times took (co) Chairmanship of 
DAC subsidiary body meetings (since later 
1970s to 2012) 3 vice chair’s  17 (co) chairs 
Source: OECD Event Management System (accessed Jan, 2013); 
http://www.oecd.org/about/budget/member-countries-budget-contributions.htm 
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2. Brief Aid Profile of Japan and UK 
 
 Japan UK 
Aid 
administration 
・Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Policy level) 
・Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (Implementation level) 
Department for  
International Development 
(Cabinet-ranked Secretary) 
ODA volume 
(2012, disbursement) 
USD 10,605 million 
<ODA/GNI: 0.17%> 
USD 13,892 million 
<ODA/GNI: 0.56%> 
% of loan aid 
(2012 disbursement) 
                   41% 3% 
Geographical 
allocation 
1. Other Asia & Oceania (31.9%) 
2. South & Central Asia (26.5%) 
1. South of Sahara (37.3%) 
2. South & Central Asia (20.5%) 
Sectoral allocation 1. Economic infrastructure (41.5%) 
2. Other Social Infrastructure (15.8%) 
1. Education, Health & Population 
(29.6%) 
2. Other Social Infrastructure (20.2%) 
Periodical trend 
of ODA volume  
(DAC ranking, 
disbursement) 
1980: 3
rd
 (USD 3,353 million) 
1990: 2
nd
 (USD 9,068 million) 
2000: 1
st
 (USD 13,507 million) 
2010: 5
th
 (USD 11,057 million) 
1980: 5
th
 (USD 1,854 million) 
1990: 6
th
 (USD 2,638 million) 
2000: 4
th
 (USD 4,501 million) 
2010: 2
nd
 (USD 13,052 million) 
Source: OECD Statistics (http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.htm) 
Note: 2011-12 average unless otherwise stated. 
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3. Overview of literature on Japan and UK’s aid 
 
As Japan’s ODA volume was growing during 1960s and 70s, quite a log of monographs, 
edited books and articles are written in English on Japanese aid during 1980s and 90s, 
most of which were by American academics. There were myths about Japan’s aid 
among the West nations (White, 1964, p.5), and trying to unpack its motives and aid 
provisions that were different from the West. The ways that these literature were written 
mirror current upsurge of academic research of emerging countries, notably China and 
India. 
 
There are three main themes that characterise Japan’s aid in these literatures. First, the 
main determinant of Japanese aid policy is its bureaucratic autonomy and interest of 
different Ministries involved in Japanese aid (see Rix, 1980; Orr, 1990; Arase 1995; 
Lancaster, 2007). For instance, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs all have different responsibilities with regard to 
aid policy making based on each ministry’s interest, and Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) takes the responsibility of implementation. Because of this, 
Japan’s aid management system is regarded as “the most complicated and opaque 
system of aid administration of any donor” (Arase, 2005, p.6).  
 
Second, the motive of Japan’s aid has been referred to as commercially-oriented with a 
geographical focus of Asia (see White 1964; Koppel & Orr, 1993). The regional focus is 
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strongly related to the origin of Japan’s aid as it started as compensation for the World 
War II to its neighbouring countries (Hook, 1995). However, as aid provision to Asian 
countries was combined with trade and investment by private sector (Söderberg, 1996), 
Japan’s aid was seen as “Third World resource nationalism” (Arase, 1995, p.35). Tied 
aid was commonly researched and associated with Japanese aid. 
 
Thirdly, however, recent literature indicate a shift and new trend of Japanese aid. From 
1990s onward, Japanese government reformed its aid management system and policies 
towards converging into global norms such as human security (Arase, 2005; Leheny & 
Warren, 2010; Lancaster, 2010). Yet, most of these literature identify the peculiarity of 
Japan’s aid which has been divergent from the DAC norms such as the concept of 
ownership (Jerve, Shimomura & Hansen, 2008; Takahashi, 2010) differentiating it from 
others as Japan’s ODA model (Menocal, Denny & Geddes, 2011; Kim & Potter, 2012). 
 
In contrast to large volume of literature on Japanese aid, UK’s aid literature is 
surprisingly few not attracting so much academic interest on its own, presumably 
because it is a member of European Union and has been researched as one of the 
European countries. Also, unlike Japan’s aid, most of British aid literature has been 
written by British academics. 
 
During early decades, the British aid shared the common features as Japan’s aid. British 
aid was prioritised to former colonial countries and the ways of aid provision was not so 
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much different from the colonial time (Little & Clifford, 1965). The self-interest 
component had constantly been associated with British aid (Bose & Burnell, 1991), and 
British tied aid was especially researched during later 1980s and 90s (May, Schumacher 
& Malek, 1989; Morrissey, Smith & Horesh, 1992; Toye, 1991) 
 
The turning point of the UK’s aid literature is in 1997 when the new labour government 
took power. Soon after DFID published its White Paper in 1998, Journal of 
International Development issued a special issue on the White Paper by academics 
offering critical perspectives as well as expectations (White, 1998). Scholars since then 
have emphasised the successes of British aid and DFID as a leading model among 
donors (Vereker, 2002; Barder, 2005; Morrissey, 2005). During 2013, two more 
important books were published by former high ranked civil servants on British tied aid 
(Lankester) and on British aid policies (Ireton).  
 
Finally, literature making comparison of Japan and the UK exclusively is very few (see 
Seddon, 2005; Hashimoto, 2010). 
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Annex B: List of Interviewees 
 
Name of interviewee Position of interviewee
1
  Place of 
interview 
Date of 
interview 
Motoyuki Ishize Counsellor (DAC Delegate),  
Permanent Delegation of Japan to the 
OECD 
Paris 18
th
 May, 
2011 
Gerardo Bracho DAC Delegate,  
Permanent Mission of Mexico to the 
OECD 
Paris 18
th
 May, 
2011 
Anna Paula Fernandes DAC Delegate,  
Permanent Mission of Portugal to the 
OECD (DAC Vice Chair) 
Paris 19
th
 May, 
2011 
Andrew Mold Senior Economist,  
OECD Development Centre 
Paris 20
th
 May, 
2011 
Naoki Yokobayashi Special Assistant for Economic 
Cooperation Issues,  
Country Assistance Planning Division II, 
International Cooperation Bureau, 
Japanese MoFA 
Osaka, 
Japan 
30
th
 Dec, 
2011 
Motoki Takahashi Professor,  
Graduate School of International 
Cooperation Studies, Kobe University 
Kobe, 
Japan 
6
th
 Jan, 
2012 
Takumo Yamada Advocacy Manager,  
Oxfam Japan 
Tokyo 10
th
 Jan, 
2012 
Yasutami Shimomura Professor Emeritus,  
Hosei University 
Tokyo 10
th
 Jan, 
2012 
Mamoru Endo Senior Consultant,  
Because Institute Co., Ltd. 
(former JANIC policy advisor) 
Tokyo 11
th
 Jan, 
2012 
Ikufumi Tomimoto Visiting Senior Advisor,  
Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(former Chief Representative, Japan 
International Cooperation Agency, France 
Office ) 
Tokyo 11
th
 Jan, 
2012 
                                                 
1
 The positions indicated both in this list and in the citations are at time of the interview date.  
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Michio Watanabe Economist,  
Director, Operations Department, 
International Development Center of 
Japan 
Tokyo 11
th
 Jan, 
2012 
Yasuo Kurata Assistant Chief Researcher,  
Office of the Commission on the 
Constitution, House of Councillors 
Tokyo 12
th
 Jan, 
2012 
Ryutaro Murotani Research Associate,  
JICA Research Institute 
Tokyo 13
th
 Jan, 
2012 
Kiyotaka Takahashi Research & Policy Manager,  
Japan International Volunteer Center 
Tokyo 13
th
 Jan, 
2012 
Sayoko Uesu Research Associate,  
National Graduate Institute for Policy 
Studies 
Tokyo 17
th
 Jan, 
2012 
Izumi Ohno Professor,  
National Graduate Institute for Policy 
Studies 
Tokyo 17
th
 Jan, 
2012 
Masaki Ijiri,  
Tatsushi Ogita,  
Isao Endo, Sosuke Ota, 
Kei Sato 
Consultants,  
Social Security and Economics Division, 
Mizuho Information & Research Institute, 
Inc. 
Tokyo 18
th
 Jan, 
2012 
Mitsuaki Furukawa Senior Research Fellow,  
JICA Research Institute 
Tokyo 19
th
 Jan, 
2012 
Yukiko Okano Counsellor (DAC Delegate),  
Permanent Delegation of Japan to the 
OECD 
Paris 21
st
 Feb, 
2012 
Tatsuhiro Mitamura First Secretary (DAC Team),  
Permanent Delegation of Japan to the 
OECD 
Paris 21
st
 Feb, 
2012 
Shoji Hitoshi Chief Representative,  
Japan International Cooperation Agency, 
France Office 
Paris 22
nd
 Feb, 
2012 
William Nicol Senior Counsellor,  
Development Co-operation Directorate, 
OECD 
Paris 24
th
  Feb, 
2012 
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Masato Hayashikawa Policy Analyst  
(Policy division of Aid for Trade),  
Development Co-operation Directorate, 
OECD 
Paris 24
th
 Feb, 
2012 
Frans Lammersen  Principal Administrator  
(Policy division of Aid for Trade),  
Development Co-operation Directorate, 
OECD 
Paris 28
th
 Feb, 
2012 
Chantal Verger Senior Policy Analyst (Review, Evaluation 
and Engagement Division), Development 
Co-operation Directorate, OECD 
Paris 29
th
 Feb, 
2012 
 
Stephan Massing Policy Analyst (Policy division of 
Peaceful & Capable States), Development 
Co-operation Directorate, OECD 
Paris 29
th
 Feb, 
2012 
Michael Ward Senior Policy Analyst (Review, Evaluation 
and Engagement Division), Development 
Co-operation Directorate, OECD 
Paris 1
st
 March, 
2012 
Kaori Miyamoto Counsellor (Policy division of Policy 
Coherence for Development), 
Development Co-operation Directorate, 
OECD 
Paris 1
st
 March, 
2012 
Frode Neergaard Deputy Permanent Representative  
(DAC Delegate), Permanent Delegation of 
Denmark to the OECD 
Paris 2
nd
 March, 
2012 
Richard Carey Consultant (Former Director of 
Development Co-operation Directorate, 
OECD) 
Paris 2
nd
 March, 
2012 
Debbie Warrener Consultant,  
Catalysing Change Agents (Former DFID 
official) 
London 12
th
 March, 
2012 
Keiichi Yokota Director,  
Development Assistance Policy Planning 
Division, International Cooperation 
Bureau, Japanese MoFA 
Tokyo 9
th
 April, 
2012 
Yoshitaka Hoshino Director,  
South America Division, Japanese MoFA 
(Former Japanese DAC delegate) 
Tokyo 9
th
 April, 
2012 
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Shunichiro Honda Research Associate,  
JICA Research Institute 
Tokyo 10
th
 April, 
2012 
Shinji Watanabe Deputy Director,  
Development Assistance Policy Planning 
Division, International Cooperation 
Bureau, Japanese MoFA 
Tokyo 11
th
 April, 
2012 
Norio Hattori Former Ambassador,  
Permanent Delegation of Japan to the 
OECD 
Tokyo 12
th
 April, 
2012 
Makoto Asai Deputy Director,  
Office for Global Issues and Development 
Partnerships,  
Operations Strategy Department,  
Japan International Cooperation Agency 
Tokyo 12
th
 April, 
2012 
Mitsuya Araki President,  
The International Development Journal 
Co., Ltd. 
Tokyo 13
th
 April, 
2012 
Keidanren officials 
(Kiyotaka Morita, 
Motohiro Sakai, 
Hiroyuki Soejima, 
Yumi Shimmyo,  
Tomoe Nishikawa) 
Managers and officials, 
International Cooperation Bureau, 
Keidanren 
Tokyo 13
th
 April, 
2012 
Shigeru Kanda Chief Researcher, Research Office,  
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and Defence, House of Councillors 
Tokyo 13
th
 April, 
2012 
Shigeaki Kanayama Deputy Director,  
Development Policy Division, 
International Bureau,  
Japanese Ministry of Finance 
Tokyo 17
th
 April, 
2012 
Tsuneo Sugishita President,  
Foundation for Advanced Studies on 
International Development  
Tokyo 17
th
 April, 
2012 
Mitsuhiro Maeda Professor,  
Advanced Institute of Industrial 
Technology (Former Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry official) 
Tokyo 17
th
 April, 
2012 
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Masato Watanabe Vice President,  
Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(Former Deputy Director-General, 
International Cooperation Bureau, 
Japanese MoFA) 
Tokyo 19
th
 April, 
2012 
Naoko Ueda Principle Deputy Director,  
Climate Change Division, Global Issues 
Cooperation Division, Japanese MoFA 
Tokyo 19
th
 April, 
2012 
Hiroshi Sato Director-General,  
Research Planning Department,  
Institute of Development Economies 
(President, Japan Society for International 
Development) 
Chiba, 
Japan 
20
th
 April, 
2012 
Shinichi Takeuchi Senior Research Fellow,  
African Studies Group,  
Area Studies Centre,  
Institute of Development Economies 
(Visiting Fellow, JICA Research Institute) 
Chiba, 
Japan 
20
th
 April, 
2012 
Mitsuru Kitano Assistant Vice-Minister,  
Minister’s Secretariat, Japanese MoFA 
Phone 
interview 
20
th
 April, 
2012 
Kimiaki Jin Chief Representative,  
Japan International Cooperation Agency, 
UK Office 
London 4
th
 July, 
2012 
Roland Fox DFID official  
(Former DAC delegate of UK) 
London 18
th
   Sep, 
2012 
Roger Riddell Associate Consultant, 
Oxford Policy Management 
Skype 
interview 
24
th
 Sep, 
2012 
Richard Jolly Research Associate (Honorary Professor),  
Institute of Development Studies, 
University of Sussex 
Phone 
interview 
25
th
 Sep, 
2012 
Alan Hudson Director,  
ONE 
London 25
th
 Sep, 
2012 
Adrian Hewitt Senior Research Associate,  
Overseas Development Institute 
(Head of the ODI Fellowship Scheme) 
London 26
th
 Sep, 
2012 
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Simon Maxwell Senior Research Associate,  
Overseas Development Institute 
(Former Director of ODI) 
Skype 
interview 
1
st
 Oct, 
2012 
Howard White Executive Director,  
International Initiative for Impact 
Evaluation (3ie) (Former IDS fellow) 
London 1
st
 Oct, 
2012 
Ed Clay Senior Research Associate,  
Overseas Development Institute 
Skype 
interview 
3
rd
 Oct, 
2012 
Alison Evans Director,  
Overseas Development Institute 
London 5
th
 Oct, 
2012 
Jonathan Glennie Research Fellow,  
Overseas Development Institute 
Skype 
interview 
5
th
 Oct, 
2012 
Nick York Deputy Director and Chief Professional 
Officer for Evaluation, DFID 
Phone 
interview 
10
th
 Oct, 
2012 
Judith Randel Director,  
Development Initiatives 
Phone 
interview 
10
th
 Oct, 
2012 
Andrew Rogerson Senior Research Associate,  
Overseas Development Institute  
(Former Counsellor of Development 
Co-operation Directorate, OECD) 
London 11
th
 Oct, 
2012 
Claire Godfrey Policy Advisor,  
Oxfam GB 
Phone 
interview 
11
th
 Oct, 
2012 
Stephen Browne Visiting Senior Fellow,  
Ralph Bunche Institute for International 
Studies, Graduate Center,  
City University of New York 
Skype 
interview 
12
th
 Oct, 
2012 
Kevin Gardner Team Aid Effectiveness,  
DFID 
Phone 
interview 
12
th
 Oct, 
2012 
Tony Addison Chief Economist/Deputy Director,  
United Nations University (WIDER) 
London 3
rd
 Nov, 
2012 
Rosalind Eyben Professorial Fellow,  
Institute of Development Studies, 
University of Sussex  
(Former DFID official) 
London 3
rd
 Nov, 
2012 
Gideon Rabinowitz Research officer,  
Overseas Development Institute (Former 
coordinator of UKAN) 
London 4
th
 Nov, 
2012 
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Karin Christiansen General Secretary,  
Co-operative Party (Former ODI Research 
Fellow, Former Managing Director of 
Publish What You Fund) 
London 5
th
 Nov, 
2012 
Clare Short Former Secretary of State, DFID Phone 
interview 
13
th
 Nov, 
2012 
Aiichiro Yamamoto Principal Representative to the European 
Union,  
JICA 
London 16
th
 Nov, 
2012 
Brian Atwood DAC Chair, 
Development Assistance Committee, 
OECD 
Phone 
interview 
10
th
 Dec, 
2012 
Myles Wickstead Visiting Professor,  
Open University (Former DFID and 
Foreign and Common Wealth Office 
official) 
London 11
th
 Dec, 
2012 
Dominic Martin Director of G8,  
Cabinet Office (Former Ambassador, 
Permanent Delegation of UK to OECD) 
London 18
th
 Dec, 
2012 
Martinus Desmet  Health expert,  
Belgium Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Former DAC Delegate, Permanent 
Delegation of Belgium to OECD) 
Skype 
interview 
26
th
 Dec, 
2012 
Rintaro Tamaki Deputy Secretary-General, 
OECD 
Paris 11
th
 Jan, 
2013 
William Hynes Policy Analyst,  
(Policy division of Aid for Trade), 
Development Co-operation Directorate, 
OECD 
Paris 14
th
 Jan, 
2013 
Karen Jorgensen Head of Review, Evaluation and 
Engagement Division, Development 
Co-operation Directorate, OECD 
Paris 14
th
 Jan, 
2013 
Jon Lomøy Director,  
Development Co-operation Directorate, 
OECD 
Paris 15
th
 Jan, 
2013 
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Dirk Dijkerman Special Advisor  
(OECD Development Strategy),  
Development Co-operation Directorate, 
OECD (Former DAC Delegate of US) 
Paris 15
th
 Jan, 
2013 
William Nicol Senior Counsellor,  
Development Co-operation Directorate, 
OECD 
Paris 18
th
 Jan, 
2013 
Motohide Yoshikawa Ambassador, 
Permanent Delegation of Japan to OECD 
Paris 21
st
 Jan, 
2013 
Yukiko Okano  Counsellor (DAC Delegate),  
Permanent Delegation of Japan to the 
OECD 
Paris 21
st
 Jan, 
2013 
Sungsoo Choi Counsellor (DAC Delegate),  
Permanent Delegation of Korea to the 
OECD 
Paris 22
nd
 Jan, 
2013 
 
Note: Yukiko Okano specified that her interview was given in a personal capacity and that her 
comments in citations do not represent official Japanese government policy. 
